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Abstract
According to the doctrine of informed consent, research participants have a right to voluntarily decide
whether to enroll in a study and to do so with an adequate understanding of what participation entails
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). Mirroring these rights, investigators have a moral obligation to give people
the facts that are most critical to their choices (Fischhoff, 2011). Yet, theory-based analytical tools for
determining which information is likely to have the largest impact on participation decisions are
underdeveloped. Lacking a basis to prioritize elements of disclosure for distinct audiences, the length and
complexity of consent documents has increased over time. Ironically, these improvements may have hindered
comprehension and people's access to the information they need to make informed choices.
According to the reasoned action model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010), decisions to participate in genomics
research--like any other behavior--are driven by a limited number of factors. In this dissertation, consequences
of participating that readily came to mind for respondents were expected to have a larger impact on attitudes
and intentions to participate in genomics research than were nonsalient consequences. Moreover, customized
messages designed to target salient versus nonsalient beliefs were expected to have larger effects on attitude
and intention. Based on media priming theory (e.g., Price & Tewksbury, 1997), plausible downstream effects
on belief salience resulting from message exposure were also explored, as was the conditional effect of salience
on belief change ( Jaccard, 1981).
An open-ended belief elicitation in Study 1 revealed audience segments with different motivations for
participating in a genetic biobank. Contributing to the greater good was especially salient for some
respondents, while receiving personal test results was salient for others. In Study 2, an experimental design
was used to test the conditional effects of segment-targeted messages on belief strength, attitudes and
intentions toward participating in a fictional genomic research project. Both studies suggested that salient
behavior-related beliefs had a larger influence on people's participation decisions. Results from Study 2 further
indicated that salient beliefs might also be more difficult to change. Theoretical and practical implications for
fostering informed consent in large-scale genomic research are discussed.
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ABSTRACT  
CUSTOMIZING MESSAGE CONTENT TO FACILITATE DECISIONS ABOUT 
PARTICIPATING IN GENOMICS RESEARCH: A REASONED ACTION APPROACH 
Ryan S. Paquin 
Joseph N. Cappella 
According to the doctrine of informed consent, research participants have a right 
to voluntarily decide whether to enroll in a study and to do so with an adequate 
understanding of what participation entails (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009).  Mirroring 
these rights, investigators have a moral obligation to give people the facts that are most 
critical to their choices (Fischhoff, 2011).  Yet, theory-based analytical tools for 
determining which information is likely to have the largest impact on participation 
decisions are underdeveloped. Lacking a basis to prioritize elements of disclosure for 
distinct audiences, the length and complexity of consent documents has increased over 
time. Ironically, these improvements may have hindered comprehension and people’s 
access to the information they need to make informed choices. 
According to the reasoned action model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010), decisions to 
participate in genomics research—like any other behavior—are driven by a limited 
number of factors.  In this dissertation, consequences of participating that readily came 
to mind for respondents were expected to have a larger impact on attitudes and 
intentions to participate in genomics research than were nonsalient consequences.  
Moreover, customized messages designed to target salient versus nonsalient beliefs were 
expected to have larger effects on attitude and intention.  Based on media priming theory 
(e.g., Price & Tewksbury, 1997), plausible downstream effects on belief salience resulting 
from message exposure were also explored, as was the conditional effect of salience on 
belief change (Jaccard, 1981).   
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An open-ended belief elicitation in Study 1 revealed audience segments with 
different motivations for participating in a genetic biobank.  Contributing to the greater 
good was especially salient for some respondents, while receiving personal test results 
was salient for others.  In Study 2, an experimental design was used to test the 
conditional effects of segment-targeted messages on belief strength, attitudes and 
intentions toward participating in a fictional genomic research project.  Both studies 
suggested that salient behavior-related beliefs had a larger influence on people’s 
participation decisions.  Results from Study 2 further indicated that salient beliefs might 
also be more difficult to change.  Theoretical and practical implications for fostering 
informed consent in large-scale genomic research are discussed. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
The doctrine of informed consent entails that researchers and clinicians have a 
moral obligation to disclose information to potential research participants and patients. 
Where disclosure standards are concerned, an emphasis has been placed on determining 
how much information must be disclosed to foster effective decision making (Jessica 
Berg, Appelbaum, Lidz, & Parker, 2001).  Indeed, it is commonly held that prospective 
research participants and patients are entitled to receive enough information to enable 
them to make voluntary and comprehending choices (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; A. 
L. McGuire & Beskow, 2010).  Some theorists have been particularly indiscriminate in 
establishing the scope of this obligation, claiming that anything short of complete 
disclosure violates the rights of those from whom consent is being sought (Kottow, 
2004).  Others have been more pragmatic, acknowledging that much of the information 
people could learn about a research project or clinical procedure is not necessary for 
attaining valid informed consent (J. Baron, 2006; Veatch, 2007; Wendler & Grady, 
2008). 
 Interestingly, much less attention has been given to what disclosed information 
should specifically be about.  Institutional codes of ethics and legal frameworks have 
defined general categories of information that disclosure procedures should address.  
However, as regulatory guidelines, these standards refer to general categories of 
information.  In that sense, they provide only rough guides for determining what 
potential research participants and patients should understand about an intervention 
before valid consent can be granted or withheld.  To meet these standards in practice, 
researchers and clinicians have erred on the side of providing increasingly detailed and 
specific information about proposed procedures (Manson & O’Neill, 2007).  However, 
providing greater amounts of information does not necessarily translate into more 
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effective informed consent (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Fischhoff, 2011).  A more 
fundamental and pragmatic question remains largely unaddressed: On what basis can a 
piece of information be classified as relevant or irrelevant to a decision?  
Several recent articles (Boddington, 2010; Caulfield et al., 2008; Lunshof, 
Chadwick, Vorhaus, & Church, 2008; Ormand et al., 2008; A. L. McGuire & Beskow, 
2010; A. L. McGuire, Caulfield & Cho, 2008; Tabor, Berkman, Hull, & Bamshad, 2011) 
have argued that progress in the field of human genomics presents a challenge to current 
ways of thinking about informed consent.  These challenges are amplified by the 
increased availability of multiplex genetic tests and genome-wide sequencing techniques.  
At the most advanced level, these testing platforms are capable of simultaneously 
generating personalized data on an unfathomable number of genetic variants and 
thousands of health conditions (Bunnik, Schermer, & Janssens, 2011; Schloss, 2011).  
Moreover, contemporary genomics is characterized by rapid change and great 
uncertainty.  Even in the short-term, it is not possible to fully foresee what can be 
learned about a person through an analysis of her DNA, who will have access to the data 
or how that information will be used.  Practices that involve generating, storing and 
using personal genomic information simply do not map well onto the dominant consent 
model.  Requirements to provide specific disclosure cannot be met because the specifics 
are largely unknown. The integration of these technologies into research protocols, 
clinical practice and consumer services strain conventional notions of how to facilitate 
informed consent and autonomous choice (Jonathan Berg, Khoury, & Evans, 2011; 
Ormand et al., 2010).  
In this regard, it is important to recognize that there is a critical difference 
between (a) defining a universal set of information, which if understood, would be 
sufficient for anybody to make an informed choice in a given context, and (b) identifying 
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information that if misunderstood would guarantee that a person remains uninformed 
about a possible course of action.  The dominant perspective in the informed consent 
literature has emphasized the former goal. Unfortunately, under the current norms the 
amount of information required for a sufficient disclosure increases with the complexity 
of the decision context. As an extension of this, choices that involve personal genome 
profiling do not fit well with the aims of specific consent.  Rather than focus on the 
problem of determining which information would be sufficient for an adequate 
disclosure, it is useful to recognize that some facts may be more relevant to people’s 
decisions than other kinds of information. A central premise of this dissertation is that 
inaccurate and mistaken beliefs are a barrier to informed consent, but only if people act 
on the basis of those beliefs.  Accordingly, consent procedures should be oriented toward 
addressing the beliefs upon which an action or choice is based.   
Understanding the cognitive basis of peoples’ decisions to participate in research 
involving the production of personal genome profiles is important for selecting and 
prioritizing the content of consent materials.  As has been noted by Beauchamp and 
Childress (2009), the bioethical principles underlying informed consent suggest that the 
disclosure process should address decision makers’ informational needs.  To the extent 
that these needs differ within a population, identifying sub-groups of similar individuals 
and delivering targeted disclosure materials may be an appropriate communication 
strategy.  However, systematically determining those informational needs, how 
individualized they are in practice, and whether disclosure materials can be effectively 
customized remain open questions.  
To address this crucial gap in the literature, I draw on the reasoned action model 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) and its implications for developing communication-based 
behavior change interventions.  The cognitive underpinnings of this model align with the 
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normative perspective that disclosure procedures should be guided by decision makers’ 
expectations, values and preferences.  Conceptually, messages that strategically appeal to 
the unique behavior-related beliefs of a specific, well-defined audience are expected to 
have a greater influence on behavior than messages that are designed to address the 
general informational needs of a broad population (Hobbis & Sutton, 2005).  Evidence 
supporting this basic theoretical proposition would provide empirical ground for 
favoring customized consent procedures, and would offer direction on how to create 
them.  I also consider the implications of media priming theory (e.g., Cappella, Fishbein, 
Hornik, Ahern, & Sayeed, 2000) in relation to defining an audience’s informational 
needs.   
In Study 1, subjects from a random population-based sample were asked to list 
the perceived advantages and disadvantages of participating in a genetic biobank.  
Responses from this belief elicitation were then used to define distinct audience 
segments with different motivations for participating.  Results from this study were used 
to inform the development of customized disclosure messages designed to meet the 
unique informational needs of these audience segments.  In Study 2, subjects were 
randomly assigned to receive different versions of the disclosure materials.  The aim was 
to test the impact of content matching on respondents’ beliefs, attitudes and intentions 
to participate in a fictional genomic research study, called the SEQOME Project.  The 
implications for adopting audience segmentation and message customization strategies 
to foster informed consent in large-scale genomics research are discussed. 
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CHAPTER T WO: PERSONAL GENOME PROFILING  AND  
THE CHALLENGE OF INFORMED CONSENT  
Recent technological advances have made it feasible to study the genomic causes 
of common health conditions and other traits on a massive scale.  In contrast, efforts to 
understand the relationship between gene variation and health prior to the completion of 
the Human Genome Project in 2003 were restricted primarily to rare monogenetic 
conditions (i.e., Mendelian conditions).  Yet, common complex diseases that have the 
greatest impact on public health are caused by interactions among multiple genes and 
environmental factors (Farkas & Holland, 2009).  Accordingly, to better understand 
common diseases, like heart disease and cancer, it is necessary to look beyond single 
genes and their effects (i.e., genetics) to the impact of gene-by-gene and gene-by-
environment interactions (i.e., genomics; see Guttmacher & Collins, 2002).  Innovations 
in the field of human genomics have resulted in the development of new forms of 
genome-wide techniques that simultaneously compile data about millions of variants 
distributed across a person’s entire genome (i.e., personal genome profiling; Bunnik et 
al., 2011).1  From a single intervention, personal genome profiling generates information 
that may be relevant to multiple heritable phenotypes, like common multifactorial 
diseases and other observable traits.  Integration of personal genome profiles into 
routine clinical, research and public health practice is a major part of the vision for the 
field of genomics (Green, Guyer, & National Human Genome Research Institute 
[NHGRI], 2011). 
In this chapter, I contrast personal genome profiling with tests that focus on 
establishing a relationship between a single-gene and a single-condition.  Further, I 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 Although the vast majority (i.e., ~99.9%) of any given person’s DNA sequence is identical to that of anyone else’s, 
with roughly 3 billion base pairs in the human genome, the unique portion nonetheless constitutes several million 
points of possible variation (Guttmacher & Collins, 2002).   
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discuss how the characteristics of personal genome profiles complicate the informed 
consent process.  Although many of these issues are equally relevant to genome profiling 
in clinical and consumer contexts, I will focus primarily on decisions to participate in 
research that involves the generation and analysis of personal genome profiles.  Lastly, I 
argue that efforts to support informed consent would benefit from a descriptive 
understanding of the beliefs upon which people base their participation decisions. 
Advancing Technology:  
From Targeted Testing to Personal Genome Profiling  
Personal genome profiling is possible because of innovations in the development 
of high-density microarrays and, more recently, high-throughput genome sequencing 
technologies.  Applications of these technologies produce information that is far broader 
in scope than that associated with more traditional approaches to genetic testing.  
Briefly, sequencing is a process by which the exact nucleotide sequence (i.e., pairings of 
adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine) is determined for a given segment of an 
individual’s DNA (Feero, Guttmacher, & Collins, 2010; Sequence analysis, 2003; 
National Institutes of Health [NIH], 2011).  Sequence analyses may differ in method, as 
well as in how much of the genome is examined (Metzker, 2010; Su et al., 2011).  For 
example, sequencing can produce a record of an individual’s entire genome, a smaller 
portion of DNA—like a chromosome or single gene—or it can focus on select regions 
within and across genes (e.g., exons, or the functional portions of genes that encode for 
amino acids).  Sequencing a segment of DNA identifies virtually all of the nucleotides 
within that segment and can be used to identify genomic variation when compared with 
a reference sequence (i.e., genotyping).   
A microarray is also a technology used to study many points of variation at once, 
but it is less comprehensive in scope.  As explained by Feero et al. (2010), thousands of 
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known gene segments are placed at specific locations on a glass slide, or gene chip. A 
prepared tissue sample containing sections of DNA or RNA is then deposited on the 
slide. Microarrays are built on the principle that nucleotide bases from the sample will 
bind to complementary bases in the probe sequences embedded on the chip 
(Trachtenberg et al., 2012).  Specific sequences in the sample are then detected using a 
specialized measurement technique.  
As with sequencing, microarrays can be used to study a single gene in depth or 
many genes at once (e.g., a multiplex testing) depending on what the specific array was 
designed to detect.  A crucial point of difference between the two technologies is that 
microarray-based assays restrict genotyping to the probes that are embedded on the 
gene chip (Hurd & Nelson, 2009).  These represent a relatively small fraction of the 
nucleotide sequence making up the region being examined.  As a consequence, large gaps 
in the resulting genetic profile are introduced by design.  DNA sequencing, on the other 
hand, generates far more complete nucleotide-level information about the analyzed 
region (Schlötterer, 2004).  For example, a single high-density microarray with genome-
wide coverage is capable of detecting up to a million nucleotide-level variants distributed 
at intervals across the entire genome.2  In contrast, next-generation whole-genome 
sequencing (WGS) can be used to identify virtually all of the three billion base pairs of 
DNA in a person’s genome (Stokes, 2011).  
Continuous reductions in both cost and error rates are making it increasingly 
feasible to generate personal genome profiles using next-generation whole-genome 
sequencing technologies (Ball et al., 2012; Collins, 2010; Venter, 2010).  For example, at 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 In general, sequence variations can be classi!ed into one of three broad categories: (1) single-base-pair changes, 
which occur when one nitrogen-containing base is substituted by another in the DNA nucleotide sequence (e.g. 
adenine for guanine, cytosine or thymine); (2) insertions of one or more nucleotide into the sequence or deletions 
from it; and (3) structural rearrangements in which the order of nucleotides is changed in some manner (Feero et al., 
2010, p. 2003).   
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least one company now offers personal whole-genome sequencing services for as little as 
$7,500 per patient for clinical applications (Illumina, Inc., 2013) and to researchers for 
less than $4,000 per subject (Darcé, 2011).  Due to this shift in the relative cost 
effectiveness of sequencing techniques, microarray technologies are gradually being 
replaced or relegated to more specialized purposes (Trachtenberg et al., 2012).  
Generating and analyzing personal genome profiles for clinical and research 
purposes differs markedly from the way that genetic testing has been implemented in the 
past.  As Biesecker et al. (2009) explain, researchers and clinicians have traditionally 
taken a “hypothesis-testing approach” to genetic testing, where a person is tested for a 
small number of genetic variants known to be associated with a single condition or trait.  
Jonathan Berg et al. (2011) refer to this approach as a “one-gene-at-a-time” analysis and 
Bunnik et al. (2011) call it “targeted testing.”  This hypothesis testing approach follows 
the logic underpinning most clinical diagnostics that “no test should be performed on a 
patient unless the ordering physician understands the test, knows how to interpret the 
result, and will change diagnosis or management based on the alternative results” 
(Biesecker et al., 2009, p. 1673).  Likewise, for much of the past decade, genetic research 
protocols aimed at understanding the genetic basis of disease adopted a similar 
candidate gene approach.  Studies were designed around a specific set of hypotheses 
relating a relatively short section of the genome to a single disease or other phenotype 
(e.g., observable physical traits, dispositions, etc.).  Due to the type of assays used for 
genotyping, relatively little residual information was collected for any given subject.  
In contrast, personal genome profiles generated from large-scale sequencing 
contain a potentially unlimited number of test results from a single tissue sample.  In the 
case of personal, whole-genome sequencing, all the information from virtually every 
conceivable genetic test could be derived from a single assessment, and this information 
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can remain available for reinterpretation indefinitely (Ball et al., 2012; Mountain, 2011).  
In other words, personal genome profiling can proceed without any immediate clinical or 
research purpose in mind.  Moreover, the interpretability of data contained in a personal 
genome profile will change over time as evidence from translational research studies 
continues to accrue (Kohane, Masys, & Altman, 2006).  In this sense, personal genome 
profiles—especially those comprised of whole-genome sequencing data—are best viewed 
as general-purpose resources rather than tests (Biesecker, 2012).   
A Challenge to Informed Consent  
Personal genome profiles can be thought of as enormous, highly individualized 
datasets that are perpetually open to reanalysis.  Informed consent procedures for 
clinical testing and research participation do not scale well to practices that are 
characterized by so much uncertainty (Jonathan Berg et al., 2011; Bunnik et al., 2011; 
Lunshof et al., 2008).  Traditional standards of informed consent aim to ensure that 
participants enter into research voluntarily and that their decisions to enroll are based 
on enough information to constitute an adequate understanding of what participation 
entails; the same general requirements are held for patients deciding whether to undergo 
clinical procedures (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; A. L. McGuire & Beskow, 2010; 
Wendler, Prasad, Wilfond, 2002).   
Toward that end, domestic and international regulatory frameworks outline 
minimum disclosure requirements that cover several broad classes of information 
(Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences & World Health 
Organization, 2002; Protection of Human Subjects, 2009).  Many of the requirements 
defined for research and clinical contexts parallel each other.  For example, some 
common elements in both domains include information about the nature and purpose of 
the proposed procedure; a description of any foreseeable risks of harm that might result 
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from it; a disclosure of likely benefits to self or others; a statement that involvement in 
the procedure is completely voluntary; and any alternative treatments or courses of 
action that might be taken by the subject (Jessica Berg et al., 2001; LeBlang, Rosoff, & 
White, 2004).  In research contexts involving human subjects, some additional elements 
include language indicating that a participant may withdraw from the study at any time 
without penalty and the extent to which confidentiality of personally identifying 
information will be maintained.  Recent recommendations pertaining specifically to 
consent for research involving whole genome sequencing call for an explanation of what 
whole genome sequencing is; how data will be analyzed, stored, and shared; how it might 
be used in the future; and what kinds of results or other data might be returned to 
participants (Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, 2012). 
Regulatory obligations to disclose information in medical and research contexts 
are meant to achieve a higher-order bioethical imperative.  The primary ethical 
justification most often given for the doctrine of informed consent rests upon the 
principle of self-determination, or respect for autonomy (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; 
Jessica Berg et al., 2001; Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Katz, 2002; LeBlang et al., 2004).  
According to Katz (2002), self-determination consists of choice and reflection—the 
freedom to act and to think about how to act, respectively.  Echoing this perspective, J. 
Baron (2006) contends that showing respect for autonomy “implies that people should 
be able to make choices for themselves, after being fully informed” (p. 13).  From this it 
follows that one of the primary objectives of informed-consent procedures is to enable 
potential subjects to accurately assess the risks and benefits of a study so they may 
evaluate whether participation is consistent with their values (Boddington, 2010; W. C. 
Thompson, 1996).   
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 The challenge to informed consent posed by genomics research centers on the 
ability of regulatory practices and institutionalized guidelines to faithfully represent the 
moral interests that underpin those practices.  To clarify, Faden and Beauchamp (1986; 
see also Beauchamp & Childress, 2009) observe that “informed consent” has two 
meanings.  In the first sense, informed consent only occurs when a subject voluntarily 
authorizes his or her involvement in a proposed activity after thoughtful, reasoned, and 
informed deliberation.  The informed consent process implied by this sense of the term 
can be thought of as a moral ideal closely aligned with autonomous choice.  In the second 
sense, informed consent occurs whenever the rules that have been established to define a 
valid consent from an institutional, legal or regulatory perspective have been satisfied.  
In practice, informed consent can be achieved in one sense of the term and not the other.  
For example, an eligible research participant who quickly reviews and signs a consent 
document, but does not comprehend the material, might satisfy rule-based requirements 
of informed consent while failing to provide autonomous authorization.  Systematic 
misalignments between the policies governing the regulatory practice and the moral 
ideal of informed consent are a cause for concern because they denote a dysfunctional 
process (Goldstein, 2010; Henderson, 2011; Katz, 2002).   
 Although there is substantial variation in genomic research protocols, such 
studies share several common features that challenge established norms of informed 
consent.  Generally, genomic research involves the production of personal genome 
profiles based on existing or newly collected biological samples and several levels of data 
analysis.  Thus, genomic research draws upon a massive volume of genetic data often in 
combination with phenotypic data (Caulfield et al., 2008; A. L. McGuire & Beskow, 
2010).  Moreover, data sharing is an established social norm among genome scientists 
(Human Genome Organization, 1996, 1997; The Wellcome Trust, 2003), such that it is 
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typically required to release sequence data into publicly accessible databases that will be 
used for a wide variety of research activities. 
Several implications of these characteristics challenge standard informed-consent 
processes.  First, because data produced for one project will likely be used in unspecified 
future research, it is not possible to fully disclose the study purpose at the time of initial 
consent (Caulfield et al., 2008).  Further, A. L. McGuire and Beskow (2010) note that 
data originating from an analysis of DNA may by definition be considered identifiable 
private information, and thus research participants have a right to be protected against 
involuntary disclosure of that information.  If this right is interpreted to include direct 
participant control over who will have access to personal genomic information, the 
conditions under which it is disclosed and how it is used, then individual autonomy 
rights would be violated unless specific re-consent were granted for each future use (see 
also Lunshof et al., 2008).  Third, once the data contained in a personal genome profile 
is released to publicly accessible databases, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to 
retrieve or destroy.  As a result, a person’s ability to unconditionally withdraw from 
research is fundamentally compromised (Caulfield et al., 2008; A. L. McGuire & Beskow, 
2010).  Lastly, the massive volume of genetic markers included in a personal genome 
profile in combination with the rapid pace at which knowledge is accrued make it 
impossible to predict what that information will reveal about any given research 
participant or her biological relatives (Sharp, 2011).  Strictly speaking, it is not possible 
to fully anticipate the risks associated with participation. 
The consent process is viewed as a means of ensuring that potential subjects have 
the information they need to make an informed decision about enrolling in research or 
undergoing treatment (Wendler et al., 2002).  On this point, Manson and O’Neill (2007) 
have observed that the procedural standards of informed consent in research and clinical 
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practice have come to emphasize the specificity of information that is disclosed.  That is, 
investigators and clinicians are expected to provide detailed and specific descriptions of 
a proposed intervention, its purpose, duration, risks of harm and benefit.  If taken to the 
logical extreme, anything that is not explicitly explained to the consenting subject, by 
definition, falls outside the purview of the consent.  In the case of large-scale genomics 
research, several additional categories of information have been suggested as being 
necessary elements of the consent process.  These recommended elements include 
details about sampling and sequencing procedures; data security issues; the risk of 
uncovering clinically meaningful unanticipated results; and the possibility of re-
identification (Caulfield et al., 2008; Tabor et al., 2011). 
However, efforts to provide more complete information to potential research 
participants tend to increase the length of written consent documents, and the 
complexity of what is disclosed, while simultaneously impeding comprehension (Albala, 
Doyle, Appelbaum, 2010; Henderson, 2011; Mann, 1994; Tabor et al., 2012).  This is 
problematic because disclosure is not only meant to ensure that information about a 
project is available, but that research volunteers are able to understand how that 
information applies to their decisions to participate (Fischhoff, 2011).  By trying to touch 
on all aspects of a study that might be relevant to any given participant, “consent forms 
have become a repository for information that may not be central to the decision” 
(Henderson, 2011, p. 268). 
Prioritizing Information for Disclosure  
A common theme in the informed-consent and decision-making literatures is 
that disclosure should emphasize information that will be relevant to the choice at hand 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Feldman-Stewart et al., 2006; Fischhoff, 2005, 2011; 
Goldstein, 2010; Jepson, Hewison, Thompson, & Weller, 2005).  Consistent with this, 
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the conceptual standards for determining whether a duty to inform has been satisfied 
tend to focus on what patients or research volunteers would need to know about the 
procedure and its consequences in order to make an informed decision (LeBlang et al., 
2004; A. L. McGuire & Beskow, 2010).  Two subtypes of this materiality standard have 
been outlined (Jessica Berg et al., 2001).  In the objective sense, an investigator is 
obligated to disclose information that is expected to influence the decision for a 
prototypical, reasonably prudent person; in the subjective sense, the informational needs 
of this abstract decision-maker give way to those of actual patients and research 
volunteers.  Beauchamp & Childress (2009) have argued that the subjective-materiality 
standard aligns best with the moral ideals underpinning the informed consent doctrine, 
and should be viewed as the preferred standard against which consent procedures are 
evaluated.  However, they also recognize the practical difficulties involved in 
determining the informational needs of each patient or potential volunteer. 
Elaborating on the materiality standard, Fischhoff (2011) recently outlined three 
criteria for determining whether a communication intervention is adequate to fulfill a 
duty to inform.  Overall, he defined communication adequacy in terms of the ability of 
the information to enable effective decision making and action.  The first criterion refers 
directly to the materiality standard.  A disclosure should contain a significant fraction of 
the information that users need to make decisions.  However, merely presenting the 
subjectively relevant facts is not enough.  The audience also needs to be able to connect 
with the information provided (i.e., accessibility).  For example, if users cannot find the 
information that matches their specific needs with reasonable effort, then the 
accessibility of that information is inadequate.  The third characteristic is 
comprehensibility.  The intended audience should readily understand disclosed 
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information.  Thus, communicators must consider audience literacy, preferred delivery 
channels and the legibility of disclosure materials.   
Information needs may be so varied within a population that no single 
communication can contain all the subjectively material facts without having an adverse 
affect on accessibility and comprehensibility.  With this in mind, Fischhoff suggests that 
a materiality analysis can help prioritize information.   The aim of such an analysis is to 
differentiate facts that are worth sharing with an audience from those that would have a 
limited impact on decisions.  In some cases, partitioning a general audience into more 
homogenous subgroups may be necessary to adequately fulfill a duty to inform.  Altering 
the content or style of a consent process with these subgroups in mind can help better 
meet the informational needs of all users. 
With regard to decisions to participate in genomic research, a number of recent 
studies have examined the perceptions, expectations and decisions of potential and 
actual participants (Beskow, Friedman, Hardy, Lin, & Weinfurt, 2010; Facio et al., 2011; 
Gollust et al., 2012; Hallowell et al., 2010; Hoeyer, 2010; Kaufman, Murphy, Scott, & 
Hudson, 2008; Nobile, Vermeulen, Thys, Bergmann, & Borry, 2013; Paquin, Cappella, 
Price, 2010; Tabor et al., 2012; Treloar, Morley, Taylor, & Hall, 2007).  An interesting 
finding from this body of research is that participation decisions do not appear to be 
motivated by a single, universal set of features.  For example, Facio et al. (2011) asked a 
sample of 322 individuals enrolled in a large-scale sequencing study to report their 
reasons for wanting to participate.  The two main motivations reported in that study 
were a conviction to altruism in promoting research (44% of participants) and a desire to 
learn more about factors that contribute to one’s own health (56%).  Further, the authors 
reported that respondents who gave altruistic reasons tended not to mention receiving 
personal health information as a motivation, and vice versa.  Similarly, Beskow et al. 
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(2010) evaluated a simplified consent form that was designed as a disclosure template 
for biobanking.  Respondents were given electronic access to additional information 
about the hypothetical study, and asked to identify specific sentences that they thought 
would matter most to them if they were deciding whether to take part.  Although seven 
sentences per participant were selected on average, no single item was chosen by a 
majority of respondents.   These findings suggest that peoples’ decisions to participate 
are likely guided by different expectations regarding participation.   
In order to better achieve the goals of informed consent, investigators must 
understand the factors that lead people to act the way they do.  When these determinants 
differ from person to person, a one-size-fits-all approach to informed consent is less 
likely to hit its mark.  In the next chapter, I will present a conceptual account of the 
belief-based origins of choice.  Further, I will discuss its implications for the 
development of communication materials aimed at addressing the informational needs 
of people who are deciding whether to participate in large-scale genomics research.  
Whereas addressing immaterial beliefs may make for a better-informed person in a 
general sense, his choice may nonetheless be determined by a different subset of beliefs 
that remain inaccurate, unrealistic or false.  As Valerius (2010) explains, a person who is 
mistaken about what can be achieved by following a plan of action has limited self-
governance with respect to that action.  Put simply, beliefs that are material to a decision 
but are inaccurate impede informed consent.  Understanding how beliefs contribute to 
decisions to participate in genomics research can aid in the development of customized 
disclosure materials that better prevent people from choosing based on unrealistic or 
false expectations.
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CHAPTER THREE:  
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF CONTENT MATCHING  AS  
A COMMUNICATION STRATEGY FOR INFORMED CONSENT  
When attempting to foster informed consent, priority should be given to 
information that is likely to have the largest impact on people’s decisions.  If expressed 
as a communication strategy, this implies that disclosures and other educational 
materials should be customized to match the informational basis of the choice at hand.  
Such a strategy presupposes that it is possible to predict how message recipients select, 
interpret and integrate information to form judgments about a given course of action 
(e.g., participating in a research study that involves personal genome profiling).  In this 
chapter, I will discuss a behavior theoretic approach to selecting message content for 
health intervention campaigns (Cappella et al., 2000; Fishbein & Cappella, 2006; 
Fishbein & Yzer, 2003).  The purpose of doing so is to better understand what it suggests 
about message customization.  Generally, customization refers to “the degree to which 
the messages that audiences receive reflect relevant individual characteristics” (Hawkins, 
Kreuter, Resnicow, Fishbein, & Dijkstra, 2008, p. 456).  In this dissertation, the relevant 
individual characteristics of interest will be defined in terms of beliefs that ultimately 
determine decisions to participate in large-scale genomics research. 
The cognitive approach to conducting a materiality analysis discussed in this 
chapter draws on the reasoned action model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) and media 
priming theory (e.g., Domke, Shah, & Wackman, 1998; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Price & 
Tewksbury, 1997).  Whereas the reasoned action model (RAM) explains how people 
integrate information to generate attitudes and behavioral intentions, media priming 
theory (MPT) describes one mechanism by which information is selected to form the 
basis of these judgments.  Below I will argue that belief salience is the lynchpin for 
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understanding how these models relate to one another.  A central proposition derived 
from the RAM is that matching message content so that it addresses salient beliefs about 
a behavior helps achieve its intended effects.  Media priming theory helps clarify how 
beliefs become salient as a function of contextual factors.  Whereas the RAM and MPT 
describe the conditional effects of belief salience on the belief–intention relationship, 
this chapter also explores the implications of salience on belief change.  
The Reasoned Action Model as  
a Framework for Selecting Message Content  
From an applied perspective, the reasoned action model has important 
implications for designing and evaluating behavioral change interventions (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980; Cappella et al., 2000; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010; Fishbein & Cappella, 
2006; Fishbein & Yzer, 2003; see also Fishbein, von Haeften, & Appleyard, 2001; 
Sayeed, Fishbein, Hornik, Cappella, & Ahern, 2005 for applied, public health examples).  
The RAM postulates that behaviors that are unconstrained by objective control factors 
are ultimately determined by beliefs.  Although the reasoned action model does not say 
how to present information in order to change these beliefs, it can be used to 
strategically select message content (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen & Manstead, 2007; 
Fishbein & Cappella, 2006).  In other words, the model is a tool for identifying the 
primary beliefs that need to be addressed when recommending that people change or 
maintain a given behavior (Fishbein & Yzer, 2003). 
Conceptual Overview of the Reasoned Action Model  
The reasoned action model consolidates several behavioral theories that have 
been used to understand and predict a range of social and health behaviors.  The 
framework is a direct extension of the theory of reasoned action (TRA; Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975), the theory of planned behavior (TPB; Ajzen, 1991), and the integrated model of 
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behavior change (IM; Fishbein, Triandis, et al., 2001; Fishbein, 2008); but also 
accommodates constructs and theoretical pathways described in the health belief model 
(HBM; Janz & Becker, 1984; Rosenstock, 1966), and social cognitive theory (SCT; 
Bandura, 1986, 1998).  Central to the RAM is the idea that behavior “follows reasonably 
and often spontaneously from the information or beliefs that people possess about the 
behavior under consideration” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p. 20).  While beliefs are the 
foundation of action, they influence behavior through a sequence of mediating and 
moderating variables.  A major strength of the reasoned action framework is its formal 
expression of these causal relationships.   
According to the RAM (see Figure 3.1), the most immediate determinant of 
behavior is the intention to engage in it.  Behavioral intention is an indication of a 
person’s readiness or willingness to act (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), and has 
been described, simply, as a decision to perform a given behavior (Fishbein, 2008).  For 
conceptual clarity, intention is a subjective—though not necessarily conscious or 
deliberate—estimate of the likelihood that one will perform the behavior in question 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010).3  Generally, a person is more likely to act if one intends to do 
so, though the strength of the intention–behavior association can be moderated by 
several factors.  These moderators include environmental constraints that would 
physically prevent intentions from being acted upon and underdeveloped skills that were 
not accurately considered when the intention was formed. 
Direct antecedents of intention.   According to the reasoned action model, 
intentions are derived from attitudes toward performing the behavior, perceived social 
pressure, and perceived behavioral control over it.  Generally, these three constructs are 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 This de!nition of behavioral intention aligns with J. Baron’s (2004) characterization of decisions as judgments (i.e., 
a subjective probability) about what to do. 
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expected to have a combined, additive effect on intention and, by extension, behavior.  
The relative contribution of these direct antecedents to intention may vary by behavior, 
population or situation.  Nonetheless, people with more favorable attitudes, more 
intense perceived social pressure, and greater perceived behavioral control on average 
have stronger intentions, and are more likely to perform a specified behavior (Fishbein, 
Hennessy, Yzer, & Douglas, 2003).  
Attitude.   Consistent with a definition offered by Eagly and Chaiken (1993), 
attitude in the reasoned action framework refers to “a psychological tendency that is 
expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (p. 1).  
Attitudes have been characterized as relatively stable evaluative representations in 
memory and, alternatively, as judgments constructed when needed based on 
contextually available information (see Bohner & Dickel, 2010; Joel Cohen & Reed, 
Attitude  
(toward the 
behavior) 
 
Behavioral  
Beliefs 
Background 
Factors 
Information 
 - Personality 
 - Mood 
 - Values 
 - Perceived Risk 
 - Past Behavior 
Social 
 - Education 
 - Age 
 - Income 
 - Religion 
 - Race, ethnicity 
 - Culture 
Information 
 - Knowledge 
 - Media 
 - Intervention 
Intention  
 
Behavior 
 
Perceived  
Social  
Pressure  
 
Normative  
Beliefs 
Perceived 
Behavioral 
Control 
Control  
Beliefs 
Actual Control 
 
 - Skills/abilities 
 - Environment 
Figure 3.1.  Path diagram of the reasoned action model.  The dashed lines represent causal pathways that are 
anticipated by the theory, but are not formally part of the model.  Adapted from Predicting and changing behavior: 
The reasoned action approach, by M. Fishbein and I. Ajzen, 2010, p. 22. 
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2006; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, for recent attempts to consolidate these 
theoretical perspectives).  Despite these different characteristics, however, there is wide 
agreement that attitudes are fundamentally evaluative in nature and oriented toward 
specific objects (Albarracín, Johnson, Zanna, & Kumkale, 2005).   
Perceived social pressure.   The reasoned action model developed out of a 
research tradition particularly interested in issues surrounding the measurement of 
social attitudes and their relation to behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Lepper, 1994).  
Nonetheless, it has long been recognized that intentions and behavior are at least 
partially influenced by the norms that prevail in a social environment (e.g., Asch, 1951; 
Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; J. R. P. French & Raven, 1959).  With this in mind, social 
influence is formally integrated with the RAM in the form of perceived social pressure.  
In short, perceived social pressure refers to an individual’s perception that performing 
the behavior under consideration would be met with approval or disapproval, and is 
formed with reference to the supposed desires and actions of others (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2010).  With this in mind, perceived social pressure in the RAM is best thought of as a 
multidimensional construct defined in terms of what the subject thinks important others 
would want them to do (i.e., injunctive norms) and how those others are believed to 
behave (i.e., descriptive norms; see Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2005; Rivis & Sheeran, 
2003). 
Perceived behavioral control.   In addition to attitude and perceived social 
pressure, the extent to which people believe they are capable of performing a given 
behavior and that the behavior is under their control is also expected to influence 
behavioral intentions and action.  In short, people are less likely to form intentions to 
perform behaviors that they do not believe they can perform.  Perceived behavioral 
control draws heavily on Bandura’s (1977, 1994, 1998) concept of self-efficacy, which 
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focuses on a person’s level of confidence that they can perform a behavior in a number of 
different situations.  As it is currently defined in the RAM, perceived behavioral control 
emphasizes the subjective degree of control and ability one has over performing a given 
behavior (Ajzen, 2002; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). 
Belief-based determinants of the direct antecedents  of intention .  
According to the RAM, the direct antecedents of intention (i.e., attitudes, perceived 
social pressure and perceived behavioral control) derive from a system of beliefs about 
the behavior under consideration.  The RAM draws qualitative distinctions between the 
beliefs that underlie each predictor.  To clarify, an attitude toward a particular behavior 
is determined by behavioral beliefs, or the expected consequences of personally 
performing the behavior combined with evaluations of these outcomes.  Perceived social 
pressure is influenced by normative beliefs, judgments about who would approve or 
disapprove of performing the behavior weighted by the motivation to comply with those 
social referents.4  The control beliefs that underlie perceived behavioral control represent 
the potential barriers, resources and opportunities that a person considers relevant to 
performing the target behavior (Ajzen, 1991).  The extent to which a person believes 
himself to have access to these control factors is weighted by their perceived power to 
facilitate or impede the behavior.   
Belief integration from the expectancy-value perspective.  Although the 
belief-based determinants underpinning each of these constructs are qualitatively 
distinct from each other, their respective components are combined following the same 
basic formula.  For ease of exposition, the remainder of this discussion will focus on the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 This de!nition of “normative beliefs” relates speci!cally to injunctive norms. Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) have 
proposed that the belief-based determinants of descriptive normative pressure are a function of (a) how frequently 
a person believes each normative referent engages in the focal behavior, and (b) the extent to which that person 
identi!es with those referents. To my knowledge, this de!nition has not yet been empirically vetted. 
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attitudinal pathway of the reasoned action model.  It is important to note, however, that 
much of what follows has relevance for understanding the cognitive processes that 
underpin perceived social pressure and perceived behavioral control, as well. 
Following Fishbein’s (1963, 1967) expectancy-value model of attitude formation 
and change, an attitude toward any object can be described as an additive function of the 
evaluations associated with salient attributes of the object (ei, i = 1, … , n) weighted by 
the strength with which those attributes are believed to be characteristic of the object (bi, 
i = 1, … , n).  Formally, the relationship between these beliefs about an object and one’s 
attitude toward the object (i.e., in this case a behavior) can be expressed by the following 
equation:  
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where AB is one’s attitude toward personally performing a behavior B, bi is the strength 
of the belief that doing B will result in outcome i, ei is the implicit evaluative response 
associated with i, and n is the number of outcomes that are spontaneously thought about 
when the idea of doing B is called to mind.  An implication of this operational definition 
is that attitude should be directly proportional to the summed ratings of the positive and 
negative consequences that people expect from performing the behavior in question. 
Salient beliefs in the RAM.  A person may hold any number of beliefs about an 
object or behavior, such as participating in research that involves personal genome 
profiling.  However, an important assumption of the RAM is that attitudes, perceived 
social pressure and perceived behavioral control are primarily determined by those 
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attributes, outcomes, social referents, and control factors that are immediately salient 
with respect to performing that behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).   
To clarify, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) defined salient beliefs as “beliefs about an 
object that come readily to mind when a person has reason to retrieve them” (p. 98).  
Further, they equate the term salience with the more contemporary notion of cognitive 
accessibility.5  The accessibility of a construct is its readiness to be used in information 
processing at a given point in time as a function of its contextual activation in memory or 
its retrieval from long-term memory into short-term memory (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; 
Higgins, 1996; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982).6  For example, when faced with the option 
to participate in a genomic research project, a person might automatically call to mind a 
number of beliefs about participating.  These beliefs might include propositions like, 
“participating will contribute to science” or “if I participate, I will receive feedback about 
my genetic risk for disease.”  Clearly, there are an unlimited number of possible beliefs 
that people might hold about participating, but most of these will not come to mind (e.g., 
a trivial belief like, “If I participate, then I will have participated,” etc.).  According to the 
RAM, nonsalient beliefs are less likely to influence behavior.   
Salience is an immutable component of the primary beliefs that ultimately drive 
behavior in the RAM (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, 2010).  The expectancy-value 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5 Operationally, the term accessibility may evoke response-time and other nonintrusive measurement techniques 
commonly used in the cognitive sciences.  I will not be adopting such techniques in this dissertation.  Rather, I will 
use traditional thought-listing techniques.  To avoid raising false expectations regarding my method, I will use the 
term salience in this dissertation.  
6 In this de!nition, the term construct is used broadly to refer to the cognitive representation of any concept, idea, 
or object, as well as beliefs relating such representations to one another (see Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, for a related 
de!nition of a psychological object). Also, the terms activation and retrieval refer to roughly comparable processes 
subscribed to in unitary-store and multi-store models of memory, respectively (see Jonides et al., 2008).  The critical 
distinction is that multi-store models postulate that there are at least two architecturally distinct neural systems 
between which the content of memory is shu!ed (e.g., the sort of architecture implied by the "le-cabinet 
metaphor used by Wyer and Srull, 1989). Unitary-store models, on the other hand, reject the notion that there is 
literally more than one memory storage system and instead postulate that “short-term” memories are simply 
temporary activations of “long-term” representations (e.g., a view that aligns better with the symbolic associative 
network described by Higgins [1996]). 
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underpinnings of the RAM clearly entail an informational basis for the formation of 
attitudes, perceived social pressure and perceived behavioral control (Ajzen & 
Albarracín, 2007; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), and salience determines which information 
will be used or selected for that process.  Following the causal sequence outlined by the 
RAM, beliefs that are salient when the decision is made to perform a behavior are 
expected to have a greater impact on its performance than beliefs that are not salient.   
  Summary.  A primary implication of the RAM is that behavioral differences 
among people are ultimately derived from differences in the informational bases of those 
behaviors—not withstanding objective barriers that would prevent them from acting on 
their intentions.  Fundamentally, the direct antecedents of intention (i.e., attitudes, 
perceived social pressure, and perceived behavioral control) are, in turn, determined by 
salient beliefs.  Although direct measures of attitudes, norms and perceived behavioral 
control can efficiently describe the psychological mechanisms underlying action, truly 
understanding why people decide to perform a behavior requires a more careful analysis 
of the salient beliefs they hold about the behavior of interest.   
Implications of the RAM for Decision  Support and Consent Disclosure  
From a communication perspective, the RAM has typically been discussed in the 
context of interventions that aim to either change or maintain behaviors that have been 
deemed desirable by some external criterion (e.g., evidence that the behavior tends to 
improve clinical outcomes or public health; a judgment that increased adoption of the 
behavior will generate revenue for a firm, etc.).  In health-behavior contexts, the general 
goal of such interventions is to increase the likelihood that people will engage in 
behaviors known to lead to positive health outcomes (e.g., exercise) or discourage 
behaviors that are known to have an adverse impact on health (e.g., smoking).  For 
decisions that involve these kinds of evidence-based choice options, as they have been 
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called (see O’Connor et al., 2007), the benefits are generally agreed to outweigh possible 
harms, or vice versa.  Thus, when dealing with these sorts of behaviors, health 
communicators often adopt a persuasive stance aimed at promoting (or preventing) 
behavior in a directional way.   
In contrast, efforts to facilitate informed consent or decision making typically 
treat behavior change, per se, as a secondary concern (Brewer, 2011).  By definition, 
disclosure materials and decision aids are intended to foster decision making in choice 
contexts where no single best course of action can be determined without taking 
individual perspectives into account.  This may be due to a substantial balance of 
beneficial and harmful consequences across alternatives, insufficient scientific evidence, 
uncertainty about outcomes, or variability in the subjective desirability of the activity 
and its attributes (O’Connor et al., 2009).  Such choices have been described as “grey-
zone,” “close calls,” “values-sensitive” or “preference-sensitive” (O’Connor et al., 2007; 
O’Connor et al., 2009).  For decisions involving these kinds of behaviors, including 
decisions to participate in genomics research or to undergo genetic testing, 
interventionists typically adopt a nonpersuasive or educational stance.  That is, no single 
choice is advocated for all decision makers.  Adopting this perspective recognizes that the 
best choices for some people may be different from that of others, due to differences in 
goals and preferences (Fischhoff, 2005).7  Ultimately, the primary aim is not to increase 
(or decrease) rates of uptake or maintenance, but instead to ensure that people’s choices 
are consistent with their own, well-informed preferences and values.  This may or may 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 The term nonpersuasive, in this sense, refers only to the stance of the interventionist in recommending a speci!c 
choice or that a given course of action is followed. A nonpersuasive intervention does not make such 
recommendations uniformly for all decision makers. It is important to understand that the term nonpersuasive 
does not necessarily refer to the stance of the interventionist toward other people’s beliefs or judgments about the 
potential consequences of the behavior, some of which may be factually inaccurate and thus a focus of intentional 
change. 
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not involve overt changes in behavior, even if it does involve changes in beliefs or other 
lower-level judgments (Molenaar et al., 2000).8  
In sum, applying the RAM to educational interventions that aim to inform 
preference-sensitive decisions requires one to adopt a somewhat different perspective 
than when it is applied in persuasive interventions.  In a persuasive intervention, 
developers set out to strategically address behaviorally relevant beliefs that meet specific 
criteria (e.g., a strong association with behavior, room for change, and amenability to 
change; see Hornik & Woolf, 1999).  Intervention materials attempt to change only those 
beliefs that are likely to have the greatest impact on behavior in the intended direction.  
For example, a campaign aimed at getting smokers to quit (i.e., an evidence-based 
behavior shown to reduce a number of health risks) would likely stress the benefits of 
quitting while deemphasizing reasons not to quit.  From a health perspective, reductions 
in smoking are generally accepted to be a good thing, and so persuasive interventions in 
this context are warranted.   
In an educational intervention, on the other hand, developers might still attempt 
to change behaviorally relevant beliefs, but the purpose is to address those in such a way 
that they become more accurate according to some factual standard.  Ultimately, 
improvements in the quality of preference-sensitive decisions and choices are achieved 
by improving the truth of the judgments upon which those decisions and choices are 
based.  For example, participation in research involving personal genome profiling is 
meant to be entirely voluntary.  A potential research volunteer is entitled to receive 
information that explains what participation entails, but the best choice depends on his 
or her personal values.  In this context, encouraging or discouraging participation (i.e., 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8 Regardless, actual or preferred choice has been used as a primary outcome in several studies intended to evaluate 
the e!ectiveness of decision support interventions (Kryworuchko, Stacey, Bennett, & Graham, 2008; Mullen et al., 
2006).  
!! 28 
change behavior) is not the communicator’s primary aim.  Rather, the goal is to foster 
understanding (i.e., change beliefs) with an emphasis on any aspects of the project that 
are most likely to factor into the decision.  Although the aim of may be different, the 
persuasive and educational perspectives make similar assumptions about the 
mechanisms that underlie behavior. 
The expectancy-value principle and content matching.   An emphasis on 
addressing belief-based determinants of behavior is a common characteristic shared by 
both persuasive and educational interventions.  In this sense, the implications of the 
RAM with regard to communication strategy are a clear extension of what Eagly and 
Chaiken (1993) have termed the expectancy-value principle—the notion that message 
content must address the primary beliefs that form the basis of whatever variable the 
message is meant to influence (see also Fishbein & Ajzen, 1981, as cited in Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010).  Recall that an important tenet of the reasoned action model is that beliefs 
influence intentions through attitudes, perceived social pressure, and perceived 
behavioral control.  According to the expectancy-value principle, changes in these direct 
antecedents of intention are only expected to the extent that change has occurred in the 
underlying sets of behavioral, normative and control beliefs, respectively (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010).  Interventions that change beliefs that are not related to one of these direct 
factors are expected to have a limited impact on intention, decisions or future behavior.   
The strategic implications of the expectancy-value principle can be viewed as a 
special case of content matching (also referred to as message adaptation).  Generally 
speaking, content matching is a communication strategy whereby messages are 
developed so as to address the specific needs or interests of a given audience (Noar, 
Harrington, & Aldrich, 2009; Rimer & Kreuter, 2006).  Less broadly, content matching 
refers to the practice of designing messages so they correspond with key theoretical 
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determinants that underlie a variable of interest for a given audience (Hawkins et al., 
2008).  In principle, content could be matched to any characteristic of an audience 
whatsoever; however, to maximize effectiveness it behooves communicators to make 
such decisions on theoretic or pragmatic grounds (Rimal & Adkins, 2003).  Because the 
direct antecedents of behavioral intention are formed through the integration of salient 
beliefs, it follows that the focus of a RAM-based message or campaign are those beliefs 
that are salient to the target audience (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).  
In other words, the information contained in the message should address beliefs that the 
audience would likely spontaneously think about when their attention is focused on the 
behavior.   
The goal of informed consent is to foster decisions and choices that are congruent 
with a decision maker’s values and preferences.  This audience-oriented perspective 
aligns disclosure with message tailoring and targeting (Kreuter & Wray, 2003; Noar et 
al., 2009).  In health-communication contexts, tailoring has been defined as “an 
assessment-based approach to creating individualized communications, in which data 
from or about a specific individual and related to a given health outcome are used to 
determine the most appropriate information or strategies to meet that person’s unique 
needs” (Rimer & Kreuter, 2006, p. S184).  Tailoring can be compared with targeting, a 
message tactic that focuses on the characteristics and preferences of a broader audience 
segment as opposed to individual audience members (Noar et al., 2009).  Rather than 
view targeting and tailoring as rigid categories, Hawkins et al. (2008) suggest that 
communication can vary in the degree to which it is tailored based on (a) the level of 
segmentation assumed when defining the intended audience and (b) the extent to which 
the content or delivery channel is customized for that audience.   
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Content matching relies on some level of audience segmentation, the division of 
a general audience into well-defined subgroups characterized by minimal within-group 
and maximal between-group differences on some set of variables (Hawkins et al., 2008; 
Noar et al., 2009; Smith, 1956).  Crucially, identifying groups of people who are similar 
in important respects and customizing message content to them is a more efficient way 
to have a desired impact given limited resources compared to a generic, unsegmented 
strategy (Slater, 1995).  Audiences can be segmented in a number of different ways.  For 
instance, they could be segmented based on demographics, geography, lifestyle, 
attitudes, or personality variables.  However, the most useful strategies for constructing 
meaningful messages are those that help researchers and practitioners understand the 
audience from the audience’s perspective, including their values, beliefs, desires, needs 
and behavior (Hornik & Ramirez, 2006; Sharyn Sutton, Balch, & Lefebvre, 1995).   
In theory, an audience could be segmented so that each subgroup consists of 
exactly one audience member, achieving a maximum degree of individuation.  Thus, if 
mediated messages were placed along a continuum according to their degree of 
segmentation and customization (see Figure 3.2), tailoring would correspond to a range 
of that continuum characterized by great individuation on both of these dimensions.  
Less personal approaches to content matching (e.g., targeting) may be equally effective 
as tailoring.  For example, highly personalized messages may be inefficient if the 
segmentation criteria and matched content are not causally related to message 
outcomes.  Also, high degrees of customization may not be possible if available message 
channels are not capable of delivering distinct messages to the intended audience 
segments.  In such cases, a less fine-grained approach to segmentation and 
customization could yield a more parsimonious message strategy. 
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 Salient beliefs as tools for  segmentation and customization.  The 
approach to content matching implied by the RAM suggests that addressing audience 
members’ primary beliefs is a way to more effectively achieve communication goals.  
Methodologically, procedures for identifying the primary determinants of a behavior 
based on the RAM have been developed at both individual- and group-levels (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980; Middlestadt, Bhattacharyya, Rosenbaum, Fishbein, & Shepherd, 1996).  
Both methods begin with a set of thought-listing exercises based on the premises that (a) 
there is a positive relation between the salience of a concept or proposition and the 
likelihood that it will be listed in a free-response procedure, and (b) in any information-
processing task, individuals are generally limited in capacity to consolidate between five 
and nine pieces of information at a time (Trafimow, 2007; see also Fiske & Taylor, 1991; 
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Individually 
Tailored 
!! 32 
Miller, 1956).  The latter assumption establishes a limit on the number of beliefs that are 
likely to determine behavior and its underlying constructs.  
Personally salient beliefs.   When eliciting behavioral beliefs (i.e., those beliefs 
theoretically expected to contribute to the formation of direct or global attitudes), each 
respondent may be asked to list the advantages and disadvantages or things they expect 
to enjoy and dislike about performing a particular behavior.  The set of outcomes that 
each person reports on these open-response questions represents his or her personally 
salient beliefs.  Following this qualitative procedure, quantitative, subjective estimates of 
the strength with which each of the elicited beliefs are held (i.e., the subjective 
probability that the outcomes expressed in those beliefs will occur given that the 
behavior is performed) and the evaluative nature of those beliefs can be measured on 
closed-ended response scales.  These quantitative scores can then be combined following 
the expectancy-value formula to construct personalized belief-based measures of 
attitude, or personal belief indices.9  When this procedure is used, the number of beliefs 
elicited and the propositional content of these will likely differ from person to person as 
a reflection of the amount of between-subject variation in the sample.  This variance in 
cognitive structure makes it difficult to generalize results about specific beliefs to the 
population from which the subjects are drawn.  Accordingly, the personalized elicitation 
procedure has been further adapted to help determine which beliefs would be the most 
appropriate targets in strategic information campaigns geared toward a mass audience.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 Alternative procedures for de!ning composite measures from personally salient beliefs are discussed by D. P.  
French and Hankins (2003). For the most part, these alternative procedures are meant to address operational issues 
that impact the statistical interpretability of the expectancy-value formulation, but do not necessarily reject the 
conceptual basis of the model. For example, it has been argued that multiplying evaluation scores by expectancy 
ratings may be unnecessary when computing a personal belief index because people are more likely to list 
outcomes they consider subjectively likely during the elicitation procedure (Cronen & Conville, 1975). As a result, 
expectancy ratings of personally salient beliefs tend to have little variance, and there is evidence that indices 
computed following a simpler, sum-of-evaluations formula have su!cient concurrent validity. 
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Modally salient beliefs.   Given the pragmatic limitations of using indices 
constructed from personal beliefs for interventions, the modally salient beliefs of a 
population can instead be elicited as part of formative research (Middlestadt, 2012).  
Here, a small number of people from the group of interest are asked to complete 
thought-listing tasks that are identical to those discussed for the elicitation of personally 
salient beliefs.  Rather than collect expectancy-value measures for all beliefs elicited by 
each participant, a content analysis of the resulting lists is conducted to classify 
outcomes according to theme and to determine which are cited most frequently across 
participants.  Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) outline three decision rules that have been used 
to determine which beliefs should be classified as modally salient: (a) include the ten or 
twelve most frequently mentioned beliefs, (b) include all beliefs that exceed a pre-
established frequency threshold (e.g., any belief mentioned by at least 10% or 20% of the 
sample), or (c) include as many beliefs as are necessary to account for a specified percent 
of all beliefs elicited (e.g., 75%).  Once the modal set is defined, a fixed-item instrument 
can be drafted to measure the expectancy-value components of those beliefs, which are 
more likely to be salient within the population than an arbitrary set of outcomes derived, 
for example, from focus group discussions or from researchers’ intuition (Fishbein & 
Middlestadt, 1995). 
While this procedure overcomes some of the practical limitations associated with 
adapting the reasoned action approach to population-level behavior interventions, it 
does so at the expense of theoretical consistency at the individual level.  For example, 
Stephen Sutton et al. (2003) observed, on average, only a 26% overlap between modal 
and personal belief sets.  That means that roughly 3 out of every 4 items in the modal 
belief index represented beliefs that were not personally salient for any given research 
subject (see also Cook, Moore, & Steel, 2005).  Given qualitative variation in personal-
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belief sets among individuals within a population, a large margin of error may result 
from summarizing individual cognitions at a general-population level.   
This is not exclusively a theoretical issue, but a practical one as well.  Belief 
indices that include several nonsalient beliefs tend to be worse predictors of direct 
attitudes and behavior than belief indices composed exclusively of salient beliefs (see van 
der Pligt, de Vries, Manstead, & Harreveld, 2000, for a comprehensive review of the 
conditional effects of salience and accessibility on the belief–attitude relationship).  For 
example, Chatzisarantis and Hagger (2005) conducted an experiment testing the 
hypothesis that participants exposed to a pro-attitudinal message targeting salient 
beliefs would report more positive post-exposure attitudes and intentions than 
participants exposed to a message that targeted exclusively nonsalient beliefs.  The 
results provided evidence in support of the expectancy-value principle using belief-based 
determinants measured at a general-population level.  Still, messages aimed at a general 
audience’s modally salient beliefs will likely fail to address a large portion the personally-
salient beliefs of many of its members (Cook et al., 2005; Stephen Sutton et al., 2003).  
In other words, generic communication materials are likely to be less adequate than 
tailored or targeted content because a smaller proportion of the information they provide 
is likely to influence user’s choices (see Fischhoff, 2011). 
Dividing a general audience into smaller audience segments may be one way to 
reduce this error.  Subdividing a large heterogeneous audience into smaller homogenous 
segments facilitates the development of messages that are specifically targeted to address 
the needs of audience members within those groups (Albrecht & Bryant, 1996; Boslaugh, 
Kreuter, Nicholson, & Naleid, 2005; Lefebvre & Flora, 1988).  From a reasoned action 
perspective, audience segments that hold different salient beliefs about a behavior are 
expected to engage in that behavior on the basis of different information.  Accordingly, a 
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segmentation strategy that uses qualitative differences in salient beliefs as the main 
segmentation criteria would be conceptually aligned with the goals of customization.  In 
turn, matching content to the modally salient beliefs of distinct audience segments would 
be expected to provide audience members with a greater proportion of the information 
they need to make effective choices.    
Media Priming Theory and Dynamic Salience  
The RAM expands upon the logic of the expectancy-value model to describe how 
information is combined in shaping the direct antecedents of behavioral intent.  
However, its treatment of the way information is selected for that integration process is 
more cursory.  The model clearly postulates that people draw upon salient beliefs as the 
informational basis of their attitudes, perceived social pressure and perceived behavioral 
control, yet it is also evident that belief salience originates from multiple sources.  Salient 
beliefs are subject to changes in strength and evaluation, but can also be replaced by new 
salient beliefs (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, 2010).  For example, exposure to a message can 
temporarily make the beliefs addressed in that message salient (see Albarracín & Wyer, 
2001; Thomas & Tuck, 1975, for evidence of post-manipulation changes in belief 
salience).  Once they are made salient, message-based beliefs are more likely to be 
integrated into an overall judgment about the target behavior.  Using a media priming 
strategy, an interventionist would select beliefs to address because the strength and 
evaluation components of those beliefs are presumably already aligned with the desired 
message outcome.  In effect, beliefs that are nonsalient for a participant prior to message 
exposure can become salient and act as short-term determinants of attitudes, intentions 
and behavior.  However, to the extent that message content can influence belief salience, 
the strategic implications of the RAM vis-à-vis content matching become somewhat 
unclear. 
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Disambiguating Salience   
Traditionally, salience in the RAM has been treated as a relatively stable property 
of behavior-focused constructs or beliefs.  The dominant account of belief salience and 
integration in the RAM can be summarized as follows (see Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975):  
i) When an object or behavior is called to mind, a person automatically 
retrieves from memory a number of thoughts or beliefs that refer to 
characteristics, attributes, outcomes, or goals that are associated with 
that object. 
ii) The probability that a specific belief will be retrieved or become 
activated in response to the stimulus object is determined by the 
strength of its learned association with that object in memory.   
iii) Each belief (i.e., characteristic, attribute, outcome or goal) is also 
associated with an implicit evaluative reaction that is stored in 
memory. 
iv) The evaluative reaction associated with a belief contributes to the 
overall attitude toward the stimulus object in direct proportion to the 
strength of the relationship between that object and the corresponding 
belief (viz., the product term in the expectancy-value model). 
v)  The effects of these belief-evaluation pairs combine across the set of 
salient beliefs in an additive manner (viz., the summation function in 
the expectancy-value model).   
As described here, salience is derived from a learned association in memory.  Symbolic 
exposure to an object or behavior prompts the activation, or retrieval, of constructs 
related to it in memory.  Assuming that these learned associations remain somewhat 
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fixed or only change slowly over time, the salience of a construct in relation to another 
object can be viewed as a fairly stable characteristic of that construct. 
In counterpoint to this view, contextual factors can also influence which beliefs 
are salient at any given moment (Ajzen & Sexton, 1999; Albarracín, 2002; Albarracín & 
Wyer, 2001; Kruglanski, 1989a; Tesser, Martin, & Medolia, 1995).  Accordingly, the set of 
salient beliefs that constitute the determinants of behavior for any given person might 
vary in content depending on context.  All else being equal, beliefs with salience that 
originates from learned associations in memory are more likely to come to mind 
spontaneously when thinking about the behavior; however, these beliefs can nonetheless 
be displaced by other beliefs due to changes in salience that originate from contextual 
features of the immediate environment (e.g., a message). 
From a communication perspective, Albarracín and Wyer (2001; see also 
Albarracín, 2002) argued that the expectancy-value model describes the integration 
process that people engage in when forming attitudinal judgments.  However, the model 
does not provide a full account of the origins of the information that gets integrated.  
When computing a subsequent attitude, message recipients may take into account (a) 
unmentioned beliefs that are spontaneously recalled, (b) information that was addressed 
in the message, or (c) both.  To clarify, the audience might recall or infer outcomes of the 
behavior from memory that were not explicitly mentioned in a message (i.e., knowledge-
based information).10  The account of belief salience given in the RAM is aligned with the 
idea of knowledge-based information.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
10 The concept that Albarracín (2002; Albarracín & Wyer, 2001) refers to as knowledge-based information is 
conceptually similar to working knowledge (Wood, 1982) and intra-attitudinal structure (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
Working knowledge represents the attitude-relevant beliefs and prior experiences that are spontaneously activated 
when encountering the attitude object (Biek, Wood, & Chaiken, 1996; Wood, 1982). In relation to attitude strength, 
working knowledge is sometimes de!ned as a structural property of an attitude that focuses on the number of 
attitude-relevant beliefs and experiences that are available in memory (Fabriger, Petty, S. Smith, & Crites, 2006; 
Wood, Rhodes, & Biek, 1995).  By virtue of having ready access to information that can be used to argue against it, 
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On the other hand, the audience might also consolidate new consequences 
described in the message into an overall attitudinal judgment.  Thus, message processing 
may involve a construal process that draws on message-based information, or 
constructs that are contextually related to an object based on assertions made in a 
message.   Further, information from both knowledge-based and message-based sources 
can be integrated into an overall judgment about the behavior.  Conceivably, message-
based information could become more salient than knowledge-based information.11  As a 
result, judgments made following message exposure would likely be more influenced by 
message-based beliefs, at least in the short-term.  Because of its emphasis on knowledge-
based belief salience, this last implication is not explicitly anticipated by the RAM.  To 
better understand the possible relationship between message exposure and belief 
salience, it is helpful to review media priming theory.   
Conceptual Overview of Media Priming Theory  
The basic media-priming hypothesis is that individuals who are exposed to 
messages referring to a given set of constructs will be more likely to draw upon those 
constructs when making subsequent judgments compared to individuals not exposed to 
that information.  Broadly speaking, priming refers to the effect of a preceding stimulus 
or event on a person’s reaction to some subsequent stimulus (Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-
Ewoldsen, & Dillman Carpentier, 2008).  As a communication effect, media priming 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Wood (1982) reasoned that people who have a well-elaborated belief structure are better able to defend against 
counterattitudinal information.  They are also thought to be better able to critically evaluate the validity or strength 
of the assertions made in a message. Availability of knowledge-based information also has implications for the 
attitude–behavior relationship.  Attitude–behavior correspondence depends in part on the extent to which the 
considerations that arise when an attitude is expressed are comparable to the considerations that arise when the 
behavior is enacted (Doll & Ajzen, 1992). That is, a strong association between an expressed attitude toward a 
behavior and action is more likely when the attitude-related information that is salient at the time the attitude 
judgment is made matches the salient information when the behavior is enacted.  Attitudes that consistently draw 
upon the same knowledge base are likely to remain fairly stable. 
11 I should note that I am not using the term knowledge in a strict epistemological sense, which would entail that 
these beliefs are true or justi!ed.  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) have clearly explained that the RAM makes no 
assumptions about the verity of the primary beliefs that determine behavior.  
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refers to “the effects of the content of media (e.g., extensive coverage of certain political 
stories, depictions of violence, the use of brief ‘teasers’ about an upcoming story on a 
newscast) on people’s later behavior or judgments (e.g., evaluations of the president, 
aggressive behavior, attention to news stories related to the teaser)” (Roskos-Ewoldsen, 
Klinger, Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2007, p. 53; see also Domke et al., 1998; Iyengar & Kinder, 
1987; Price & Tewksbury, 1997).  Petty and Jarvis (1996; as cited in Petty, DeMarree, 
Briñol, Harcajo, & Strathman, 2008) noted that three basic steps are involved in the 
process that results in priming effects.  First, a priming induction must activate, or make 
salient (at least temporarily), a construct from memory.  Second, the activated construct 
biases the interpretation of a target object.  Finally, the biased interpretation is used to 
guide judgments or impressions of the target, or behavior. 
Most often, media priming effects are described as a kind of assimilation, where 
impressions of a target become biased toward the prime stimulus.  Assimilation occurs 
when the primed construct becomes incorporated as part of the information upon which 
judgments about the target are based (DeCoster & Claypool, 2004).  Thus, assimilative 
priming effects are closely related to the construal of message-based information 
described by Albarracín (2002; Albarracín  & Wyer, 2001).   
Priming theory suggests that concepts that would not otherwise spontaneously 
come to mind when deciding to follow a course of action can be made temporarily salient 
by increasing their prominence in the immediate environment or information context.  
Regarding communication-based interventions designed to influence behavior, it has 
been argued that assimilative priming can be employed strategically to guide the 
development of messages that will temporarily make certain concepts salient and alter 
behavior in the direction of campaign goals (Cappella et al., 2000; Fishbein & Cappella, 
2006; Fishbein & Yzer, 2003).  For example, a communication strategy aimed at 
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encouraging the adoption of a specific behavior may attempt to develop messages that 
emphasize potential outcomes that members of the target audience evaluate favorably, 
but that do not readily come to mind when thinking about the behavior.  In essence, the 
goal of such an intervention is to temporarily increase the message-based salience of 
certain beliefs that have otherwise low knowledge-based salience.  If the message 
strategy is successful, the influence of the primed beliefs on the criterion variables (e.g., 
attitudes, behavioral intentions, etc.) should be greater among subjects exposed to the 
priming message than among subjects who were not.   
Empirical Tension between Content Matching and Assimilative Priming  
Assimilative priming effects can enhance the anticipated strategic benefits of 
content matching; but under some circumstances, one would expect content matching 
and media priming to work against one another.  The main point of contention is that 
content matching and media priming have divergent underlying assumptions regarding 
the stability of belief salience.  Here it is important to recall that exposure to a message 
can influence (a) belief strength, (b) the evaluation of constructs predicated in that belief, 
(c) belief salience, or (d) any combination of these effects (Albarracín, 2002; Albarracín  
& Wyer, 2001).  In content matching, the goal is to identify beliefs that are already 
salient and craft appeals to change belief strength and/or outcome evaluations.  Media 
priming theory endorses a message strategy whereby salience is increased, but belief 
strength and outcome evaluations remain unchanged.  As mentioned, if a priming 
strategy were used in an intervention, the goal might be to call to mind beliefs already 
aligned with the desired outcome in an effort to harness the predictive power of those 
beliefs.  Clearly, assimilative priming effects could also work against campaign goals if 
the message inadvertently makes constructs that are misaligned with the intended 
message effect more salient.  In further contrast to the media priming strategy, 
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addressing misaligned beliefs is strategically beneficial from the content matching 
perspective because those beliefs exhibit the greatest room for change (Hornik & Woolf, 
1999).   
Presenting content matching and media priming as two distinct message 
strategies deemphasizes the fact that mean changes in belief strength or outcome 
evaluations can occur in tandem with assimilative priming effects (Cappella et al., 2000; 
Fishbein & Cappella, 2006).  In other words, these effects are not mutually exclusive in 
practice; message exposure can simultaneously affect changes in salience, belief 
strength, and evaluations.  Consequently, message-driven changes in salience could 
undermine the relative empirical benefit of content matching.  For example, suppose 
that an investigator is interested in testing the comparative efficacy of two versions of an 
informed consent procedure.  One version is developed with the expectancy-value 
principle in mind, and addresses consequences that were found through an elicitation 
study to be modally salient to the target audience.  The other version of the consent 
document was developed based on generic guidelines.  These consent materials 
emphasize different sets of harmful consequences that could result from participating in 
the project.  Suppose that both versions of the consent materials are equally efficacious 
at strengthening the respective beliefs that they target.  Which version of the consent 
procedure is expected to result in more negative attitudes toward participating?  The 
answer depends on the relative proportion of salient message-based beliefs following 
exposure.   
According to the RAM, the generic version is less likely to address the audience’s 
salient beliefs.  As a result, the generic version would be expected to have less influence 
on attitudes from this perspective.  However, based on MPT, exposure to the generic 
message could temporarily increase the salience of the consequences it mentioned.  If 
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this were to happen, the relationship between message-based beliefs and attitude would 
be strengthened.  Empirically, the content matching strategy adopted by the targeted 
version of the consent document may lose its “persuasive” advantage.12  Post-exposure 
attitude would simply appear to be a function of message-based beliefs, regardless of 
how they match-up with pre-exposure, knowledge-based salient beliefs. 
A study conducted by Albarracín and Wyer (2001) provides a good example of 
how a message-based shift in salience can impact attitude formation.  In that study, 
belief-based measures of students’ attitudes toward comprehensive exams were 
computed drawing on expectancy-value estimates of (a) four novel outcomes that were 
addressed in a message that a participants (N = 40) were asked to read (i.e., message-
based beliefs), and (b) seven outcomes that had been spontaneously generated by 
participants in a pretest (i.e., knowledge-based beliefs).  When correlated with a direct 
measure of attitude toward comprehensive exams, the index that drew upon message-
based beliefs exhibited a stronger relationship (r = .57, p < .01) than the knowledge-
based index (r = .25, ns).  These results were compared with analogous data from an 
independent sample of participants (N = 21) who had not read the persuasive message.  
In this second sample the results were reversed; whereas the message-based belief index 
was not significantly associated with direct attitude (r = .18, ns), the knowledge-based 
index was strongly correlated with it (r = .47, p < .05).  A reasonable explanation of this 
pattern of results is that the novel message-based beliefs became more salient 
immediately following message exposure than knowledge-based beliefs (see Domke, 
2001; Domke, McCoy, & Torres, 1999; Yi, 1990).   
                                                                                                                                                                      
12 This assumes that the proportion of post-exposure salient beliefs with origins in the generic version increases to a 
point that is at least equivalent to the proportion of pre-exposure, knowledge-based salient beliefs addressed in 
the targeted version. 
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Based on the expectancy-value principle, a message that addresses knowledge-
based beliefs is more likely to impact primary determinants of intention and behavior.  
However, if message exposure temporarily increases the proportion of salient beliefs 
with message-based origins, then the strategic advantage of matching content to 
knowledge-based salient beliefs could be over-powered.  
The Role of Salience in Belief Change  
Lastly, it is worth considering briefly how salience affects changes in belief 
strength in response to message content.  Two characteristics of salient beliefs are 
especially relevant.  First, salient beliefs tend to be held more strongly than nonsalient 
beliefs (Cronen & Conville, 1975; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; see also Newton, Ewing, 
Burney, and Hay, 2011).  Second, belief salience has been found to be positively 
correlated with belief confidence (Kopp, 2010; Krosnick, Boninger, Ghuang, Berent & 
Carnot, 1993).  Belief confidence is a sense that the belief or judgment is valid.  Although 
this relationship is conventionally small, people tend to express greater certainty in 
judgments about salient behavioral consequences than they do nonsalient consequences.   
According to a framework proposed and tested by Jaccard (1981), belief change 
in response to a message is a function of (a) the difference between the position 
advocated by the source and the position accepted by the recipient prior to message 
exposure (i.e., discrepancy), (b) the recipient’s confidence that his or her original 
position is accurate (i.e., own confidence), and (c) the recipient’s confidence that the 
message source is correct (i.e., source confidence).  Belief salience can be viewed as a 
moderator of a message’s impact on beliefs due to its associations with strength and 
confidence.   
Jaccard’s theoretical account extends W. J. McGuire’s (1968) reception-yielding 
model of persuasion by specifying the psychological determinants of yielding as it relates 
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to belief change.  Yielding here refers to message-congruent change in a primary belief 
resulting from exposure to a message (W. J. McGuire, 1968).  Yielding is differentiated 
from acceptance, the extent to which a message recipient agrees with claims regarding a 
particular belief, regardless of message exposure (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1981; Wyer, 1974).  
When an audience already accepts the position taken by a message, discrepancy is low 
and so there is little opportunity for yielding.  If the goal of the message is to change 
beliefs, large discrepancies are an advantage because they leave greater room for 
improvement (Dillard, 2011; Hornik & Woolf, 1999). 
Yielding to a message is not only a function of discrepancy or prior acceptance 
(Kaplowitz & Fink, 1997).  The results of Jaccard’s experiment demonstrated that people 
tend to resist yielding when the message source is perceived to be less reliable than they 
are themselves.  With a high degree of confidence in one’s own position, little belief 
change occurs regardless of how great the discrepancy or how much confidence there is 
in the message source.  On the other hand, the strength of the association between 
discrepancy and belief change increases as confidence in the source increases when own 
confidence is low.  Generally, people who have a high degree of confidence in the 
accuracy of their original judgments tend to resist yielding to appeals that are 
incongruent with those judgments (Albarracín, Wallace, and Glasman, 2004; Jaccard, 
1981).  This is also consistent with Petty, Briñol and Tormala’s (2002) self-validation 
hypothesis; that people rely more on their thoughts about a topic when they have 
confidence rather than doubt in those thoughts. 
Because salience is positively associated with belief strength, knowing whether 
the beliefs addressed by a message are salient provides some clues about pre-exposure 
acceptance and, thus, discrepancy.  A message that aims to strengthen a belief will have 
less room for improvement when the belief is salient, all else being equal.  Conversely, a 
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message that aims to weaken a belief will have greater room for improvement when the 
belief is salient.  
Likewise, the positive association between belief salience and confidence offers 
insights about resistance to belief change.  Salient beliefs are likely to be held with 
greater confidence.  When the goal of a message is to further strengthen, or affirm, a 
belief that the audience agrees is true, salient beliefs will be somewhat less resistant to 
change.  However, because the appeal is congruent with the audience’s original 
judgments, this reduction in resistance may be less consequential to yielding than prior 
acceptance.  By virtue of having greater room to improve nonsalient beliefs, noticeable 
belief change resulting from an affirming appeal is more likely when it addresses a 
nonsalient belief.   Conversely, when the goal of a message is to substantially weaken, or 
disconfirm, beliefs that the audience agrees with, salient beliefs will be more resistant to 
change than nonsalient beliefs.  Although there is greater opportunity to change salient 
beliefs through a disconfirming appeal, salient beliefs are also held with greater 
confidence than nonsalient beliefs.   As a result, it is more difficult to persuade people to 
disagree with a salient belief that they think is true than it is a nonsalient belief.  In sum, 
salient beliefs are likely to be less amenable to change than nonsalient beliefs.   
Conclusion  
  In this chapter, I have defined content matching as the alignment between 
message claims and the audience’s salient beliefs about a message topic.  Salient 
behavioral beliefs are important because they are expected to relate more strongly to 
attitudes and intentions than nonsalient beliefs.  An implication of the RAM is that 
changes in belief strength in response to a message are more likely to cause changes in 
attitude and intention when the message topic is matched to the salient beliefs of the 
audience.  Because the RAM views salience as a relatively fixed property of the beliefs 
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that people hold, differences in belief salience within a population can prove useful for 
audience segmentation and message customization.  In Study 1, I examine the feasibility 
of taking a belief-based approach to audience segmentation.  Here, the primary 
segmentation criteria were perceived advantages and disadvantages of taking a genetic 
test as part of a research study.  Respondents in a large population-based sample who 
listed similar consequences of participating were grouped together and distinguished 
from other respondents who listed different consequences.  
Dividing a general audience into smaller audience segments based on 
interindividual, qualitative differences in belief salience can help prioritize information 
for consent disclosure.  The goal of that approach to segmentation is to identify 
information the audience needs to make effective choices.  Salient behavioral beliefs are 
more strongly related to attitudes than nonsalient beliefs; further, attitude change 
partially mediates the impact of belief change on intention and behavior.  Thus, salient 
beliefs have a larger impact on decisions, choices and actions than nonsalient beliefs.  
However, the RAM and MPT offer two alternative hypotheses regarding the effects of 
message exposure on the salience of behavioral beliefs.  Specifically, the RAM 
emphasizes the knowledge-based origins of belief salience, treating salience as relatively 
stable over time.  On the other hand, MPT emphasizes the immediate message-based 
origins of salience.  From this perspective, short-term increases in salience are expected 
following exposure.  Both processes may affect belief salience at any given point in time.  
Less clear, though, is whether message-based priming effects are likely to overpower the 
effects of salience with knowledge-based origins.   
Figure 3.3 depicts the conditional direct and indirect effects implied by the 
conceptual models discussed in this chapter.  These relationships can be stated as a set of 
general hypotheses.  The studies presented in the next two chapters test specific  
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versions of these hypotheses as they related to peoples decisions to participate in large-
scale genomics research projects. 
First, belief salience will moderate the impact of message appeals on changes in 
behavioral belief strength.  A message appeal directed at a given belief will lead to less 
change in belief strength when that belief is salient, compared to when it is nonsalient.  
Second, based on the RAM, belief salience will moderate the direct effect of 
corresponding behavioral beliefs (i.e., a belief-evaluation products, biei) on attitude.  
When a behavioral outcome is salient, the positive relationship between the behavioral 
belief and attitude will be stronger than when it is nonsalient.  This hypothesis extends to 
a conditional indirect effect on intention.  The moderating effect of belief salience on the 
relationship between a behavioral belief and attitude will impact intention through 
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Figure 3.3.  Conceptual model showing predicted conditional e!ects of belief salience on the attitudinal pathway 
of the reasoned action model.  The dashed lines represent causal pathways implied by media priming theory.  
Sigma represents the summation of belief-evaluation products (i.e., biei) over several behavioral outcomes, i. 
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attitude.  Under conditions where behavioral outcomes are addressed in a message, a 
competing hypothesis is derived from MPT.  When subjects receive a message that 
addresses a given behavioral outcome, the direct positive impact of the corresponding 
behavioral belief on attitude will be stronger than when subjects do not receive the 
message.  A further condition of this MPT hypothesis is that the outcome addressed in 
the message is not already salient to the audience (i.e., knowledge-based salience).  This 
hypothesis also implies a conditional indirect effect on intention through attitude.  
Lastly, the impact of a message on attitude and intention is a function of the 
hypothesized conditional effects of belief salience and mediating pathways. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: STUDY ONE  
 The purpose of Study 1 was twofold: (1) identify frequently held beliefs that are 
likely to be relevant to participating in a hypothetical genome-sequencing study, and (2) 
determine whether it is possible to define meaningful subgroups of potential research 
participants who differ in their primary motivations to participate.  Toward this end, 
Study 1 was divided into two phases, which I will refer to as the belief elicitation and 
audience segmentation, respectively.  Examining between group differences in belief 
strength, belief–attitude, and belief–intention associations, validated the audience-
segmentation strategy.  
 Method  
The data for this analysis were collected as part of the Genetics, Public Opinion, 
and Deliberation (gPOD) project at the University of Pennsylvania. The gPOD project 
was a three-phase study that consisted of a baseline survey of the general U.S. adult 
population, online discussion groups and an end-of-project survey designed to assess 
changes in public opinion over time. The analyses conducted in Study 1 drew exclusively 
from data collected during the baseline phase of the study. 
Participants  
 Respondents of the gPOD baseline survey were a probability sample of 
noninstitutionalized adults aged 18 years or older living in the United States.  Knowledge 
Networks (KN), a research firm that specializes in conducting nationally representative 
online surveys, collected the data.  Knowledge Networks maintains a large subject pool of 
U.S. adults living in telephone-accessible households.  Members of the KN subject pool 
were recruited using a list-assisted, random-digit-dialing method (RDD).  To help ensure 
that the sample is not biased against households without a computer or internet 
connection, panel participants are provided with a Web TV appliance and monthly 
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internet service.  For the gPOD baseline survey, a random probability sample of adults 
was drawn from households in the KN subject pool.  
Eligible respondents who agreed to participate in the project (N = 3,754) 
completed an online questionnaire between October 29 and November 17, 2008.  The 
overall cooperation rate for the baseline survey was approximately 77%.  The belief 
elicitation and audience segmentation analyses that comprise Study 1 are based on a 
subsample of respondents (N = 1,099) drawn at random from among those who agreed 
to participate in the baseline survey.  
Participants in the Study 1 subsample ranged in age from 18–89.  Twenty-eight 
percent of participants in the sample were 18–34, 21% were 35–44, 31% were 45–59, and 
20% were sixty years or older. Fifty-seven percent of the sample was female.  The 
majority of the sample was non-Hispanic White Americans (69%), followed by non-
Hispanic African Americans (20%), and Hispanics (7%).13 A small proportion of the 
sample (4%) had less than a high school education, 24% had completed high school, 34% 
completed some college, 24% had earned a four-year degree, and 14% had completed a 
graduate or professional degree. 
Procedure  
Belief elicitation.  The gPOD baseline survey included an open-ended question 
designed to elicit salient behavioral outcomes related to participating in a genetic 
research project.  The research project was hypothetical and described as a population 
biobank.  The question was modeled on the semi-structured, thought-listing exercise 
recommended by Fishbein and Ajzen (2010; see also Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; 
                                                                                                                                                                      
13 An oversample of 544 African Americans was included among the respondents who completed the baseline 
survey. This oversample was designed to enhance the analytical power of comparisons between racial subgroups 
within the general population.  The subsample for this analysis was drawn from the full group of baseline 
participants, without regard for the oversampling. 
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Middlestadt, 2012; Middlestadt et al., 1996).  Each respondent was given space to list up 
to two advantages and two disadvantages of “volunteering to take a genetic test as part of 
a research study sometime in the next 12 months.”  A content analysis (Krippendorff, 
2004; Neuendorf, 2002, 2009) of the reported consequences was then conducted to 
identify common themes.   
A codebook for the analysis was developed using an iterative process.  First, three 
independent coders classified responses from a random sample of participants (ncodebook 
= 100) into common themes.  The coders were not given any background information 
about the target behavior or common themes reported in the relevant literature.  The use 
of a blind-coding procedure was intended to minimize bias from the coders’ prior 
knowledge of the subject matter being investigated (Neuendorf, 2009).  Next, the three 
coders met to compare and discuss their respective classification schemes.  These were 
then integrated to form an initial, standardized coding instrument.  The initial codebook 
defined nineteen themes dedicated to advantages and fourteen dedicated to 
disadvantages.14   
The reliability of the initial coding instrument was then tested on elicitation 
responses from a second random subsample of baseline participants (nreliability1 = 100).  
All three coders independently coded responses from this second sample, and a 
reliability check was conducted.   
Responses from a final sample of gPOD baseline participants (n = 1,000) were 
then coded.  All three coders analyzed responses from a random subsample of this final 
                                                                                                                                                                      
14 The gPOD baseline questionnaire was formatted so that the !rst two text-!elds were designated as a place for 
the respondent to list “advantages” and the second two text-!elds were designated for “disadvantages.”  Thus, 
advantages and disadvantages appeared in separate columns in the resulting data !le. Except in some rare cases 
where the coders could reasonably judge that the respondent erroneously listed an advantage in the disadvantage 
text !eld (or vice versa), whether a response was an “advantage” or “disadvantage” could largely be taken at face 
value based on its column placement in the dataset. Also, two additional, nonthematic categories were included in 
the codebook. These were used to classify “don’t know” responses, and responses that did not !t into any of the 
other prede!ned themes.  
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set of participants (nrelibability2 = 100), so that a final reliability test of the coding 
instrument could be conducted.  Elicitation responses from the remaining participants 
(n = 900) were equally divided among the three coders.  After coding was completed, the 
initial and final samples were combined into a single dataset (N = 1,099).15  
Audience Segmentation.  The second phase of Study 1 drew on the content-
analyzed elicitation responses.  Respondents were grouped into audience segments 
through a cluster analysis.  The goal of the cluster analysis was to empirically identify 
two or more subpopulations whose members had similar motivations and informational 
needs with respect to participating in genetics research.  If successful, the audience 
segments would be differentiated by having beliefs that are salient in one group but not 
the others.  Thus, understanding which beliefs differentiate one audience segment from 
another can be useful for developing targeted messages.   
Measures  
 The baseline gPOD survey included direct measures of intention, attitude, 
perceived social pressure, and perceived behavioral control with respect to participating 
in a genetic research study.  Additionally, the survey measured several belief-strength 
items assumed to underlie the attitude construct.  The belief items were selected based 
on a review of literature published between 1994 and 2007 that examined intentions to 
participate in genetics testing and research (see Paquin et al., 2010, for details).   
 Behavioral intention.  Intention to participate in a genetics research study was 
measured with a single item (M = 3.24, SD = 1.23).  The question was premised with a 
short paragraph that introduced the concept of “participating in research studies that 
involve genetic testing.” Participants were then asked, “If it were no cost to you and your 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 The combined sample size does not add up to 1,100.  By conducting separate random draws without replacement 
to generate the initial and !nal subsamples, one participant was inadvertently included in both.  
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family and you were asked to take part in a research study, how likely is it that sometime 
in the next 12 months you would volunteer?” Responses were measured on a 5-point 
scale ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely).  
Direct attitude.   Six semantic differential items were used to measure attitude 
toward taking a genetic test as part of a research study.  All items were scored on 5-point 
scales ranging from 1 to 5.  The common stem for these items was, “If there were no cost 
to you and your family, for you to volunteer to take a genetic test as part of a research 
study sometime in the next 12 months would be….” The semantic differential endpoints 
were harmful–beneficial (H-B), foolish–wise (F-W), worthless–valuable (W-V), 
unsatisfying–satisfying (U-S), undesireable–desirable (U-D), and bad–good (B-G).  
The internal consistency of the items was strong (! = .93).  For some analyses, the 
average of these six items was used as a composite attitude scale (M = 3.66, SD = 0.87). 
Perceived social pressure.   Two dimensions of social influence are relevant in 
applications of the reasoned action model (RAM).  Injunctive norms (M = 3.18, SD = 
0.98) were measured with a single item that asked, “If there were no cost to you and your 
family, would the people in your life whose opinions you value most think you should or 
should not volunteer to take a genetic test as part of a research study sometime in the 
next 12 months?”  Responses were assessed on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely 
should not) to 5 (definitely should). The second dimension of perceived social pressure, 
descriptive norms (M = 2.61, SD = 1.02), was measured by asking respondents how 
much they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “Most people like me have 
volunteered to take a genetic test as part of a research study.”  Responses were measured 
on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  The 
bivariate association between injunctive and descriptive norms was too weak to justify 
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consolidating them into a single measure of perceived social pressure (r = .34, p < .001).  
Instead, the variables were treated as separate predictors. 
Perceived behavioral control.   Perceived behavioral control was measured 
with a single item (M = 1.66, SD = 1.01): “If there were no cost to you and your family 
and you were recruited to participate in a research study requiring a genetic test, how 
confident are you that you could follow through on completing the research?”  Responses 
were measured on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all confident) to 3 (extremely 
confident) 
Behavioral beliefs.  Participant expectations about participating in a genetics 
research study were assessed with eight items.  These items were premised with the 
phrase, “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: My 
participating in a genetics research study in the next 12 months 
will________________?”  The items were scored on 5-point response scales ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  The outcomes were (B1) Help scientists 
develop treatments for disease, (B2) Give me access to information about my genetic 
health risk, (B3) Put the privacy of my genetic information at risk, (B4) Make me a part of 
research that goes against my personal values, (B5) Take away my control over how my 
DNA samples are used, (B6) Make me worry about my health, (B7) Make me feel proud, 
and (B8) Make me hopeful about my future health.  
Belief salience.  As part of the content analysis, each elicitation response was 
assigned a numerical code corresponding to a codebook theme.  In this way, the four 
open-ended response fields were translated into four, multinomial variables.  These 
multinomial variables were then converted into thirty-three binary variables; one 
representing each of the thirty-three codebook themes.  These variables indicated 
whether a respondent elicited a response matching a specific theme, and therefore 
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whether that theme was 0 (nonsalient) or 1 (salient) to the respondent.  These themes 
are listed in the left-hand column of Table 4.1.  
Data Analysis  
 Audience segmentation was conducted using the two-step cluster analysis 
procedure in SPSS 18.0.  Two-step cluster analysis is an exploratory technique 
recommended for large data sets (N > 200).  The procedure is capable of generating 
clusters on the basis of either continuous or categorical data and does not require that 
the number of clusters in the final solution be defined a priori (Noru!is, 2012).  The two-
step clustering algorithm partitions objects into clusters so as to maximize cohesion and 
separation.  Cohesion is the degree of similarity among objects within a given cluster.  
Separation is the amount of dissimilarity between clusters.   
The reliability of the two-step clustering procedure is sensitive to the number of 
variables entered as clustering criteria (Maibach, Maxfield, Ladin & Slater, 1996).  
According to Formann (1984; as cited in Mooi & Sarstedt, 2011), the number of 
clustering variables, m, should not exceed the integer value expressed by the equation, 
m = log(n) / log(2)!" #$ , where n is the number of objects to be clustered.16  The analysis 
excluded participants with responses that did not correspond with any theme in the 
codebook (i.e., n =228, 21% of the final elicitation subsample).  871 respondents 
remained for clustering.  Applying Formann’s rule, using more than nine clustering 
variables would have reduced the reliability of the cluster solution.  Thus, to facilitate 
audience segmentation based on belief salience, the thirty-three binomial salience 
variables were further compiled into nine metathemes (see the top row of Table 4.1).  
These indicated whether a respondent elicited at least one consequence matching a
                                                                                                                                                                      
16 Formann (1984) refers to the minimum acceptable sample size, n = 2m, given a known number of clustering 
variables, m. I transposed this equation to solve for the maximum acceptable m, given a known sample size.  
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Table 4.1 
 
Inductively Developed Belief Elicitation Themes and Metathemes 
 
 Metatheme 
Codebook theme 
Greater 
Good 
Personal 
Feedback 
Practical 
Barriers 
Family/ 
Friends 
Anticipated 
A!ect 
Quality of 
Results 
Privacy 
Concerns Curiosity 
Direct 
Bene!t/ 
Cost 
Altruism/help others (non family) ×         
Contribute to medicine ×         
Contribute to science ×         
Personal information about future 
health/genetic risk  ×        
Personal information about current health  ×        
Early diagnosis of diseases  ×        
Prevent diseases  ×        
Treat diseases  ×        
Maintain current health  ×        
Improve health  ×        
Timing/time consuming   ×       
Physical costs/barriers   ×       
Inconvenient   ×       
Help family/people who are close to you    ×      
Learn about family members’ genetic health risk    ×      
Stressful for others    ×      
Burden to others    ×      
Worrisome/stressful for self     ×     
Peace of mind     ×     
(table continues on next page) 
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
 
 Metatheme 
Codebook theme 
Greater 
Good 
Personal 
Feedback 
Practical 
Barriers 
Family/ 
Friends 
Anticipated 
A!ect 
Quality of 
Results 
Privacy 
Concerns Curiosity 
Direct 
Bene!t/ 
Cost 
Don’t want to know      ×    
Lack of response e!cacy      ×    
Unreliable results      ×    
Uncertain predictor of future conditions      ×    
Concerns about misuse of personal data       ×   
Concerns about privacy/con!dentiality       ×   
Do not trust researchers/genetic science       ×   
Knowledge        ×  
Learn about personal genetic pro!le        ×  
Interesting        ×  
Incentives (nonmonetary)         × 
Help self         × 
Cost (monetary)         × 
Payment (monetary)         × 
Note. Cells marked ‘×’ indicate which codebook themes (i.e., row) were components of each metatheme (i.e., column). 
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theme comprised by that metatheme.  The binary metathemes were used as clustering 
variables.  Thus, defining the nine metathemes was a pragmatic step taken to improve 
the likelihood of identifying meaningful audience segments.   
Because cluster analysis is a heuristic technique, clusters are formed regardless of 
whether natural or meaningful subgroups are present in the population; thus, it was 
important to validate the cluster solution (Sharma, 1996).  Reliability was established by 
using a different clustering procedure on the same data, and comparing the results (Mooi 
& Sarstedt, 2011).  Because binary clustering variables were used, replicating the analysis 
using a k-means clustering approach was possible.  The resulting clusters were then 
cross-tabulated with those defined by the two-step clustering procedure and measures of 
association computed (e.g., kappa, !).  The ! statistic is a measure of the observed 
agreement between coders—in this case clustering algorithms—over a set of categories 
that ranges from "1 to +1 (i.e., perfect disagreement and perfect agreement corrected for 
chance, respectively).  Qualitative guidelines for interpreting ! values have been 
recommended by several authors, with different cut-off values endorsed (Hallgren, 
2012).  A systematic analysis of these cut-off values by Muñoz and Bangdiwala (1997) 
suggests that # $ .75 is an indication of near perfect agreement.  With this threshold in 
mind, I adopted # = .75 as the minimally acceptable value for designating a clustering 
solution as reliable. 
The internal validity of the clustering solution was assessed using the silhouette 
coefficient, which is a measure of the clustering solution’s overall goodness-of-fit based 
on cohesion and separation (Noru%is, 2012).  The silhouette coefficient ranges from "1 to 
+1, with values less than .20 indicating a poor quality solution, between .20 and .50 a fair 
solution, and greater than .50 a good solution (Mooi & Sarstedt, 2011).   
!!
59 
 The external validity of the clustering solution was evaluated using several 
criteria.  First, a descriptive analysis of belief salience was conducted.  Elicitation 
responses were ranked by frequency in the different audience segments (i.e., clusters of 
respondents).  In turn, the relative frequency of a belief within a subpopulation indicated 
its salience for that segment (i.e., modal salience).  Beliefs were classified as modally 
salient for each segment by applying three decision rules adapted from Ajzen and 
Fishbein (1980): (a) the ten most frequently mentioned beliefs, (b) any belief mentioned 
by at least 10% of the sample, or (c) as many beliefs as are necessary to cumulatively 
account for 75% of all beliefs elicited. The observed segments’ modally salient beliefs 
were then compared to identify points of qualitative differentiation and commonality.  
 Second, it has long been hypothesized that salient beliefs will tend to be held 
more strongly than nonsalient beliefs (Cronen & Conville, 1975; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 
see also Newton et al., 2011).  Independent-samples t tests for equality of means were 
conducted to compare belief-strength ratings between audience segments (i.e., clusters).  
Lastly, I tested the hypothesis that associations of differentiated behavioral 
beliefs with attitude and intention would be moderated by audience segment.  A low-
powered test of this hypothesis examined differences in correlation coefficients across 
segments.  This was followed by a more sophisticated and conceptually appropriate 
moderation analysis.  Specifically, a multiple-sample SEM analysis with maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) was implemented using the multi-group procedure in 
AMOS 16.0.  The generic model for the analysis was based on the attitude-components 
measurement model of the RAM described in detail by Hennessy, Bleakley, and Fishbein 
(2012).  The model was adapted for this study and is shown in Figure 4.1.  
Briefly, the eight behavioral belief items were modeled as causal indicators of a 
composite belief index (i.e., formative measure).  In the figure, this formative 
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measurement model presumes that the exogenous manifest variables (i.e., B1 to B8) 
collectively cause the underlying, belief-based attitude construct (i.e, the belief index).  
The double-headed arrows between the causal indicator items reflect unanalyzed 
correlations between items.  The regression coefficients connecting the causal-belief 
items to the belief index are estimates of the influence that each of those beliefs has on 
the index.  To define the scale of the index, the regression coefficient from B8 (i.e., “make 
me hopeful about my future health”) to the index was set to a value of 1.  The disturbance 
of the belief index was set to 0, which makes the latent composite a linear combination of 
its causal indicators (i.e., a weighted manifest variable; Kline, 2011).  Fixing the 
disturbance variance in this way was a strategy for dealing with under-identification in 
the formative measurement model.  Items that referred to undesirable outcomes (i.e., B3, 
B4, B5, and B6) were multiplied by –1 to reverse their values. 
 The six semantic differential items were presumed to be manifest, effect 
indicators of respondents’ underlying attitudes toward participating in genetics research.  
Accordingly, direct attitude was modeled as a standard latent variable (i.e., reflective 
measure).  
Intention was measured with a single item, and was represented as a single-
indicator measure.  To avoid an identification problem, the residual of the manifest item 
was fixed to zero.  
Single-indicator measures of perceived behavioral control, injunctive norms and 
descriptive norms were also included in the model, but are not depicted in Figure 4.1.  
These measures were included to control for the direct effects of perceived norm and 
perceived behavioral control on intention when estimating the indirect effects of belief 
strength items on intention via attitude.  Consistent with the RAM, these measures were 
treated as exogenous variables with direct paths leading to intention.  Covariances
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Figure 4.1.  Measurement model for the attitude component of the reasoned action model as applied in this study.  Adapted from “Measurement Models for 
Reasoned Action Theory,” by M. Hennessy, A. Bleakley, and M. Fishbein, 2012, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 640, p. 49
Belief Index
D1
B1
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
D2
IntentionDirect 
Attitude
D3
H-B W-V F-W U-S U-D G-B INT
1 1 1
1 1
1111111
1
0
0
!!
62 
among these three variables and the disturbance term of the direct attitude scale were 
freely estimated.  
Preliminary analysis revealed that in order to achieve good fit, the error terms 
between several of the semantic differential items needed to be correlated.  In this 
context, this error-covariance structure is justified given the conceptual similarity of the 
response scales, and that these items were presented to respondents as a set.  
In the multisample analysis presented here, the model was simultaneously fit to 
data drawn from two audience segments.  This analysis focused on comparing parameter 
estimates for the direct and indirect effects of beliefs on the weighted-manifest belief 
index, attitude and intention.  As explained in the results section, two beliefs were 
particularly relevant in assessing the external validity of the clustering solution: B1 (i.e., 
“Help scientists develop treatments for disease”) and B2 (i.e., “Give me access to 
information about my genetic health risk”).  Constraining parameters so they are equal 
in both samples is more parsimonious (e.g., has greater degrees of freedom) than a 
model in which these relationships are allowed to differ across groups.  The central 
question examined in a multisample analysis is whether the overall fit of the model 
declines when equality constraints across samples are added to free parameters 
(Maruyama, 1998).   
A variety of global fit indices will be reported, including indices of absolute fit, 
indices of relative fit, and indices of fit with a penalty for lack of parsimony.  These 
include an overall chi-square test of model fit (which should be statistically 
nonsignificant at the .05 alpha-level), the root mean square of approximation (RMSEA; 
which should be less than .08 to declare satisfactory fit and .05 or less for good fit), the p 
value for the test of close fit (pclose-fit; which should be greater than .05), the comparative 
fit index (CFI; which should be greater than .95), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI; which 
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should be greater than 0.95), and the standardized root means square residual (SRMR; 
which should be less than .05).  
In the analysis presented here, the overall model for each group has the same 
form.  That is, the parameter matrices, dimensions, and location of the fixed, free and 
constrained parameters are the same for each group (Bollen, 1989).  Given this, models 
with more equality constraints are nested within models with fewer equality constraints.  
Accordingly, omnibus comparisons of model fit were made using the chi-square 
difference test, !2D.  Between-group comparisons of specific parameters and 
relationships between variables were assessed with pair-wise parameter difference tests.  
Results  
Belief Elicitation  
Intercoder reliability of the initial codebook was calculated using ReCal3, a 
reliability calculator for nominal data coded by three or more coders (Freelon, 2010a, 
2010b).  The average, pair-wise percent agreement among the three coders was 84% for 
the first advantage and 86% for the second advantage listed by respondents 
(Krippendorff’s " = .83 and .84, respectively).  The first disadvantage had an average 
pair-wise percent agreement of 78%, while the second disadvantage was 88% 
(Krippendorff’s " = .75 and .85, respectively).  In each case, the intercoder reliability of 
the initial codebook met or exceeded the a priori acceptable minimum (i.e., 
Krippendorff’s " = .75). 
Satisfactory intercoder reliability was also achieved when coding the final sample.  
The average, pair-wise percent agreement among the three coders was 77% for the first 
advantage and 80% for the second advantage listed by respondents (Krippendorff’s " = 
.75 and .77, respectively).  The first disadvantage had an average pair-wise percent 
agreement of 86%, while the second disadvantage was 82% (Krippendorff’s " = .84 and 
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.79, respectively).  Codebook themes ranked by the number of times each belief was 
mentioned by participants in the elicitation study are presented in Table 4.2.  The 
superscripts indicate which codebook themes would be considered modally salient 
beliefs for the general population based on the three different decision rules defined by 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980).  
Audience Segmentation  
All nine metathemes were entered as clustering variables in an initial two-step 
cluster analysis.  This analysis identified two distinct groups.  The average silhouette for 
this clustering solution was .20, indicating that the degree of separation and cohesion 
exhibited by these clusters was poor.  A replication of this analysis using a k-means 
clustering approach produced clusters that agreed substantially with the original two-
step solution, ! = .71, p < .001.  Nonetheless, this level of agreement fell short of the 
minimally acceptable reliability threshold (i.e., ! " .75).  
A tentative examination of this solution revealed that two metathemes were 
particularly important for cluster formation: personal feedback and greater good.  
Compared to 77% of respondents in the first cluster who had elicited at least one belief 
that made up the personal feedback metatheme, only 14% did so in the second cluster.  
In contrast, only 18% of respondents in the first cluster had elicited at least one greater-
good belief versus 73% of respondents in the second cluster. 
As a follow-up, I performed a second two-step cluster analysis using only the 
personal-feedback and greater-good metathemes as clustering variables.  This analysis 
produced a four-cluster solution, with an average silhouette of 1.0.  In addition to very 
strong internal validity, a k-means replication analysis perfectly reproduced the four 
clusters generated by the two-step clustering procedure.  An examination of the cluster
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Table 4.2 
Frequency of Belief-Elicitation Themes in a Random Subsample of gPOD Participants  
 
Codebook theme Rank f %V %N 
Timing/time consumingabc 1 198 7.9 18.0 
Altruism/help others (non family)abc 2 169 6.8 15.4 
Concerns about misuse of information/sampleabc 3 161 6.4 14.6 
Concerns about privacy/con!dentialityabc 4 158 6.3 14.4 
Contribute to scienceabc 5 157 6.3 14.3 
Contribute to medicineabc 6 150 6.0 13.6 
Personal information about future health/genetic riskabc 7 144 5.8 13.1 
Don’t want to knowabc 8 136 5.4 12.4 
Knowledgeabc 9 130 5.2 11.8 
Worrisome/stressful for selfabc 10 128 5.1 11.6 
Personal information about current healthab 11 127 5.1 11.6 
Physical costs/barriersa 12 86 3.4 7.8 
Inconvenienta 13 77 3.1 7.0 
Lack of response e!cacya 15 67 2.7 6.1 
Help family/people who are close to you 14 66 2.6 6.0 
Family knowledge of genetic health risk 16 60 2.3 5.5 
Personal information about genetics/genetic makeup 17 53 2.1 4.8 
Treat diseases 18 51 2.0 4.6 
Prevent diseases 19 50 2.0 4.5 
Incentives (nonmonetary) 20 44 1.8 4.0 
Help self 21 43 1.7 3.9 
Unreliable results 22 41 1.6 3.7 
Improve health 23 32 1.3 2.9 
Interesting 24 28 1.1 2.5 
Early diagnosis of diseases 25 25 1.0 2.3 
Cost (monetary) 26 24 1.0 2.2 
Payment (monetary) 27 22 0.9 2.0 
Maintain current health 28 20 0.8 1.8 
Lack of trust 29 15 0.6 1.4 
Stressful for others 30 15 0.6 1.4 
Peace of mind 31 10 0.4 0.9 
Burden to others 32 9 0.4 0.8 
Uncertain predictor of future conditions 33 5 0.2 0.5 
Note. N = 1,099.  V = 2,501 = Number of valid elicitation responses given by respondents.  f = Frequency of the 
elicitation theme.  %V  = Percentage of valid elicitation responses matching the theme.  %N = Percentage of 
respondents who elicited at least one belief matching the theme.  Each participant could list up to four outcomes, 
which yielded a total of 4,396 coded responses.  
 
a Modal salient belief based on “75% of valid elicitation responses” decision rule 
b Modal salient belief based on “10% of respondents” decision rule 
c  Modal salient belief based on “Top 10 valid elicitation responses” decision rule 
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characteristics revealed that the first cluster (n = 317, 36%) was comprised entirely of 
respondents who elicited at least one greater-good belief and no personal-feedback 
beliefs.  The second cluster (n = 282, 33%) included only respondents who elicited at 
least one personal-feedback belief but no greater-good beliefs.  Respondents in the third 
cluster (n = 117, 20%) had elicited no beliefs that fit within these two metathemes.  And 
the fourth cluster (n = 95, 11%) was made-up of respondents who elicited both greater-
good and personal-feedback beliefs. 
Participants in the first and second clusters differed with respect to the number 
of beliefs in the greater-good and personal-feedback metathemes that they listed.  For 
the sake of convenience and clarity throughout the remainder of this dissertation, I will 
refer to these two groups as the altruist and instrumentalist audience segments, 
respectively.  The emergence of differences based on these metathemes is consistent with 
findings reported by Facio et al. (2011).  Corroboration with prior research in this way 
lends face validity to the clustering solution.  
Validation of the audience-segmentation strategy.  A more nuanced 
understanding of the characteristics of the clustering solution is possible.  Toward that 
end, I examined between-segment differences in belief salience, belief strength, and 
associations of particular beliefs with attitudes and intentions.  
Descriptive comparison of belief salience.  As a qualitative check of the 
external validity of this clustering solution, I compared the modally-salient beliefs for 
these two groups.  Table 4.3 shows the most frequent codebook themes by audience 
segment.   
Not surprisingly, elicited beliefs that comport with themes consolidated into the 
greater-good and personal-feedback metathemes are among the most common in both 
groups.  These beliefs also appear to differentiate the two audience segments from one  
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Table 4.3 
Frequency of Belief-Elicitation Themes by Audience Segment  
 
 Altruists (n = 317, v = 918) Instrumentalists (n = 282, v = 840) 
Rank Theme f %v %n Theme f %v %n 
1 Help othersabc 143 15.6 45.1 Info about personal riskabc 99 11.8 35.1 
2 Contribute to scienceabc 124 13.5 39.1 Info about current healthabc 98 11.7 34.8 
3 Contribute to medicineabc 114 12.4 36.0 Don’t want to knowabc 63 7.5 22.3 
4 Time consumingabc 96 10.5 30.3 Worryabc 60 7.1 21.3 
5 Privacy concernsabc 62 6.8 19.6 Misuse of dataabc 49 5.9 17.4 
6 Misuse of dataabc 60 6.5 18.9 Privacy concernsabc 46 5.5 16.3 
7 Physical barriersabc 48 5.2 15.1 Treat diseaseabc 44 5.2 15.6 
8 Inconvenientabc 34 3.7 10.7 Prevent diseaseabc 42 5.0 14.9 
9 Knowledgeabc 32 3.5 10.1 Time consumingabc 39 4.6 13.8 
10 Don’t want to knowc 27 2.9 8.5 Family health risk infoabc 36 4.3 12.8 
11 Worry 24 2.6 7.6 Response e!cacyab 30 3.6 10.6 
12 Response e!cacy 23 2.5 7.3 Improve healtha 28 3.3 9.9 
        
Note. N = 599. v = Number of valid elicitation responses given by respondents.  f = Frequency of the elicitation 
response theme.  %v = Percent of valid elicitation responses that matched the theme.  %n = Percent of respondents 
who elicited at least one response matching the theme.  Excluded in this analysis are responses in which the 
participant did not list anything in the space provided, indicated that nothing comes to mind, gave a response that 
did not correspond with any theme in the codebook, or repeated an outcome that !t into a single theme.  
 
a Modal salient belief based on “75% of valid elicitation responses” decision rule 
b Modal salient belief based on “10% or respondents” decision rule 
c Modal salient belief based on “Top 10 valid elicitation responses” decision rule 
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another.  The altruist segment reported with great frequency outcomes related to helping 
others, advancing medicine and contributing science.  In contrast, many of the beliefs 
reported by participants in the instrumentalist segment presupposed that personal 
health information would be returned to them.  People in this audience segment 
appeared to expect to receive direct health benefits for themselves or their friends and 
family through participating in genetics research. 
The disadvantages that were salient for instrumentalists also reflect an 
underlying emphasis on receiving personal information.  For example, 21% of 
respondents in the instrumentalist segment were concerned that they would learn 
something that they do not want to know, and 11% were concerned about receiving 
information that would not be actionable.  In contrast, the motivation to contribute to 
society that is prevalent among the altruists may be offset by perceived disadvantages 
related to participation itself.  For example, 15% of altruists mentioned physical barriers, 
like pain associated with having blood drawn, and 11% noted that participation would be 
inconvenient.  
Comparison of the modally salient beliefs for the two audience segments revealed 
numerous points of differentiation; however, there was also evidence of commonality.  
Specifically, three beliefs were salient for both segments based on all three decision rules.  
In both segments, the time burden of participating, privacy concerns, and fears that data 
or DNA samples would be misused were salient disadvantages of participating in 
genetics research.  
Between-segment differences  of  belief strength and belief–intention 
correlations.   Many of the closed-ended belief-strength items (i.e., B1–B8) collected as 
part of the gPOD baseline survey correspond to modally-salient beliefs of the altruist and 
instrumentalist audience segments.  Two beliefs were particularly notable.  The closed-
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ended item, “[My participation will…] Help scientists develop treatments for disease 
(B1),” relates to the second most frequent codebook theme given by respondents in the 
altruist segment (i.e., “Contribute to science”). Likewise, the belief item, “Give me access 
to information about my genetic health risk (B2),” corresponds closely with the most 
frequent codebook theme in the instrumentalist segment (i.e., “Info about personal 
risk”).  A third item, “Make me worry about my health (B6),” corresponds with a belief 
that was modally salient for instrumentalists, but fell short of meeting the salience 
criteria for altruists (i.e., “Worry”).  
In addition to beliefs that differentiate the two audience segments, three of the 
closed-ended items related to beliefs that were modally salient for both groups.  “Put the 
privacy of my genetic information at risk (B3)” relates to the theme, “Privacy concerns.” 
The other items that corresponded with a belief that demonstrated common salience, 
“Make me a part of research that goes against my personal values (B4)” and “Take away 
my control over how my DNA samples are used (B5),” both loosely fit with the theme 
“Misuse of data.”  
Table 4.4 shows means and standard deviations of behavioral belief items by 
Audience Segment.  Also listed is the room-for-improvement index (RFII) for each item.  
RFII is “a ratio that can be interpreted as analogous to the percentage of people yet to 
adopt the desired belief” (Dillard, 2011, p. 482).17  Also reported are Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients denoting the bivariate association of each belief item with intention to 
participate in genetics research. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
17 Formally, Dillard de!nes RFII by the following equation: 
 
 
,
1!
!
=
UE
MUE
RFII
 (4.1) 
 
where UE is the upper end of the response scale (i.e., the “true” or ideal score) and M is the item mean.  In the case of 
negatively worded items, the RFII is !ipped by subtracting from one. 
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Table 4.4 
Mean Belief Strength, Correlation with Intention, and Room for Improvement of Belief Items by 
Audience Segment  
 
 Altruists (n = 317)  Instrumentalists (n = 282) 
Belief item M SD r RFII  M SD r RFII 
 
My participating in a genetic research 
study in the next 12 months will… 
          
B1…Help scientists develop 
treatments for disease.  
 
4.22a 0.65 .40b 20%  4.04 0.72 .27 24% 
B2…Give me access to information 
about my genetic health risk. 
 
3.88 0.79 .13 72%  4.10a 0.76 .32b 78% 
B3…Put the privacy of my genetic 
information at risk. 
 
3.39 1.06 −.34 60%  3.48 1.05 −.39 62% 
B4…Make me a part of research that 
goes against my personal values. 
 
2.21 1.11 −.39 30%  2.38 1.15 −.41 34% 
B5…Take away my control over how 
my DNA samples are used. 
 
3.23 1.07 −.32 44%  3.28 1.06 −.26 43% 
B6…Make me worry about my health. 
 
2.93 1.11 −.26 48%  3.42a 1.03 −.28 61% 
B7…Make me feel proud. 
 
3.49a 0.97 .51 38%  3.18 0.92 .44 46% 
B8…Make me hopeful about my 
future health. 
 
3.40 0.89 .32 40%  3.65a 0.83 .44 34% 
         
Note. N = 599. RFII = room-for-improvement index.  Correlation coe!cients reported are measures of the 
association between each belief item with intention to participate in genetics research.  All correlations are 
signi!cantly di"erent from zero at p < .001 except for that between B2 and intention in the GG audience segment  
(r = .13), which is signi#cant at p < .05.  
 
a  Based on an independent samples t-test, the mean belief strength of this item for this audience segment is 
signi!cantly greater than in the other segment, p < .05. 
b Correlation coe!cient is signi"cantly greater in this audience segment than in the other, p < .05; based on a one-
tailed test of the di!erence between two correlation coe"cients found in two independent samples using Fisher’s r 
to z transformation. 
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In assessing the external validity of the audience segmentation strategy, two sets 
of between-segment comparisons are particularly relevant.  First, behavioral beliefs 
classified as modally salient in one audience segment but not the other are expected to be 
held more strongly by members of the segment for which the belief is modally salient 
(Cronen & Conville, 1975; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  In other words, altruists will agree 
more strongly with item B1 (i.e., contribute to science) than will instrumentalists.  
Likewise, B2 (i.e., received personal genetic information) and B6 (i.e., worry) will be held 
more strongly by the instrumentalists.  Between-segment differences in belief strength of 
outcomes that were salient for both audience segments are not expected (i.e., B3–B5).  
Second, the absolute magnitude of associations between behavioral beliefs and 
intention were expected to be greater when the beliefs are salient than nonsalient.  Thus, 
the B1–intention correlation should be greater among the altruists.  Likewise, B2–
intention and B6–intention correlations should be greater among the instrumentalists 
than among the altruists.  
In line with expectations, independent-samples t tests for equality of means 
provided evidence of conventionally small-to-medium differences in belief strength by 
Audience Segment.  The belief that participating would help scientists develop 
treatments for disease (i.e., B1) was significantly stronger in the altruist segment than in 
the instrumentalist segment, t(591) = !3.25, p = .001, d = 0.26.  Similarly, the belief that 
participating in a genetic research study would provide personal information about 
genetic health risk (i.e., B2) was held more strongly by instrumentalists than by altruists, 
t(595) = 3.39, p < .001, d = 0.28.  Concerns that participating would lead to health-
related worry (i.e., B6) were also believed more strongly by respondents in the 
instrumentalist segment, t(594) = 5.53, p < .001, d = 0.45.   
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No between-segment differences were observed in the “commonality” beliefs (i.e., 
B3–B5); however, mean differences were observed in the remaining two belief items.  
Item B7 (i.e., “make me feel proud”) was significantly stronger for the altruists than the 
instrumentalists, t(591.464) = !4.07, p < .001, d = 0.34.  In contrast, item B8 (i.e., “make 
me hopeful about my future health”) was believed more strongly by members of the 
instrumentalist segment, t(593) = 3.43, p < .001, d = 0.28.  No specific hypotheses were 
posed with respect to these last two beliefs because neither corresponded to themes 
generated from the belief elicitation.  It is worth noting that these beliefs appear to be 
affective in nature, and may not have been elicited even if they were salient due to the 
way the elicitation question was worded (Stephen Sutton et al., 2003). 
Evidence in support of the hypothesized moderation effect of Audience Segment 
on the associations between belief items and intention was also found in two out of three 
cases.  One-tailed tests of the difference between two independent correlation 
coefficients based on Fisher’s r to z transformation were used for this analysis (Jacob 
Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003; Preacher, 2002).  These tests revealed that the 
correlation of B1 with intention was significantly greater for the altruists than it was for 
instrumentalists, z = 1.78, p = .037.  Also consistent with expectations, the correlation 
between B2 and intention was significantly greater for instrumentalists, z = 2.46, p = 
.007.  The correlation coefficients for the association between B6 and intention by 
segment were not significantly different, z = 0.31, p = .379.  In hindsight, this finding 
may not be particularly surprising, given that “worry” was the eleventh most-frequent 
theme elicited by participants in the altruist audience segment.  By failing to meet the 
threshold of a modally salient belief according to the “top 10” rule by just one rank-
position, the belief might have been marginally salient for members of the altruist 
segment.   
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Lastly, it is interesting to note that despite these differences in belief strength and 
belief–intention correlations, attitude toward participating was equally favorable for the 
altruists (M = 3.79, SD = 0.79) and the instrumentalists (M = 3.76, SD = 0.85), t(595) = 
!0.49, p = .622.  Similarly, mean intention to participate in the altruist segment (M = 
3.44, SD = 1.17) was statistically indistinguishable from the mean intention in the 
instrumentalist segment (M = 3.35, SD = 1.16), t(596) = !1.01, p = .314.  The data 
presented to this point suggests that, on average, respondents in both segments have 
formed equally strong attitudes and intentions toward participating, but may have done 
so on the basis of different information. 
Multisample SEM analysis.  The external validity of the clustering solution was 
further evaluated by testing the hypothesis that the association of differentiated 
behavioral beliefs with the latent summed-product belief index, attitude and intention 
would be moderated by Audience Segment.  Specifically, it was expected that the direct 
and indirect effects of B1 (viz., contribute to science) on the belief index, attitude and 
intention would be stronger among altruists than among instrumentalists.  Conversely, 
the direct and indirect effects of B2 (viz., receive personal risk information) on the belief 
index, attitude and intention would be stronger in the instrumentalist segment than in 
the altruist segment.   
The analysis reported here was restricted to respondents who had been classified 
as members of the altruist or instrumentalist audience segments (N = 599).  Missing 
values on variables included in the model were imputed using the multiple imputation 
procedure in LISREL 8.8.  Mardia’s coefficient for multivariate kurtosis was 80.37 in the 
instrumentalist sample and 67.09 in the altruist sample, indicating a non-normal 
multivariate distribution of the data.  Bias-corrected confidence intervals, standard 
errors and p-values were estimated using a bootstrapping approach with 2,000 
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replications. The Bollen-Stine bootstrapped p value for the chi-square tests of model fit 
were also reported (pB-S; Bollen & Stine, 1992).  
First, the fit of the hypothesized model was tested separately in the two samples 
to check that it was tenable for each group.  For the altruists (n = 317), the hypothesized 
model showed excellent fit with the data, where !2(71) = 88.77, pB-S = .268, RMSEA = .03 
[90% CI: .00, .05], pclose fit = .990, TLI = 0.99, CFI = .99, and SRMR = .03.  The fit 
statistics also indicated adequate model-fit in the instrumentalist sample (n = 282), 
where !2(71) = 108.71, pB-S  = .098, RMSEA = .04 [90% CI: .03, .06], pclose fit = .736, TLI = 
0.97, CFI = .99, and SRMR = .03.  In sum, the model was tenable for both samples. 
Next, I conducted a multiple sample SEM.  In the best fitting constrained model, 
all path coefficients connecting the measured belief items to the belief index, the path 
from the belief index to attitude, and the paths from attitude, injunctive norm, 
descriptive norm and perceived behavioral control to intention were constrained to be 
equal in both groups.  The disturbances of the endogenous latent variables, 
measurement error terms, unobserved correlations among the belief items, and the 
coefficients relating observed indicators to the latent attitude scale were allowed to differ 
across groups.  Fit indices for the constrained model were as follows: !2(154) = 222.86, 
pB-S = .056, RMSEA = .03 [90% CI: .02, .04], pclose fit = 1.00, TLI = 0.97, CFI = .99, and 
SRMR = .03.   
In the unconstrained model, the coefficients relating B1 and B2 to the latent belief 
index were allowed to differ between the two audience segments. Based on the results 
from exploratory analyses of different model configurations, the direct path from 
descriptive norm to intention was also estimated separately for each sample. This 
characteristic of the statistical model is conceptually justified, given that the direct 
predictors of intention according to the RAM are not expected to have equal impact in all 
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populations. The unconstrained model also fit the data well, where !2(151) = 206.02, pB-S 
= .114, RMSEA = .03 [90% CI: .02, .04], pclose fit = 1.00, TLI = 0.98, CFI = .99, and SRMR 
= .03.18  Fit indices for both the constrained and unconstrained models demonstrate 
adequate fit with the data. 
Although the constrained model is more parsimonious than the unconstrained 
model, the imposition of equality constraints significantly reduced overall model fit, !2D 
(3) = 16.844, p < .001.  In other words, when the estimates of the coefficients relating B1 
and B2 to the belief index and descriptive norm to intention are allowed to differ by 
Audience Segment, the model fits the data significantly better despite a loss of 
parsimony.   
Parameter estimates for the final (i.e., unconstrained) model are shown in Table 
4.5.  As expected, pair-wise parameter difference tests provided evidence that the direct 
effect of B1 on the belief index was stronger among alturists than it was for 
instrumentalists, z = 2.479, p = .013.  Also, the direct effect of B2 on the belief index was 
significantly stronger for the instrumentalists than for the altruists, z = 2.332, p = .020.  
Comparison of the parameter estimates in the respective audience segments reveals that 
this moderation effect was particularly dramatic.  Whereas B1 was a significant causal 
indicator of the underlying belief index in the altruist audience segment, it was not 
significant in the instrumentalist segment.  Likewise, B2 was only a significant indicator 
of the belief index in the instrumentalist segment.  The same pattern was also evident for 
the indirect effects of B1 and B2 on attitude and intention.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
18 I compared this unconstrained model with several others that had fewer equality constraints (e.g. setting all 
coe!cients from the belief items to the index free; as well as setting the path coe!cients from the belief index to 
latent attitude, and all direct paths to intention free). The overall !t of the model I adopted was statistically no 
di!erent from any of these alternatives, but was the most parsimonious. 
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Table 4.5 
Selected Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates from a Structural Model Predicting Attitude 
and Intention to Participate in a Genetic Research Study by Audience Segment  
 
 Altruists (n = 317) Instrumentalists (n = 282) 
Parameter Unst. SE St. Unst. SE St. 
Direct e!ects       
 B1 ! Belief indexa 1.37*** 0.57 .27 0.18 0.39 .04 
 B2 ! Belief indexa 0.49 0.44 .12 1.51*** 0.64 .34 
 B3 ! Belief index 0.47** 0.27 .16 0.47** 0.27 .15 
 B4 ! Belief index 0.58*** 0.24 .20 0.58*** 0.24 .20 
 B5 ! Belief index −0.04 0.20 −.01 −0.04 0.20 −.01 
 B6 ! Belief index 0.59*** 0.24 .20 0.59*** 0.24 .18 
 B7 ! Belief index 1.33*** 0.51 .40 1.33*** 0.51 .36 
 B8 ! Belief index 1.00c — .28 1.00c — .25 
 Belief index ! Direct attitude 0.18*** 0.04 .74 0.18*** 0.04 .73 
 R2Attitude .54**   .54**   
 Direct attitude ! Intention 0.45*** 0.07 .30 0.45*** 0.07 .32 
 Descriptive norm ! Intentionab 0.19*** 0.06 .16 0.02 0.06 .02 
 Injunctive norm ! Intention 0.15** 0.06 .13 0.15** 0.06 .13 
 Perceived behavioral control ! Intention 0.41*** 0.05 .33 0.41*** 0.05 .35 
 R2Intention .51**   .49**   
Indirect e!ects       
 B1 ! Direct attitudea 0.24*** 0.08 .20 0.03 0.06 .03 
 B2 ! Direct attitudea 0.09 0.06 .09 0.27*** 0.07 .25 
       
 B1 ! Intentiona 0.11*** 0.04 .06 0.01 0.03 .01 
 B2 ! Intentiona 0.04 0.03 .03 0.12*** 0.04 .08 
       
Note. N = 599.  Unst. = Unstandardized parameter estimate; St. = Standardized parameter estimate; B1 = Help 
scientists develop treatments for disease; B2 = Give me access to information about my genetic health risk; B3 = Put 
the privacy of my genetic information at risk; B4 = Make me a part of research that goes against my personal values; 
B5 = Take away my control over how my DNA samples are used; B6 = Make me worry about my health; B7 = Make me 
feel proud; B8 = Make me hopeful about my future health; PBC = Perceived behavioral control.  Bootstrap standard 
errors and p-values were calculated using the bias-corrected percentile method.  
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001.  
 
a Parameter freely estimated in each sample. 
b The estimates for this parameter in each sample are signi!cantly di"erent, z = 2.47, p < .01. 
c Unstandardized coe!cient constrained to unity to set metric for latent index, no signi!cance test possible. 
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In all, the results of the multisample analysis provide support for the external 
validity of the clustering solution.  Specifically, the results provide evidence that 
expecting to “help scientists develop treatments for disease (B1)” is a determinant of 
attitude and intention for altruists, but not for the instrumentalists. Similarly, 
expectations about receiving “information about my genetic health risk (B2)” are 
associated with attitudes and intentions to participate in genetics research among 
instrumentalists, but not among altruists. 
Alternative moderation analysis using OLS regression.   To corroborate the 
results of the multisample SEM analysis, I also conducted tests for moderation using 
hierarchical OLS regression.  Two separate analyses predicting attitude and intention 
were run.  In both cases, the analysis proceeded in three steps.  First, attitude (intention) 
was regressed on all eight behavioral beliefs.  In the second step, a dummy variable 
denoting membership in one of the audience segments was added.  The instrumentalist 
segment was the reference category.  Lastly, two interaction terms were entered in the 
third step: B1 ! Audience Segment and B2 ! Audience Segment.  The interaction terms 
were computed using mean-centered belief variables to avoid issues with 
multicollinearity (Jacob Cohen et al., 2003).  All beliefs included in the model were also 
mean-centered.  The analyses were conducted using the same imputed dataset from the 
multisample SEM (N = 599).  For this analysis, attitude (M = 3.77, SD = .82) was 
computed by taking the average of the six manifest variables that had been used as effect 
indicators in the SEM analysis.   
Collectively, the eight behavioral beliefs entered in the first step explained 47% of 
the variance in attitude, R2 = .47, F(8, 590) = 65.70, p < .001, f2 = 0.890.  Addition of the 
audience segment variable in the second step did not significantly contribute to the 
amount of variance explained, "F (1, 589) = 1.26, p = .261, ns.  However, the two 
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interaction terms entered in the third step explained an additional 1% of the variance in 
attitude, !R2 = .01, !F(2, 587) = 4.15, p = .016, f2 = 0.010.  Moreover, as predicted, the 
regression coefficients of both interaction terms were significantly different from 0.  
Adjusting for all other variables in the model, Audience Segment moderated the effect of 
B1 on attitude, such that the association was stronger among members of the altruist 
segment, bB1 " Audience Segment  = 0.17, SE = 0.08, t(587) = 2.22, p = .027, f2 = 0.013.  
Audience Segment also moderated the effect of B2 on attitude, such that the association 
was significantly weaker among members of the altruist segment, bB2 " Audience Segment  = 
#0.17, SE = 0.07, t(587) = #2.48, p = .014, f2 = 0.013.  These results are fully consistent 
with those observed in the multisample SEM. 
For the model predicting intention, the eight belief variables entered in the first 
step accounted for 36% of the variance, R2 = .36, F(8, 590) = 41.81, p < .001, f2 = 0.570.  
Addition of the Audience Segment variable in the second step did not explain any 
additional variance in intentions, !F (1, 589) = 0.71, p = .400, ns.  A marginally 
significant increase in explained variance resulted from adding the interaction terms in 
the third step, R2 = .01, F(2, 587) = 2.98, p = .052.  Bearing that in mind, being a 
member of the altruist audience segment did not significantly alter the association of B2 
with intention, bB2 " Audience Segment  = #0.18, SE = 0.11, t(587) = #1.654, p = .099.  The 
regression coefficient for the B1 " Audience Segment interaction term was significant, bB1 
" Audience Segment  = 0.27, SE = 0.12, t(587) = 2.25, p = .025, f2 = 0.008.  Considering the 
limitations this analysis, I would emphasize that the pattern of results aligns with those 
observed from the multisample SEM.   
Conclusion  
Based on the results from Study 1, there is evidence of two distinct 
subpopulations of potential research participants: the altruists and instrumentalists.  
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Each of these audience segments has different motivations for participating in genetics 
research.  Beliefs about contributing to science were determinants of attitude and 
intention, but only for respondents classified as members of the altruist segment.  Beliefs 
about gaining access to information about personal genetic health risk were 
determinants of attitude and intention, but only for members of the instrumentalist 
segment.  According to the conceptual model described in Chapter 3, changes in these 
beliefs should impact attitude and intention differently, depending on audience segment.  
In the next chapter, I present an experiment designed to examine the effects of message 
content that matches the uniquely salient beliefs of one audience segment versus the 
other.  The messages used in that experiment were designed to influence beliefs about 
participating in a fictitious whole-genome sequencing research project, called the 
SEQOME Project.  An important characteristic of the SEQOME Project—as it was 
presented to respondents—is that no individual sequence data or related health 
information would be returned to participants.  
Specific Hypotheses  
Effects of message exposure on belief strength.   The first hypothesis 
refers to the conditional direct effects of messages targeted to address the altruists’ and 
instrumentalists’ uniquely salient beliefs.  Table 4.6 lists the twelve behavioral beliefs 
that were differentially salient for the altruist and instrumentalist audience segments.  
Also presented are the desired position for each belief in the context of the SEQOME 
Project (i.e., true/strongly agree v. false/strongly disagree), the anticipated message 
position (i.e., affirm v. disconfirm), the overall evaluation of the outcome predicated in 
each belief item (i.e., advantage v. disadvantage), and the effect on attitude and intention 
that is expected assuming the belief is salient and yielding occurs.  Study 1 demonstrated 
that altruists and instrumentalists agreed more strongly with beliefs that were uniquely  
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Table 4.6 
 
Desired Position, Message Position, Outcome Evaluation, and Expected E!ect of Yielding on 
Attitude and Intention for Salient Beliefs by Audience Segment 
 
Belief item 
Modal 
salience 
Desired 
position 
Message 
position 
Outcome 
evaluation 
E!ect of 
yielding on 
attitude/ 
intention 
My participating in a genetic research 
study in the next 12 months will…      
 …Help others in the future. ALT T A + M 
 …Help advance science. ALT T A + M 
 …Contribute to medical research. ALT T A + M 
 …Contribute to knowledge. ALT T A + M 
 …Cause me to feel physical pain. ALT T A – L 
 …Be an inconvenience to me. ALT T A – L 
 …Give me information about my personal genetic health risk. INST F D + L 
 …Teach me something new about my current health. INST F D + L 
 …Give me information to help me make medical treatment decisions. INST F D + L 
 …Provide me with information to help me prevent disease. INST F D + L 
 …Make me feel worried about my health. INST F D – M 
 …Tell me something about my genes that I do not want to know. INST F D – M 
     + 
Note. ALT = Modally salient for the altruist audience segment. INST = Modally salient for the instrumentalist 
audience segment.  T = True/strongly agree. F = False/strongly disagree.  A = A!rm the proposition expressed by 
the behavioral belief. D = Discon!rm the proposition expressed by the behavioral belief. + = Predicate is generally 
viewed as a positive outcome or advantage. – = Predicate is generally viewed as a negative outcome or 
disadvantage. M = Yielding with the message position will tend to contribute to a more favorable attitude and 
greater intention, assuming the belief is salient.  L = Yielding with the message position will tend to contribute to a 
less favorable attitude and lower intention, assuming the belief is salient.  No explicit assumptions are made about 
the behavioral beliefs that are concordantly salient for both segments: Time consuming, privacy concerns and 
misuse of data.  
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salient to members of their respective groups.  Generalizing the results from Study 1, it is 
reasonable to assume that beliefs that were salient for the altruist segment (i.e., greater-
good beliefs) will be aligned with the desired message position; beliefs that were salient 
for the instrumentalist segment (i.e., personal-feedback beliefs) are likely to be 
misaligned.  Moreover, differences in belief strength by audience segment translate into 
foreseeable differences in discrepancy and, thus, room for improvement.  Specifically, 
greater room for improvement is expected in both greater-good and personal-feedback 
beliefs among instrumentalists than among altruists.   
The following pair of hypotheses refers to changes in belief strength due to 
message exposure.  In the experiment presented in Chapter 5, message customization 
was captured by a manipulated factor, Message Topic (no-message control, altruist-
targeted, instrumentalist-targeted).  The altruist-targeted message aims to strengthen 
GG beliefs, and the instrumentalist-targeted message aims to weaken PF beliefs.  The 
hypotheses follow from the conceptual discussion connecting salience to belief change 
(e.g., Jaccard, 1981).  The observed group-level factor, Audience Segment (altruist, 
instrumentalist), can be viewed as a proxy of belief salience.  Two complimentary 
hypotheses are outlined here.  In H1a, greater-good (GG) beliefs are the dependent 
variables.  In H1b, personal-feedback (PF) beliefs are the dependent variables. 
 
H1a:  There will be an Audience Segment ! Message Topic interaction effect 
on GG belief strength.  The altruist-targeted message will increase GG 
belief strength more among subjects in the instrumentalist segment 
than it will among those in the altruist segment.  The expected pattern 
of GG belief strength by experimental condition is depicted in Figure 
4.2.  
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H1b: There will be an Audience Segment ! Message Topic interaction effect 
on PF belief strength.  The instrumentalist-targeted message will 
decrease PF belief strength more among subjects in the altruist 
segment than it will among those in the instrumentalist segment.  The 
expected pattern of PF beliefs strength by experimental condition is 
shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
Moderator Effect of Belief Salience on the Association of Behavioral 
Beliefs with Attitude and Intention.  According to the conceptual model outlined in 
Chapter 3, salient behavioral beliefs are more strongly related to attitudes and intentions 
than nonsalient beliefs.  Operationally, belief strength ! outcome evaluation terms (i.e., 
behavioral beliefs) will have a greater positive impact on attitude and intention when 
those measures refer to salient outcomes.  However, the RAM and media priming theory 
(MPT) offer different accounts of salience.  According to MPT, exposure to a message 
addressing otherwise nonsalient beliefs can make them temporarily salient.  Thus, two 
competing hypotheses are offered. 
 
H2RAM:  Audience Segment will moderate the direct positive association of 
behavioral beliefs with attitude. GG behavioral beliefs will be more 
strongly related to attitude among altruists than among 
instrumentalists. PF behavioral beliefs will be more strongly related to 
attitude among instrumentalists than among altruists.  The 
conditional effect of Audience Segment will also indirectly impact 
intention through attitude.  
Figure 4.2. Expected pattern of greater-good belief strength by Message Topic and Audience Segment, as 
predicted in H1a.
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Figure 4.3. Expected pattern of personal-feedback belief strength by Message Topic and Audience Segment, as 
predicted in H1b.
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H2MPT: Audience Segment and Message Topic will moderate the direct 
positive association of behavioral beliefs with attitude.  GG behavioral 
beliefs will be more strongly related to attitude among subjects 
exposed to the altruist-targeted message versus the instrumentalist-
targeted message.  PF behavioral beliefs will be more strongly related 
to attitude among those exposed to the instrumentalist-targeted 
message versus the instrumentalist-targeted message.  The Audience 
Segment interaction effect will prevail when there is no message.  The 
conditional effect of Message Topic will also indirectly impact 
intention through attitude.  
 
Indirect effects of message exposure on attitude and intention .  If the 
claims made in the instrumentalist-targeted message were fully accepted, they would 
generally entail a less favorable view of participating in the SEQOME Project than that 
originally held by respondents.  According to the conceptual model outline in Chapter 3, 
the instrumentalist-targeted message indirectly affects attitude and intention through 
changes in PF belief strength.  However, the strength of this indirect effect depends on 
the salience of those beliefs.  Once again, the RAM and MPT offer competing accounts of 
belief salience.  Following the RAM, PF beliefs are more likely to be salient among the 
instrumentalist audience segment.  According to MPT, PF beliefs are more likely to be 
salient among recipients of the instrumentalist-targeted message.  
 
H3RAM:   There will be an Audience Segment ! Message Topic interaction on 
attitude and intention, such that members of the instrumentalist 
audience segment who receive the instrumentalist-targeted message 
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will have less favorable attitudes and weaker intentions compared to 
all other conditions.  
 
H3MPT:   There will be a main effect of Message Topic on attitude and intention, 
such that the instrumentalist-targeted message will produce less 
favorable attitudes and weaker intentions compared to the altruist-
targeted message or control. 
 
Attitudinal ambivalence and decisional conflict.  Lastly, I pose two 
research questions related to decisional conflict (Janis & Mann, 1977; O’Connor, 1993, 
1995) and attitudinal ambivalence (Kaplan, 1972; M. M. Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 
1995).  Decisional conflict is a popular measure of decision quality (O’Connor et al., 
2009; Stacey et al., 2011).  Janis and Mann (1977) define decisional conflict as the 
intrapersonal tension to simultaneously accept and reject an action that is anticipated to 
yield some balance of positive and negative effects.  In this sense, decisional conflict is 
conceptually similar to attitudinal ambivalence.  When referring to actions, attitudinal 
ambivalence is the degree to which a behavior is evaluated positively and negatively at 
the same time.  Decisional conflict and attitudinal ambivalence are, in part, a 
consequence of the inherent difficulty of some decision tasks, but may also be influenced 
by modifiable sociocognitive factors.  For example, a person is likely to experience 
greater decisional conflict if he or she (a) feels uninformed about the alternatives, 
benefits and risks; (b) lacks clarity about relevant personal values; or (c) feels social 
pressure to choose a particular course of action.  O’Connor (1995) has argued that 
reductions in decisional conflict improve the likelihood that effective decisions will be 
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made, where effectiveness is defined in terms of being informed, consistent with 
personal values and acted upon. 
 
RQ1:  Will there be differences in decisional conflict by Message Topic and 
Audience Segment? 
 
RQ2:  Will there be differences in attitudinal ambivalence by Message Topic 
and Audience Segment?
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CHAPTER FIVE: STUDY TWO  
Expanding on the results from the analyses presented in Chapter 4, Study 2 
tested whether content matching facilitates the formation of message-congruent beliefs, 
attitudes and intentions.  The main criterion variables in the study were attitudinal 
judgments and intentions toward participating in a hypothetical, whole-genome 
sequencing research project (i.e., SEQOME Project).  Also examined were changes in 
belief strength, decisional conflict and attitudinal ambivalence as a function of message 
exposure and outcome salience.  
Method  
Design  
 The experiment was designed to be analyzed as a 3 (Message Topic: altruist-
targeted, instrumentalist-targeted, no-message control) ! 2 (Audience Segment: altruist, 
instrumentalist) between-subjects factorial design.  Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of the message-topic conditions.  Audience Segment was intended to be an 
observed factor.   The segmentation analysis described in the last chapter established a 
rule for classifying respondents into segments.  A critical assumption of this design was 
that similar segments would be identified in the Study 2 sample.  
Participants  
Survey Sampling International (SSI) administered sample selection and 
recruitment.  SSI is a sampling firm that maintains a proprietary online subject pool.  
Participants were a general sample of U.S. adults aged 18 years or older drawn from the 
SSI online panel and invited by email to participate in the study.  Stratified sampling was 
used to ensure national representativeness of the sample.  Completing the survey entered 
respondents into a quarterly drawing for $12,500 funded by SSI.  The drawing consisted 
of panelists from across the SSI subject pool (appx. N = 900,000), and was not limited to 
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participation in the current study.  Beyond this incentive, participants did not receive 
any compensation for their participation.  
SSI recruited a total of 2,521 respondents on September 5th–12th, 2012.  
Respondents followed a link to the study website and read the consent form.19  In all, 
2,350 consented to complete the study.  Of these, 86 had missing values that should not 
have been possible given the way the survey was programmed.  This loss of data was 
likely due to server overload during brief periods of excessive traffic to the online 
questionnaire.  Because the extant data from these cases may have also been corrupted, 
they were excluded from all analyses presented here.  A total of 817 respondents dropped 
out before completing the entire survey.  Because the primary outcome variables in this 
study are reasoned action constructs (e.g., intentions, attitudes, and behavioral beliefs), 
all analyses presented here were restricted to respondents who completed all sections of 
the questionnaire designed to measure those constructs (N = 1,577).  The demographic 
characteristics of this sample are presented in Table 5.1. 
Procedure  
Approval for the study was sought in accordance with the research ethics 
procedures of both the University of Pennsylvania and NHGRI.  The protocol was 
approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Pennsylvania, and 
consequently designated exempt from additional internal review by the NIH Office of 
Human Subjects Research Protections (OHSRP).  
                                                                                                                                                                      
19 Unfortunately, it is not possible to calculate the response rate for the survey. The platform used by SSI is not 
driven through survey-direct invitations, so there is no record of the number of people who received an invitation 
to participate in this speci!c study. As was explained to me by an SSI account manager, “panelists are sent a daily e-
mail inviting them to log into our online communities. From there they view a series of 10 question related to 
surveys we have in the !eld. Depending on their responses, they are then sent on to the survey for which they are 
most likely to qualify for” (C. Keeler, personal communication, September 17, 2012). 
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Table 5.1 
Demographic Pro!le of Study 2 Participants 
Variable N % 
   
Sex   
 Male 793 53.9 
 Female 678 46.1 
 Missing 106 — 
    
Education   
 Less than high school 36 2.5 
 High school graduate or GED 347 23.7 
 Some college, but did not !nish 439 30.0 
 Two-year college degree/A.A. or A.S. 167 11.4 
 Four-year college degree/B.A. or B.A. 336 22.9 
 Masters, doctorate or professional degree 141 9.5 
 Missing 110 — 
    
Ethnicity   
 Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin 148 10.2 
 Non-Hispanic 1,305 89.6 
 Don’t know 4 0.3 
 Missing 120 — 
    
Race   
 White 1,115 76.5 
 Black or African American 203 13.9 
 American Indian or Alaska Native 16 1.1 
 Asian or Paci!c Islander 66 4.5 
 Other 58 4.0 
 Missing 119 — 
    
Household income   
 Less than $25,000 372 25.6 
 $25,000 - $49,999 486 33.4 
 $50,000 - $74,999 319 22.0 
 $75,000 - $99,999 162 11.1 
 $100,000 or more 114 7.8 
 Missing 124 — 
    
Age   
  M 43.23   
  SD 17.37   
  Mdn 41.00   
  Min 18   
  Max 86   
  Missing 101   
    
Note. N = 1,577. % = Percent based on valid responses, excludes missing. 
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All stimulus materials and questionnaire items were presented and completed 
online.  The study was designed so that participants could complete the entire procedure 
in a single session, lasting approximately 25 minutes.  Panelists who responded to the e-
mail invitation to participate from SSI followed a link to the study website, which was 
hosted by the Annenberg School for Communication.  The landing page consisted of a 
brief consent document providing a general description of the study and procedure (see 
Appendix A for the content and programming notes of the online questionnaire).  Those 
who consented were considered enrolled in the study and given access to the rest of the 
questionnaire.  Upon enrollment, all respondents were automatically assigned to one of 
three message-topic conditions (viz., instrumentlist-targeted, altruist-targeted and no-
message control) using a random number generator coded into the online questionnaire.   
On the first page of the questionnaire, participants were given general 
instructions for completing the survey. Next, they were presented with a brief paragraph 
introducing the target behavior of the experiment: participation in a hypothetical, whole-
genome sequencing study called the SEQOME Project. 
 Following the introduction, respondents were presented with a dimensional-
salience task, which is described in the Measures section.  Next, respondents assigned to 
the instrumentalist- and altruist-targeted message conditions received additional 
information about participating in the SEQOME Project.  This supplementary 
information was specifically designed to address the unique informational needs of the 
two main audience segments from Study 1: the altruists and instrumentalists (see 
Chapter 4).  In total, 507 (32%) respondents were assigned to read the altruist-targeted 
message, 538 (34%) read the instrumentalist-targeted message, and 532 (34%) were 
assigned to the no-message control condition.   
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After that, participants were asked to complete the second part of the 
questionnaire.  These measures included direct attitude and intention to participate 
SEQOME Project, expectancy-value ratings covering several beliefs, attitudinal 
ambivalence, decisional conflict, perceived knowledge about genome sequencing, 
message perceptions (i.e., perceived sufficiency, relevance and quality), and 
demographics.20  Items for constructing perceived social pressure and perceived 
behavioral control scales were also included as theoretically relevant control variables.  
Materials  
Experimental intervention materials were designed to address segment-level, 
salient beliefs about participating in the SEQOME Project.  The manipulated portions of 
the messages were comprised of six statements corresponding to beliefs found to be 
exclusively salient for either the altruists or the instrumentalists.   
The message-topic manipulations were text-based and embedded within the 
survey (see Appendix B).  Message content was modeled after informed consent 
documents and brochures developed for existing genomics research projects (Biesecker, 
2010; Biesecker, et al., 2009; The 1000 Genomes Project Consortium, 2009, 2010; UK 
Biobank, 2010).  For the sake of simplicity and brevity, the information was formatted as 
a bulleted list of statements.   
Messages did not overtly endorse or dissuade participation.  In other words, the 
messages did not directly suggest that participating in the SEQOME Project would be a 
good [or bad] thing to do.  However, the messages did draw connections between 
participating in the SEQOME Project and specific consequences of doing so.  Thus, it was 
expected that recipients would respond to the messages as if an attitudinal position had 
                                                                                                                                                                      
20 A skip pattern was coded into the questionnaire so that respondents assigned to the no-message control group 
did not receive the items designed to measure message relevance and quality. 
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been taken.   From the theoretical perspective underlying this research, changes in 
attitude and intention toward participating in the SEQOME Project were expected to be 
a function of changes in belief strength, outcome evaluations, and, in some cases, 
outcome salience.  This principle holds regardless of whether a message has been 
designed with persuasive intent (i.e., the message source aims to sway recipients’ 
attitudes, intentions, or behavior in a certain direction).  Coincidently, the messages used 
in this study affirmed beliefs that were accurate and disconfirmed beliefs that were 
inaccurate within the context of the SEQOME Project.   
For example, contributing to science and receiving personal genetic risk 
information are both commonly salient outcomes related to genomic research 
participation.  On average, people tend to believe that these outcomes will occur as a 
result of participating.  However, the SEQOME Project was defined as a genomic 
research study in which individual results would not be returned to participants.  
Whereas the altruist-targeted message affirmed that participating in the SEQOME 
Project would contribute to science, the instrumentalist-targeted message disconfirmed 
that doing so would provide personal information about genetic health risk.  Moreover, 
because both of these outcomes are seen as desirable, these messages have different 
implications for attitude and intention.  Strengthening beliefs about contributing to 
science would foster more favorable attitudes toward participating and greater 
intentions.  Weakening beliefs about receiving personal risk information would produce 
less favorable attitudes and lower intentions to participate.21 
                                                                                                                                                                      
21 Naturally, this characterization of the impact of belief change on attitude, intention and beliefs assumes that 
these concerns are salient.   
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Measures  
Survey questions were divided into eight sections.  Only the items used for analyses 
reported in this dissertation are described here in greater detail. 
Belief salience.  Belief salience was measured using a dimensional-salience 
task (Budd, 1986; Newton et al., 2011; van der Pligt & Eiser, 1984).  Respondents were 
presented with a list of 20 potential consequences of participating in the SEQOME 
Project (e.g., “helping advance science”).22  They were then asked to select items from the 
list matching their five most important reasons for deciding whether to participate in the 
SEQOME Project.  Prior research has shown that beliefs nominated in this way tend to 
have briefer response latencies—and thus greater accessibility and salience—than beliefs 
that are not nominated (van Harreveld, van der Pligt, de Vries, & Andreas, 2000).  The 
dimensional salience approach was used as an alternative to the traditional, open-ended 
elicitation procedure (see Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010).   
The behavioral outcomes that each participant selected were taken to represent 
his or her personally salient beliefs with regard to participating in the SEQOME Project.  
Behavioral outcomes ranked by frequency are presented in Table 5.2.  Comparing the 
rank-order positions of these outcomes between Studies 1 and 2 reveals substantial 
differences.   
Responses to the dimensional-salience task were meant to help categorize 
respondents into audience segments with characteristics similar to those identified in 
Study 1.  The audience segments would then serve as a proxy measure of salience for 
beliefs addressed in the message topic manipulations.  From an analytical perspective, it 
                                                                                                                                                                      
22 The content analysis described in Study 1 produced 33 themes. To reduce response burden, only the 20 most 
frequently elicited beliefs were represented in the list given as part of dimensional-salience task.  In Study 1, fewer 
than 4% of respondents gave an elicitation response corresponding to each of the thirteen themes that were 
excluded (see Table 4.2).  
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Table 5.2 
 
Frequency of Behavioral Outcomes Selected by Participants from the Dimensional-Salience Task 
 Rank    
Behavioral outcome Study 1 Study 2 f %V %N 
Helping others in the future.abc 2 1 885 11.2 56.1 
Contributing to medical research.abc 6 2 861 10.9 54.6 
Helping advance science.abc 5 3 764 9.7 48.4 
Contributing to knowledge.abc 9 4 721 9.1 45.7 
Learning information to help me prevent disease.abc 19 5 509 6.5 32.3 
Receiving information about my current health.abc 11 6 481 6.1 30.5 
Receiving information about my personal genetic risk for disease.abc 7 7 475 6.0 30.1 
Receiving information that may be helpful to my relatives.abc 15 8 435 5.5 27.6 
Receiving information about my personal genetic code.abc 17 9 409 5.2 25.9 
Learning information to help me make treatment decisions.ac 18 10 373 4.7 23.7 
Learning more about my family history of disease. 16 11 368 4.7 23.3 
Putting my privacy at risk.  4 12 227 2.9 14.4 
Receiving compensation other than money. 20 13 217 2.8 13.8 
Losing control over how my DNA samples are used. 3 14 217 2.8 13.8 
Feeling physical pain. 12 15 192 2.4 12.2 
Feeling worried. 10 16 175 2.2 11.1 
Learning something that I cannot do anything about. 14 17 162 2.1 10.3 
Having to make time in my busy schedule. 1 18 151 1.9 9.6 
Learning something that I do not want to know. 8 19 145 1.8 9.2 
Doing something that is inconvenient. 13 20 118 1.5 7.5 
Note. N = 1,577. V = 7,885 = Total number of belief-item selections made during the dimensional salience task 
across all respondents. f = Frequency count of the number of times each belief item was selected. %V  = Percentage 
of the total number of selections matching the chosen item. %N = Percentage of respondents who selected the 
item. Each participant was required to select !ve items from a list of twenty.   
 
a Modal salient belief based on “75% of selections” decision rule 
b Modal salient belief based on “25% of respondents” decision rule 
c Modal salient belief based on “Top 10 valid elicitation responses” decision rule 
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was important that a large portion of the sample be classified as either altruists or 
instrumentalists.  Using Study 1 as a reference, it was expected that 2/3 of all 
respondents would fit into one of these two groups.   Also, the ratio of altruists to 
instrumentalists was expected to be balanced.  Conceptually, it was crucial that a number 
of outcomes salient to the altruists would not be salient to the instrumentalists, and vice 
versa.  Further, the uniquely salient beliefs of each audience segment were meant to 
correspond with the message manipulations.  Beliefs addressed in the altruist-targeted 
message were to be uniquely salient to the altruists; beliefs addressed in the 
instrumentalist-targeted message were to be uniquely salient to the instrumentalists.  
Unfortunately, the proposed classification scheme failed to meet these qualifications 
when applied to the Study 2 sample.  Appendix C contains a more detailed account of my 
efforts to implement and adapt the proposed audience-segmentation strategy.  
Ultimately, no satisfactory solution was found, and an alternative operationalization of 
belief salience was adopted.   
A new approach: Relative greater-good salience.   Instead of using audience 
segments as a proxy for belief salience, I developed an alternative measure.  The aim of 
this measure was to capture relative differences in salience for outcomes addressed by 
the segment-targeted message manipulations.  For this measure, I focused on two sets of 
outcomes from the dimensional-salience list.  The first set was the four most frequently 
selected outcomes addressed in the altruist-targeted message (i.e., greater-good 
outcomes): (a) “Helping others in the future,” (b) “Helping advance science,” (c) 
“Contributing to medical research,” and (d) “Contributing to knowledge.”  The second set 
was the four most frequently selected outcomes addressed in the instrumentalist-
targeted message (i.e., personal-feedback outcomes): (a) “Receiving information about 
my personal genetic risk,” (b) “Learning something new about my current health,” (c) 
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“Receiving information to help me make medical treatment decisions,” (d) “Learning 
information to help me prevent disease.” 
To compute relative greater-good salience, the number of greater-good (GG) and 
personal-feedback (PF) outcomes selected by each respondent was tallied.  Next, for 
every respondent, the number of selected PF outcomes was subtracted from the number 
of GG outcomes.  For example, a respondent who selected three GG outcomes from the 
list and two PF outcomes received a relative GG salience score of +1.  Respondents who 
selected two GG outcomes and three PF outcomes received a score of !1.  The resulting 
9-point scale ranged from !4 to +4 (M = 0.88, SD = 1.74).  Due to differences in the 
overall frequency that GG and PF outcomes were selected, the distribution of relative GG 
salience favored positive values (see Figure 5.1).   
Respondents with positive relative-GG-salience values nominated more GG 
outcomes than PF outcomes.23  In terms of content matching, portions of the 
instrumentalist-targeted message were expected to be a better match for respondents 
with lower relative GG salience; the altruist-targeted message was a better match for 
respondents with greater relative GG salience. 
Dual salience.   Relative GG salience only captured raw differences in the 
number of GG and PF outcomes nominated by a respondent.  The measure ignores the 
overall number of outcomes from those two categories that were selected.  For example, 
respondents who did not select any GG or PF outcomes received a relative GG salience 
score of 0; however, so did respondents who selected the same number of outcomes from 
both sets (i.e., 4:4, 3:3, 2:2, 1:1).  In order to account for these differences in the overall 
salience of GG and PF outcomes, I also created a dual-salience index. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
23 Referencing the audience segments identi!ed in Study 1, relative GG salience can also be thought of as the 
degree to which a respondent is an altruist versus an instrumentalist.   
Drawing an analogy with attitudinal ambivalence (M. M. Thompson et al., 1995), 
I constructed this index using the following equation:
Dual salience = 
SGG ? SPF? ?
2
SGG SPF? ? , (5.1)
where SGG is the number of GG outcomes selected and SPF is the number of PF outcomes 
selected.  The square root of these terms was used so that a unique score of 0 would be 
assigned to respondents who did not select any GG or PF outcomes (n = 57).  The index 
ranged fro??? 1 to +1.41 (M = 0.35, SD = 0.82).  Negative values indicate that the 
Figure 5.1.  Frequency plot of relative greater-good salience scores.
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respondent selected at least one outcome from one of the two sets, but none from the 
other.  As the number of outcomes from a single set increased, dual salience decreased 
toward !1.  Positive dual-salience scores indicated that outcomes from both sets had 
been selected.  Greater values were obtained when more outcomes from both sets were 
selected and when the proportion of outcomes selected from each set was more balanced 
(see Figure 5.2).  Frequencies of dual-salience values are presented in Table 5.3. 
Behavioral intention.  Intention to participate in the SEQOME Project, was 
measured with three items using 7-point Likert-type scales: e.g., “If you were asked to 
take part, how likely is it that you would volunteer to participate in the SEQOME  
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respondents could not select more than !ve outcomes from the dimensional-salience list. 
 
  
! ! !
! 100 
Table 5.3  
Frequency Distribution of Dual-Salience Scores 
Dual salience f % 
   
 Low −1.00 115 7.3 
 −0.87 114 7.2 
 −0.71 151 9.6 
 −0.50 111 7.0 
 0.00 57 3.6 
 0.50 136 8.6 
 0.63 203 12.9 
 0.79 280 17.8 
 1.00 117 7.4 
 1.26 116 7.4 
 High 1.41 177 11.2 
    
Note. N = 1,577. % = Percent based on valid responses, excludes missing. 
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Project?” (1 [extremely unlikely], 7 [extremely likely]). The average of these items was 
used to construct an interval-level measure of intention (! = .97, M = 4.96, SD = 1.46).  
Greater scores on this composite scale represent a stronger intention to participate in the 
SEQOME Project.   
Attitude.  Attitude toward participating in the SEQOME Project was measured 
with five items that reflected instrumental and affective dimensions of attitude (see 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010).  These items were presented as a set of 7-point semantic 
differentials (Min = 1, Max = 7): “For me to participate in the SEQOME Project would be 
(a) bad–good, (b) harmful–beneficial, (c) disturbing–reassuring, (d) exciting–boring, 
and (e) valuable–worthless.”  The adjectives anchoring the latter two items were 
displayed with reverse polarity, relative to the other attitude items.  A confirmatory 
factor analysis of the main reasoned action model constructs revealed that the 
underlying attitude factor did not adequately explain the variance in these two items.  
After exploring alternative measurement models, I decided that a more reliable measure 
of attitude would be achieved by excluding these items.  The reduction in content validity 
that resulted was acceptable, given that the retained items represent both conceptual 
dimensions of attitude.  In the analyses presented here, the average of the three 
remaining items was used to represent attitudes toward participating in the SEQOME 
Project.  Higher scores indicated more favorable attitudes (! = .88, M = 5.08, SD = 1.25).   
Perceived social pressure .   Perceived social pressure was measured with 
three items assessed on 7-point response scales.  The most recent version of the reasoned 
action model considers perceived social pressure to be a two-dimensional construct.  
These dimensions consist of a respondent’s perceptions of what important others think 
should be done (i.e., injunctive norms) and what important others do themselves with 
respect to a given behavior (i.e., descriptive norms).  Because participation in whole-
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genome sequencing research is an uncommon behavior, respondents were not expected 
to know any normative referents who have participated in such a study.24  With this in 
mind, the items used to measure perceived social pressure focused exclusively on the 
injunctive-norm dimension: e.g., “Most people who are important to me think that I 
should participate in the SEQOME Project, if I am asked to take part in it,” (1 
[completely false] to 7 [completely true]).  The average was used to create a composite 
scale (! = .94, M = 4.79, SD = 1.37).  Higher values on this scale indicated greater 
perceived social pressure to participate in the SEQOME Project. 
 Perceived behavioral control.   Perceived behavioral control was measured 
using three items.  One of these reflected the capacity dimension of that construct: “If I 
am asked to take part, I am confident that I am able to participate in the SEQOME 
Project” (1 [completely false], 7 [completely true]).  The other two represented the 
autonomy dimension: e.g., “If I am asked to take part, participating in the SEQOME 
Project is completely up to me” (strongly disagree [1]–strongly agree [7]).  
Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that a single underlying factor was unable to 
explain a majority of the variance in two of these measures.  To preserve the content 
validity of the overarching construct in subsequent analyses, I treated the capacity and 
autonomy dimensions as two separate factors.  The first of these was represented by the 
single item used to measure the capacity dimension (M = 5.25, SD = 1.45).  The other 
two items were averaged to form a single measure representing the autonomy dimension 
(r = .57, M = 5.64, SD = 1.30).  Higher scores on these measures reflected a greater sense 
of control over participating in the SEQOME Project.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
24 Alternatively, asking respondents to report whether the people who are important to them would participate in 
genomics research if they had the chance might have been a way to measure descriptive norms in this context.   
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Behavioral beliefs.   Thirty items were used to assess belief strength and 
evaluations of 15 behavioral outcomes.  Descriptive statistics for these belief-strength (bi) 
and outcome-evaluation (ei) items are presented in Table 5.4.  Also displayed are the 
characteristics of the belief-evaluation products (biei).   
Belief strength (b i).   Participants were asked to complete a block of 15 belief-
strength items.  These items were premised with the instructions, “We would also like to 
know how strongly you believe each of the following outcomes will happen if you 
participate in the SEQOME Project.”  For each behavioral outcome (e.g., “My 
participation in the SEQOME Project…will help advance science”), participants were 
asked to select the point on a 7-point response scale that best described their opinion, 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
Especially strong correlations among two sets of items suggested high internal 
consistency.25  The first set referred to the four GG outcomes: (a) “Help others in the 
future,” (b) “Help advance science,” (c) “Contribute to medical research,” and (d) 
“Contribute to knowledge.”  The inter-item reliability of these four items was strong (! = 
.94; see Table 5.5a for a correlation matrix).  I combined them into a single measure by 
calculating the average score across all four items (i.e., GG belief strength; M = 5.94, SD 
= 1.16). 
The second set referred to the four PF outcomes: (a) “Receive information my 
personal genetic risk,” (b) “Learn something new about my current health,” (c) “Receive 
information to help me make medical treatment decisions,” (d) “Be given information to 
help me prevent disease.”  The correlation matrix for these items is presented below the 
diagonal in Table 5.5b.  Noting conceptual similarity and strong inter-item reliability  
                                                                                                                                                                      
25 The magnitude of these correlations became problematic when I attempted to regress attitude on all 15 belief-
strength items.  Collinearity diagnostics from that analysis revealed that items in the GG and PF belief sets were too 
closely related to be included in the same model as independent variables. 
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Table 5.4 
 
Summary of Means and Standard Deviations for Belief Strength, Outcome Evaluations, and 
Belief-Evaluation Products 
 
Belief 
Strength (bi) 
Outcome 
evaluation (ei) 
Belief-evaluation 
product (biei) 
Belief item M SD M SD M SD 
1. Greater-good outcomes       
 a. Help others in the future.a 5.93 1.27 2.16 1.25 1.98 1.13 
 b. Help advance science.a 5.91 1.26 2.04 1.24 1.89 1.16 
 c. Contribute to medical research.a 5.97 1.24 2.06 1.22 1.92 1.15 
 d. Contribute to knowledge.a 5.96 1.25 2.13 1.20 1.98 1.12 
2.  Personal-feedback outcomes       
 a. Receive information about my personal 
genetic risk.b 
5.17 1.74 1.60 1.40 1.34 1.21 
 b. Learn something new about my current 
health.b 
5.29 1.71 1.86 1.29 1.56 1.18 
 c. Receive information to help me make 
medical treatment decisions.b 
5.21 1.75 1.9 1.25 1.59 1.15 
 d. Be given information to help me prevent 
disease.b 
5.18 1.76 2.08 1.23 1.67 1.14 
3. Put the privacy of my genetic information at 
risk.  
3.81 1.75 −0.61 1.70 −0.24 1.16 
4. Be part of research that goes against my 
personal values.  
3.21 1.83 −1.00 1.79 −0.26 1.05 
5. Take up a lot of my time.  3.94 1.56 −0.17 1.47 −0.03 1.02 
6. Feel worried about my health.b 3.61 1.73 −0.83 1.74 −0.28 1.11 
7. Be told something about my genes that I do 
not want to know.b 
4.07 1.77 0.40 1.63 0.35 1.15 
8. Feel physical pain.a 3.42 1.67 −1.26 1.68 −0.44 1.02 
9. Inconvenient.a 3.67 1.61 −0.45 1.44 −0.14 0.94 
Note. N = 1,577. Belief strength items range from 1 to 7. Outcome evaluations range from −3 to +3.  The belief-
evaluation products were rescaled by dividing by 7, and range from −3 to +3.  
 
a Belief addressed in the altruist-targeted message. 
b Belief addressed in the instrumentalist-targeted message. 
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(! = .96), I averaged these measures into a single scale representing expectations about 
receiving personal feedback (i.e., PF belief strength; M = 5.21, SD = 1.63).  
Outcome evaluations (e i).  Participants were also asked to evaluate a parallel 
list of 15 outcomes.  Each item was anchored by a phrase that directly corresponded to an 
outcome from one of the belief-strength measures (e.g., “Helping advance science is:”).  
Outcome evaluations were rated on 7-point response scales ranging from –3 (extremely 
bad) to +3 (extremely good).  The evaluation items corresponding to the GG and PF 
outcomes had high internal consistency (see Tables 5.5a and 5.5b).  The averages of these 
two sets were computed to create composite scales of PF outcome evaluations (M = 1.88, 
SD = 1.14, ! = .91) and GG outcome evaluations (M = 2.10, SD = 1.11, ! = .93).   
Belief-evaluation products (b ie i).  Lastly, belief-evaluation products were 
created.  These were computed by multiplying corresponding strength and evaluation 
items, then dividing each by a constant of 7.26  Belief-evaluation products ranged from 
"3 to +3.  To avoid using cumbersome variable labels, I will refer to specific belief-
evaluation products as behavioral beliefs.  The product of the GG strength and 
evaluation composites was calculated (GG behavioral beliefs: M = 1.94, SD = 1.06), as 
was that of the PF beliefs (PF behavioral beliefs: M = 1.54, SD = 1.07). 
Attitudinal ambivalence.  Consistent with Fishbein’s expectancy-value model, 
numerical measures of ambivalence presuppose that attitudes can have positive and 
negative components.  Simultaneously endorsing favorable and unfavorable positions 
toward some object is the hallmark of attitudinal ambivalence.   
Two items developed by Kaplan (1972) were used to measure the positive (P) and 
negative (N) components of ambivalence toward participating in the SEQOME Project.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
26 Dividing by a constant allowed for more precise reporting of regression results using fewer decimal places.  The 
distributions of the product terms were not a!ected, only the unit size. 
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Table 5.5a 
 
Intercorrelations among Greater-Good Belief Strength and Outcome Evaluation Items 
Belief item 1a 1b 1c 1d 
     
1a.   Help others in the future. — .76 .79 .78 
1b.   Help advance science .82 — .82 .76 
1c.   Contribute to medical research. .85 .82 — .76 
1d.   Contribute to knowledge. .78 .77 .80 — 
Note.  N = 1,577.  Coe!cients below the diagonal are among belief-strength items (bi).  Coe!cients above the 
diagonal are for the outcome-evaluation items (ei).  All coe!cients are signi"cantly greater than zero, p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.5b 
 
Intercorrelations among Personal-Feedback Belief Strength and Outcome Evaluation Items 
Belief item 2a 2b 2c 2d 
     
2a.   Receive information about my personal genetic risk. — .75 .64 .64 
2b.   Learn something new about my current health.  .85 — .73 .71 
2c.   Receive information to help me make medical treatment 
decisions. 
.81 .86 — .79 
2d.   Be given information to help me prevent disease. .81 .85 .90 — 
Note.  N = 1,577.  Coe!cients below the diagonal are among belief-strength items (bi).  Coe!cients above the 
diagonal are for the outcome-evaluation items (ei).  All coe!cients are signi"cantly greater than zero, p < .001. 
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Both items were assessed on 5-point unipolar response scales.  The items had similarly 
worded stems: “Considering the positive (negative) qualities of participating in the 
SEQOME Project and ignoring its negative (positive) ones, please evaluate your 
participation on the following scale.  For me to participate in the SEQOME Project is…” 0 
(not at all positive [negative]), 1 (a little positive [negative]), 2 (moderately positive 
[negative]), 3 (mainly positive [negative]), or 4 (completely positive [negative]).  These 
component scales were then transformed into a measure of ambivalence (AMB) using an 
equation derived from M. M. Thompson et al. (1995; see also Breckler, 1994; Zhao, 
2005):  
 
 AMB = (P + N)/2 – |(P – N)|,  (5.2) 
 
where P is the score on the positive component scale and N  is the score on the negative 
component scale.  
M. M. Thompson et al. (1995) assumed that the P and N terms of Equation 5.2 
would be measured on 4-point scales ranging in value from 0 to 3.  Given that 
assumption, ambivalence scores could vary from a minimum of !1.5 through +3.0 at 
increments of 0.5.  Because I used 5-point response scales to measure P and N, the 
equation resulted in an ambivalence scale ranging from !2.0 to +4.0.  Again, this scale 
varied at increments of .5; however, no combination of N and P yielded an ambivalence 
score of +3.5.  Lacking a conceptual justification for this missing value, I recoded all 
scores of +4 so that they were instead +3.5.  Further, I rescaled this variable by adding a 
constant of 2 and then multiplying by 2.  Thus, the final measure of ambivalence (N = 
1,569, M = 4.67, SD = 3.10) was distributed as a 12-point integer scale, ranging from 0 
(low ambivalence) to 11 (high ambivalence). 
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Decisional conflict .   Participants were also asked to complete the 16-item 
decisional conflict scale (DCS) developed by O’Connor (1993, 1995).  The DCS measures 
the degree of uncertainty people experience in choosing to follow a course of action (see 
Table 5.6).  The scale was adapted to refer to participating in the SEQOME Project. 
Immediately prior to completing the DCS, respondents were presented with a 
forced-choice question, “If you were asked to take part in the SEQOME Project and you 
had be make a decision today, would you choose to participate” (0 [no], 1 [yes])?  The 
majority of respondents (73%) indicated that they would participate under those 
circumstances.  All items of the traditional DCS were assessed on 5-point Likert-type 
scales, ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). 
  A confirmatory factor analysis of the DCS revealed that items from the 
uncertainty and support subscales did not load well.  These items were removed.  The 
fourth item in the effective decision subscale was also excluded because it detracted from 
overall model fit.  Following O’Connor’s scoring recommendations, I calculated a 
summary, decisional-conflict scale with the remaining 9 items (N = 1,526, M = 32.90 SD 
= 20.91).  Each participant’s responses were (a) summed across items, (b) divided by 9, 
(c) multiplied by 25, and (d) subtracted from 100.  The resulting composite scale ranged 
from 0 (no decisional conflict) to 100 (extremely high decisional conflict).  
Results  
Preliminary Analysis  
 Inattentive responding.  There is growing concern among survey 
methodologists that Internet-based data collection methods may be especially conducive 
to inattentive responding (Meade & Craig, 2012).  The threat was a particular concern in 
this study because participating weighted the odds of winning a cash drawing.  Panelists 
completing a greater number of studies were entered into the drawing a greater number  
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Table 5.6 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Decisional Con!ict Scale Items 
Item M  SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Informed subscale     
1.  When it comes to choosing to participate in the SEQOME Project,  
I know which options are available to me.b 
2.57  1.13 −0.49 −0.47 
2.  I know the bene!ts of participating in the SEQOME Project.b 2.76  1.07 −0.83 0.20 
3.  I know the risks of participating in the SEQOME Project.b 2.34  1.18 −0.35 −0.71 
Values clarity subscale     
1.  I am clear about which bene!ts of particating in the SEQOME Project 
matter most to me.b 
2.67  1.10 −0.65 −0.18 
2.  I am clear about which risks of participating in the SEQOME Project 
matter most to me.b 
2.37  1.17 −0.31 −0.70 
3.  I am clear about which is more important to me, the bene!ts or the 
risks of participating in the SEQOME Project.b 
2.67  1.08 −0.60 −0.16 
Uncertainty subscale     
1.  I am clear about the best choice for me. 2.75  1.07 −0.61 −0.26 
2.  I feel unsure about what to choose.a 1.80  1.27 −0.03 −1.07 
3.  This decision is hard for me to make.a 1.76  1.27 0.11 −1.03 
Support subscale     
1.  I have enough support from others to make a choice. 2.47  1.13 −0.35 −0.46 
2.  I feel pressure from others in making this decision.a 1.11  1.21 0.77 −0.48 
3.  I have enough advice to make a choice. 2.46  1.16 −0.39 −0.60 
E!ective decision subscale     
1.  My decision shows what is most important to me.b 2.87  0.95 −0.54 −0.07 
2.  I expect to stick with my decision.b 2.96  0.91 −0.51 −0.30 
3.  I am satis!ed with my decision.b 2.94  0.94 −0.56 −0.20 
4.  I feel I have made an informed choice. 2.67  1.06 −0.57 −0.14 
Note. N = 1,526.  All items were measured on 5-point Likert-type response scales, ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) 
to 4 (strongly agree).  Except for the three items that were reverse-coded, higher scores are consistent with a lower 
degree of decisional con!ict.   
 
a = Item was reverse-coded. 
b = Item was retained in the !nal measurement model and composite scale. 
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of times.  As a result, participants unmotivated to faithfully represent their actual 
attitudes, beliefs, or opinions may have nonetheless been motivated to complete the 
questionnaire.  Some respondents may have adopted a response strategy aimed at 
avoiding the cognitive burden of thoughtfully completing the survey while maintaining 
the appearance of having done so.  Such a strategy poses a threat to protocol validity and 
has been labeled satisficing (Krosnick, 1991; Krosnick, Narayan, and Smith, 1996).   
 Prior to conducting my principal analyses, I screened the data for careless 
responding.  Specifically, I identified cases with excessively long strings of the same 
response category over many consecutive items.  A response pattern of this sort is known 
as straight lining (Kaminska, McCutcheon & Billiet, 2010) or nondifferentiation 
(Krosnick et al., 1996).  To do so, I constructed a long-string index (Meade & Craig, 
2012).  For each respondent, I recorded the maximum number of consecutive items to 
which the same response category was selected (Meade & Craig, 2012).  For instance, 
suppose a respondent selected “2” for twelve 7-point items in a row, but otherwise varied 
his or her response.  The long-string value for that respondent would be 12.  Long-string 
values were tallied separately for items measured on 7-point and 5-point scales.  The 
greater of these two values represented the maximum number of consecutive items for 
which a participant gave an identical response.   
Following the strategy developed by J. A. Johnson (2005), I plotted long-string values by 
frequency.  Excessively long strings of the same response category were defined by 
applying a scree-like test to this graph (see Figure 5.3).  The noticeable drop in frequency 
of long-string values greater than 12 marks the threshold for valid consecutive responses.  
Using this threshold as a cut-off point, 207 respondents (13%) had long-string values 
greater than 12, and were classified as straight liners.  All subsequent analyses were 
conducted twice, once with the full sample and once with straight liners excluded.  
Figure 5.3. Frequency plot of long-string index values.  Values to the left of the vertical dotted line were 
considered to be within a reasonable range of consecutive response.  Respondents who selected the same 
response category on 13 or more items in a row were classi#ed as straight liners.
Inferences derived from the two samples were not fundamentally different.  In light of 
this, only analyses based on the full sample are reported. 
Manipulation !delity. I conducted a manipulation check to verify that 
respondents assigned to the message-topic conditions read the information that was 
provided to them.  Each message included two claims targeting beliefs that turned out to 
be nonsalient in the overall sample. The instrumentalist-targeted message claimed that 
participating in the SEQOME Project would neither cause health-related worry, nor lead 
to being told something that the participant did not want to know.  Thus, respondents 
who read the instrumentalist-targeted message could be expected to express weaker 
agreement with those beliefs.  The altruist-targeted message claimed that participating in 
the SEQOME Project would cause minor physical pain, and be an inconvenience.  Thus, 
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respondents who read the altruist-targeted condition could be expected to express 
stronger agreement with those beliefs.   
 As shown in Table 5.7, a MANOVA provided evidence in support of the predicted 
mean differences in belief strength by message-topic condition.  The multivariate main 
effect of the message-topic manipulation was significant, Wilks’s ! = .94, F(8, 3142) = 
11.88, p < .001, "2 = .03.  Univariate effects of Message Topic on all four of the belief-
strength items were also significant.  In sum, these results support the fidelity of the 
message-topic manipulation.  
Hypothesis Tests  
Hypothesis 1:  Effects of message exposure on belief strength.   
 H1a.  In H1a, I predicted an Audience Segment # Message Topic interaction 
effect on GG belief strength.  Rephrased in terms of relative GG salience, I hypothesized 
that the altruist-targeted message would increase GG belief strength more when relative 
GG salience was low (i.e., PF outcomes are comparatively more salient).  The altruist-
targeted message was designed to strengthen beliefs about participating in the SEQOME 
Project related to GG outcomes (e.g., advancing science and contributing to medicine).  
In contrast, the instrumentalist-targeted message remained silent on those outcomes.  
Thus, the instrumentalist-targeted message was not expected to have an impact on GG 
belief strength compared to the control condition. 
A pair of regression analyses was conducted to test this hypothesis (see Table 
5.8).  In the first analysis, the message-topic control group was treated as the reference 
category.  Dummy variables representing the altruist-targeted and instrumentalist-
targeted message topic conditions were entered along with mean-centered, relative GG 
salience and dual salience (which was included as a control).  Interaction terms were 
entered to test for moderating effects of relative GG salience by Message Topic.  The  
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Table 5.7 
 
Mean Belief Strength of Four Nonsalient Perceived Consequences of Participating in the SEQOME 
Project by Message Topic 
Measure 
Message Topic 
 
No-message 
control 
Instrumentalist-
targeted 
Altruist-
targeted 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F(2, 1574) p η2 
My participation in the 
SEQOME Project will… 
      
B6 Make me feel worried 
about my health. 
3.80 (1.68) 3.24a  (1.77) 3.80 (1.67) 18.93 .001 .02 
B7 Tell me something about 
my genes that I do not 
want to know. 
4.34 (1.63) 3.61a  (1.89) 4.28 (1.69) 28.78 .001 .04 
B8 Cause me to feel physical 
pain. 
3.35 (1.67) 3.30 (1.64) 3.62a  (1.69) 5.33 .005 .01 
B9 Be an inconvenience to 
me. 
3.54a (1.62) 3.65ab (1.57) 3.83b (1.62) 4.39 .013 .01 
Note. N = 1,577.  Means within rows that have no superscript in common are signi$cantly di%erent from each other 
based on results of Games-Howell tests, p < .05.  
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Table 5.8 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Greater-Good Belief Strength by Message Topic, Relative Greater-Good Salience, and 
Interaction Terms 
 Model 1a Model 2b 
Predictor B SE β 95% CI B SE β 95% CI 
Constant 5.91*** 0.05  [5.82, 6.01] 5.88*** 0.05  [5.78, 5.97] 
Message topic         
 No-message control — — — — 0.03 0.07 .01 [−0.10, 0.17] 
 Instrumentalist-targeted −0.03 0.07 −.01 [−0.17, 0.10] — — — — 
 Altruist-targeted 0.13† 0.07 .05 [−0.00, 0.28] 0.17* 0.07 .01 [0.03, 0.30] 
Relative GG salience 0.19*** 0.03 .28 [0.13, 0.24] 0.14*** 0.03 .20 [0.08, 0.19] 
Dual salience 0.25*** 0.04 .18 [0.18, 0.33] 0.25*** 0.04 .18 [0.18, 0.33] 
No-message control × Relative GG salience — — — — 0.05 0.04 .04 [−0.03, 0.13] 
Instrumentalist-targeted × Relative GG salience  −0.05 0.04 −.04 [−0.13, 0.03] — — — — 
Altruist-targeted × Relative GG salience −0.02 0.04 −.02 [−0.10, 0.06] 0.03 0.04 .03 [−0.05, 0.11] 
Note.  N = 1,577.  CI = con!dence interval.  The dependent variable in both models is greater-good belief strength.  The analyses were conducted as hierarchical 
multiple regressions.  Estimates from the !nal models are presented here. When relevant, change statistics of individual steps are reported in the text.  The two 
models di!ered only with respect to which message-topic dummy variable was treated as the reference category.  Accordingly, both models were equivalent with 
respect to the amount of variance they explained, R2 = .07, F(6, 1570) = 19.79, p < .001.   
 
†p < .06. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
a = Reference category is the no-message control group. 
b = Reference category is the instrumentalist-targeted message group. 
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model specified for the second analysis was identical, except that the instrumentalist-
targeted message group was used as the reference category.  The change statistics 
reported below refer to the unique contribution of a specific predictor, assuming a 
hierarchical regression model in which all other predictors had already been entered in 
the first step. 
 No additional variance in GG belief strength was explained with the addition of 
the interaction terms, !R! = .00, !F(2, 1570) = 0.82, p = .439.  Crucially, the coefficient 
for the interaction term representing the effect of the altruist-targeted message by 
relative GG salience was not significantly different from zero, " = #.02, p = .670.  In 
order to show support for Hypothesis 1a, this interaction effect would have had to have 
been both negative and significant.  This result was corroborated in the second model 
that treated the instrumentalist-targeted message condition as the reference category.  
Contrary to H1a, relative GG salience did not moderate the effects of the altruist-targeted 
message on GG belief strength, " = .03, p = .412.  Thus, H1a was not supported. 
In all, relative GG salience was the only substantive predictor variable 
significantly associated with GG belief strength in both models.  All else being equal, GG 
belief strength was higher at higher values of relative GG salience.  In the model treating 
control as the reference category, the weighted average effect of relative GG salience 
across all levels of the other predictors was statistically significant, " = .28, p < .001.  The 
estimate for this effect was nominally smaller when the instrumentalist-targeted 
message condition was used as the reference category, " = .20, p < .001.  These findings 
are consistent with one of the conceptual assumptions underlying Hypothesis 1.  Namely, 
that salient beliefs tend to be held more strongly than nonsalient beliefs.  However, this 
observation alone is insufficient to be interpreted as support for H1a.   
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The two models differed with respect to the average effect the altruist-targeted 
message.  When compared to the control group, only a marginally significant effect of the 
altruist-targeted message was observed, ! = .05, p = .058.  On the other hand, GG belief 
strength was significantly higher in the altruist-targeted message condition compared 
the instrumentalist-targeted condition, ! = .07, p = .016.  It is also worth noting that, on 
average, no significant differences in GG belief strength were observed between the no-
message control and the instrumentalist-targeted conditions.  At best, these findings 
lend partial support for the assumption that the altruist-targeted message would 
increase GG belief strength, on average.  However, this increase in GG belief strength 
amounted to less than two-tenths of a point on a seven-point scale.  Given the small size 
of this effect, it would be difficult to argue from a practical standpoint that the altruist-
targeted message was successful.  
H1b.  In H1b, I predicted an Audience Segment " Message Topic interaction 
effect on PF belief strength.  Replacing the audience-segment construct with relative GG 
salience, I hypothesized that the instrumentalist-targeted message would reduce PF 
belief strength more when relative GG salience was high (i.e., PF outcomes are 
comparatively less salient).  Moreover, exposure to the altruist-targeted message was not 
expected to have an impact on PF belief strength compared to the no-message control 
condition. 
Similar to the analyses used to test H1a, two regression models were devised to 
test H1b (see Table 5.9).  Once again, the no-message control group was treated as the 
reference group in the first model.  Dummy variables representing the altruist-targeted 
and instrumentalist-targeted message conditions, mean-centered relative GG salience 
and dual salience were entered.  Interaction terms were entered to test for moderating 
effects of relative GG salience by Message Topic.  The interaction of relative GG salience 
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Table 5.9 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Personal-Feedback Belief Strength by Message Topic, Relative Greater-Good Salience, 
and Interaction Terms 
 Model 1a Model 2b 
Predictor B SE β 95% CI B SE β 95% CI 
Constant 5.68*** 0.07  [5.56, 5.81] 5.62*** 0.07  [5.49, 5.75] 
Message topic         
 No-message control — — — — 0.07 0.09 .02 [−0.12, 0.25] 
 Instrumentalist-targeted −1.32*** 0.09 −.38 [−1.50, −1.14] −1.25*** 0.09 −.36 [−1.43, −1.07] 
 Altruist-targeted −0.07 0.09 −.02 [−0.25, 0.12] — — — — 
Relative GG salience 0.05 0.04 .05 [−0.03, 0.12] 0.04 0.04 .05 [−0.03, 0.12] 
Dual salience 0.26*** 0.05 .13 [0.16, 0.35] 0.26*** 0.05 .13 [0.16, 0.35] 
No-message control × Relative GG salience — — — — 0.00 0.05 .00 [−0.10, 0.11] 
Instrumentalist-targeted × Relative GG salience  −0.15** 0.05 −.09 [−0.25, −0.05] −0.15** 0.05 −.09 [−0.25, −0.04] 
Altruist-targeted × Relative GG salience −0.00 0.05 −.00 [−0.11, 0.10] — — — — 
Note.  N = 1,577. CI = con#dence interval.  The dependent variable in both models is personal-feedback belief strength.  The analyses were conducted as hierarchical 
multiple regressions. Estimates from the !nal models are presented here. When relevant, change statistics of individual steps are reported in the text. The two 
models di!ered only with respect to which message-topic dummy variable was treated as the reference category.  Accordingly, both models were equivalent with 
respect to the amount of variance they explained, R2 = .16, F(6, 1570) = 50.84, p < .001.   
 
**p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
a = Reference category is the no-message control group. 
b = Reference category is the altruist-targeted message group. 
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by the altruist-targeted message was not expected to be significant, but excluding it 
would have been a misspecification of the hypothesized model.   The second model was 
identical, except that the altruist-targeted message condition was used as the reference 
category.  Once again, change statistics reported here refer to unique variance 
contributed by a specific predictor after all other variables had been taken into account. 
Interaction terms representing the moderated effect of Message Topic on PF 
belief strength by relative GG salience explained significantly more variance than the 
main effects alone, !R! = .01, !F = 5.71, p = .006.  As hypothesized, the instrumentalist-
targeted message reduced PF belief strength significantly more as relative GG salience 
increased, " = #.09, p < .01.  
To further explore this interaction, simple regression coefficients, standard errors 
and t tests for the effect of the instrumentalist-targeted message on PF belief strength 
were estimated at three levels of relative GG salience: the mean and one-standard 
deviation above and below the mean.  This simple-slopes analysis was conducted using 
an SPSS macro developed by A. F. Hayes (PROCESS; Hayes, 2012a, 2012b, in press).  
Estimated marginal means of PF belief strength by Message Topic at ±1 SD relative GG 
salience are presented in Figure 5.4.   
At the mean relative GG salience, the instrumentalist-targeted message 
significantly reduced PF belief strength compared to the no-message control, B = #1.32, 
SE = 0.09, 95% CI [#1.50, #1.14], t(1570) = #14.37, p < .001.  The impact of the 
instrumentalist-targeted message was less pronounced when relative GG salience was 
low.  Recall that at #1 SD relative GG salience, PF outcomes were comparatively more 
salient than GG outcomes.  At that level of relative GG salience, the instrumentalist-
targeted message still significantly reduced PF belief strength, but to a lesser extent than 
at the mean, B = #1.06, SE = 0.13, 95% CI [#1.31, #0.80], t(1570) = #8.11, p < .001.  The  
Figure 5.4. Mean estimates for personal-feedback belief strength as a function of Message Topic and 
relative greater-good salience.
instrumentalist-targeted message reduced PF belief strength more at +1 SD relative GG 
salience, B ???1.57, SE = 0.13, 95% CI ??1.83, ??1.14], t(1570) = ??12.22, p < .001.  
A similar pattern of simple slopes was observed at these three levels of relative 
GG salience when the altruist-targeted message condition was the reference category.  At 
?? SD relative GG salience scale, the instrumentalist-targeted message was associated 
with a one-unit reduction in PF belief strength, B ???1.00, SE = 0.13, 95% CI ???1.25, 
?0.74], t(1570) = ??7.61, p < .001.  The estimated reduction in PF belief strength 
associated with the instrumentalist-targeted message at +1 SD relative GG salience was 
more pronounced, B ???1.50, SE = 0.13, 95% CI ??1.76, ??1.25], t(1570) = ??11.43, p <
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.001.  Combined, these results support H1b.  The instrumentalist-targeted message 
reduced PF belief strength to a greater extent as relative GG salience increased.  With 
increased salience of PF outcomes over GG outcomes, the instrumentalist-targeted 
message was less effective at reducing PF belief strength.   
Hypothesis 2 :  Moderator effect of belief salience on associations of 
behavioral beliefs with attitude and intention.  Two alternative predictions were 
made regarding the moderating effect of belief salience on the relationship of belief-
evaluation products (viz., behavioral beliefs) with attitudes and intentions toward 
participating in the SEQOME Project.  The first version of this hypothesis was derived 
from the reasoned action model (H2RAM).  In H2RAM, I predicted that the direct positive 
influence of behavioral beliefs on attitude (and the indirect influence on intention) would 
be moderated by Audience Segment.  In turn, this conditional direct effect was expected 
to influence intention through attitude.  Rephrasing these predictions in terms of relative 
GG salience, (a) the positive relationship between GG behavioral beliefs and attitude will 
become stronger as relative GG salience increases, and (b) the positive relationship 
between PF behavioral beliefs and attitude will become stronger as relative GG salience 
decreases.  Importantly, these conditional effects should also indirectly impact intention 
through attitude. 
The competing hypothesis was based on media priming theory (H2MPT).  In 
H2MPT, I predicted that the influence of behavioral beliefs with attitude—and indirectly 
intention—would be moderated by Audience Segment and Message Topic.  Specifically, 
(a) the positive relationship between GG behavioral beliefs and attitude will be stronger 
following exposure to the altruist-targeted message (compared to the instrumentalist-
targeted message),  and (b) the positive relationship between PF behavioral beliefs and 
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attitude will be stronger following exposure to the instrumentalist-targeted message.27  
In the no-message control, the relationships of these behavioral beliefs to attitude will 
follow the pattern predicted by the reasoned action model.  These conditional effects 
were also expected to indirectly impact intention through attitude.  
 To test these predictions with respect to attitudes toward participating in the 
SEQOME Project, I conducted a hierarchical regression analysis (see Table 5.10).  
Dummy variables representing the altruist- and instrumentalist-targeted message 
conditions were entered in the first step.  Next, mean-centered GG and PF behavioral 
beliefs were entered along with the seven remaining behavioral-belief items.  In the third 
step, mean-centered relative GG salience and dual salience were entered.  Interaction 
terms of relative GG salience by GG and PF behavioral beliefs were entered in the fourth 
step.  Two additional interaction terms were entered in the fifth step representing the 
conditional effects of the (a) GG behavioral beliefs by the altruist-targeted message, and 
(b) PF behavioral beliefs by the instrumentalist-targeted message.   These last two 
interactions were included to test the predictions outlined in H2MPT.   
 The regression analysis predicting attitude toward participating in the SEQOME 
Project was replicated using intention as the dependent variable.  In two additional 
steps, attitude was entered as a predictor, followed by perceived social pressure and 
perceived behavioral control variables (see Table 5.11).  Technically, this statistical model 
was insufficient to test the predictions made regarding intention in the competing 
versions of Hypothesis 2.  According to the reasoned action model, behavioral beliefs and  
                                                                                                                                                                      
27 The conditional e!ect of altruist-targeted message exposure would be expected to positively increase the 
association of the greater-good belief-evaluation product with attitude and intention at all levels of relative GG 
salience.  Likewise, the conditional e!ect of instrumentalist-targeted message exposure would yield positive 
increases to the association of the personal-feedback product with attitude and intention at all levels of relative GG 
salience.  Thus, H2MPT does not propose three-way interactions of relative GG salience, Message Topic and 
behavioral beliefs, but rather, additive pairs of two-way interactions: (a) belief-evaluation products by relative GG 
salience and (b) belief-evaluation products by Message Topic.  
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Table 5.10 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Attitude Toward Participating in the SEQOME 
Project from Message Topic, Behavioral Beliefs, Relative Greater-Good Salience, and  
Interaction Terms 
Predictor ΔR2 B SE β 95% CI 
Constant  5.16*** 0.05  [5.07, 5.25] 
Step 1 .001     
 Message topica      
  Altruist-targeted  −0.08 0.06 −.03 [−0.20, 0.03] 
  Instrumentalist-targeted  0.03 0.06 .01 [−0.09, 0.14] 
Step 2 .439***     
 B1E1 Greater-good behavioral beliefs  0.45*** 0.04 .38 [0.38, 0.53] 
 B2E2   Personal-feedback behavioral beliefs  0.25*** 0.04 .21 [0.17, 0.33] 
 B3E3   Put the privacy of my genetic information at risk  0.06† 0.03 .05 [−0.00, 0.12] 
 B4E4   Be part of research that goes against my  
personal values 
 0.11** 0.03 .09 [0.04, 0.17] 
 B5E5    Take up a lot of my time  0.08* 0.03 .06 [0.01, 0.14] 
 B6E6    Feel worried about my health  0.02 0.03 .01 [−0.04, 0.08] 
 B7E7    Learn something about my genes that I do not want 
to know 
 0.03 0.03 .03 [−0.20, 0.08] 
 B8E8    Feel physical pain  0.13*** 0.03 .11 [0.07, 0.20] 
 B9E9    Inconvenient  −0.02 0.04 −.01 [−0.09, 0.05] 
Step 3 .002†     
 Relative GG salience  0.04* 0.02 .05 [0.01, 0.07] 
 Dual salience  0.08* 0.03 .05 [0.01, 0.14] 
Step 4 .006***     
 B1E1 × Relative GG salience  0.07*** 0.02 .10 [0.04, 0.11] 
 B2E2 × Relative GG salience  −0.04* 0.02 −.06 [−007, −0.01] 
Step 5 .001     
 B1E1 × Altruist-targeted  0.08 0.05 .04 [−0.02, 0.17] 
 B2E2 × Instrumentalist-targeted   −0.03 0.05 −.01 [−0.13, 0.07] 
       
 Total R2 .443     
 Total F 74.58***    
Note. N = 1,577.  CI = con!dence interval.  The BiEi predictors refer to belief-evaluation product terms.  Regression 
coe!cients and standard errors from the "nal model are presented here.  
 
†p < .06. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
a Reference category is the no-message control group. 
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Table 5.11 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Intention to Participate in the SEQOME Project 
from Message Topic, Behavioral Beliefs, Relative Greater-Good Salience, Interaction Terms, and 
Principal Reasoned Action Model Variables 
Predictor ΔR2 B SE β 95% CI 
Constant  0.03 0.13  [−0.23, 0.29] 
Step 1 .000     
 Message topica      
  Altruist-targeted  −0.03 0.04 −.01 [−0.12, 0.06] 
  Instrumentalist-targeted  −0.03 0.05 −.01 [−0.12, 0.06] 
Step 2 .414***     
 B1E1 Greater-good behavioral beliefs  0.09** 0.03 .07 [0.03, 0.15] 
 B2E2   Personal-feedback behavioral beliefs  0.05 0.03 .04 [−0.01, 0.11] 
 B3E3   Put the privacy of my genetic information  
at risk 
 0.12*** 0.02 .10 [0.07, 0.16] 
 B4E4   Be part of research that goes against my  
personal values 
 −0.05* 0.03 −.04 [−0.10, −0.00] 
 B5E5    Take up a lot of my time  0.00 0.03 .00 [−0.05, 0.05] 
 B6E6    Feel worried about my health  −0.04 0.02 −.03 [−0.08, 0.01] 
 B7E7    Learn something about my genes that I do not 
want to know 
 0.02 0.02 .02 [−0.02, 0.06] 
 B8E8    Feel physical pain  0.04 0.03 .03 [−0.01, 0.09] 
 B9E9    Inconvenient  0.01 0.03 .01 [−0.05, 0.06] 
Step 3 .006***     
 Relative GG salience  0.04* 0.02 .05 [0.01, 0.07] 
 Dual salience  0.08* 0.03 .05 [0.01, 0.14] 
Step 4 .006***     
 B1E1 × Relative GG salience  0.03* 0.01 .04 [0.01, 0.06] 
 B2E2 × Relative GG salience  −0.02 0.01 −.03 [−.05, 0.00] 
Step 5 .003*     
 B1E1 × Altruist-targeted  −0.06 0.04 −.03 [−0.13, 0.01] 
 B2E2 × Instrumentalist-targeted   −0.11* 0.04 −.05 [−0.19, −0.03] 
Step 6      
 Attitude  0.24*** 0.02 .21 [0.20, 0.28] 
Step 7      
 Perceived social pressure  0.23*** 0.02 .21 [0.19, 0.27] 
 Capacityb  0.47*** 0.02 .46 [0.43, 0.50] 
 Autonomyb  0.04† 0.02 .03 [0.00, 0.07] 
       
 Total R2 .768     
 Total F 245.49***    
Note. N = 1,577.  CI = con$dence interval. The BiEi predictors refer to belief-evaluation product terms.  Regression 
coe!cients and standard errors from the "nal model are presented here.  
 
†p < .06. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
a Reference category is the no-message control group. 
b Dimension of perceived behavioral control. 
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the hypothesized interactions are expected to have an indirect effect on intention that is 
mediated through attitude.  To test this mediated-moderation hypothesis, I combined 
the two regression models predicting attitude and intention into a single path analysis 
using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2012b).  The analysis followed the general 
structure of the causal-steps approach for testing mediation hypotheses (R. M. Baron & 
Kenny, 1986).  Additionally, bias-corrected standard errors and 95% confidence intervals 
for the hypothesized conditional indirect effects were obtained.  These were generated 
using the PROCESS bootstrapping procedure with 1000 replications (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008). 
Significant interaction effects were further explored by conducting simple slopes 
analyses at the mean and ±1 SD of the moderator.  When relevant, the Johnson-Neyman 
technique (P. O. Johnson & Neyman, 1936; as cited in Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) 
was also used to define the region of significance for conditional relationships.  An added 
benefit of the Johnson-Neyman technique is that it produces estimated simple slopes at 
a wider range of moderator values, which facilitates plotting the interaction. 
 Hypothesized conditional effects on attitude.  The relative-GG-salience 
interaction terms explained additional variance in attitudes toward participating in the 
SEQOME Project, !R! = .01, !F(2, 1561) = 7.96, p < .001.  These interaction terms were 
designed to test whether relative GG salience moderated the effects of GG and PF 
behavioral beliefs.  In line with H2RAM, the association between GG behavioral beliefs 
and attitude became stronger as relative GG salience increased, " = .10, p < .001.  Also as 
predicted, the association between PF behavioral beliefs with attitude became weaker as 
relative GG salience increased, " = #.06, p = .020. 
Including the second pair of interaction terms in the fifth step did not explain any 
additional variance in attitude, !R! = .00, !F(2, 1559) = 1.77, p = .171.  The regression 
coefficients for these terms represented the moderating effect of Message Topic, based 
on a media priming account of attitude formation.  In short, the competing hypothesis 
derived from media priming theory, H2MPT, was not supported. Message Topic did not 
moderate the relationship of GG and PF beliefs on attitude toward participating in the 
SEQOME Project.
Follow-up analyses for the conditional e!ect of greater-good behavioral beliefs 
on attitude. Simple slopes for the moderating effect of relative GG salience on the 
association between GG behavioral beliefs and attitude are presented in Figure 5.5.  The 
effect of GG behavioral beliefs on attitude at the mean relative GG salience was 
Figure 5.5. Simple slopes for the moderating e!ect of relative greater-good salience on the relation between 
greater-good behavioral beliefs and attitude toward participating in the SEQOME Project.
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significant and positive, B = 0.45, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [0.38, 0.52], t(1559) = 12.46, p < 
.001.28  At !1 SD relative GG salience, the association between GG behavioral beliefs and 
attitude was weaker, B = 0.33, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [0.23, 0.42], t(1559) = 6.84, p < .001.  
At +1 SD relative GG salience, the association of GG behavioral beliefs with attitude 
toward participating in the SEQOME Project was strongest, B = 0.58, SE = 0.05, 95% CI 
[0.49, 0.67], t(1559) = 12.21, p < .001.  Further, the 95% confidence intervals for the 
slope estimates at one standard deviation relative GG salience below and above the mean 
do not overlap, indicating that those effects are significantly different from one another.  
I also examined the Johnson-Neyman significance region for the conditional 
effect of GG behavioral beliefs on attitude by relative GG salience.  For respondents with 
a speculative value of relative GG salience below !3.20, the association between GG 
behavioral beliefs and attitude was not significantly different from zero.  In terms of the 
current sample, this means that GG behavioral beliefs had no discernable impact on 
attitudes toward participating in the SEQOME Project among respondents who selected 
four PF outcomes and no GG outcomes in the dimensional-salience task, B = 0.10, SE = 
0.09, 95% CI [!0.08, 0.29], t(1559) = 1.08, p = .281.   
Follow-up analyses for the conditional effect of personal-feedback  behavioral 
beliefs on attitude.   Simple slopes of the conditional direct effect of PF behavioral 
beliefs on attitude by relative GG salience are depicted in Figure 5.6.  At the mean-level 
of relative GG salience, a one-unit increase in PF behavioral belief resulted in a 1/4-unit 
increase in attitude toward participating in the SEQOME Project, B = 0.25, SE = 0.04, 
95% CI [0.17, 0.33], t(1559) = 6.16, p < .001.29  The association was stronger at !1 SD  
                                                                                                                                                                      
28 The simple slope of the relationship between GG behavioral beliefs and attitude at the mean level of relative GG 
salience is not plotted in Figure 5.5.  This slope was excluded to reduce clutter. 
29 The simple slope of the relationship between PF behavioral beliefs and attitude at the mean level of relative GG 
salience is not plotted in Figure 5.6.  This slope was excluded to reduce clutter.  
relative GG salience, B = 0.32, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [0.22, 0.42], t(1559) = 6.25, p < .001.
At +1 SD relative GG salience, the association between PF behavioral beliefs and attitude 
was weakest, B = 0.18, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [0.08, 0.28], t(1559) = 3.68, p < .001.  In 
short, the positive influence of PF behavioral beliefs on attitudes toward participating in 
the SEQOME Project increased with increased salience of PF outcomes (viz., relative to 
GG outcomes).  This supports H2RAM.
Moreover, the Johnson-Neyman significance region for this moderation effect 
revealed that PF behavioral beliefs were not significantly associated with attitudes when 
relative GG exceeded a speculative value of +3.95.  In terms of the current sample, the 
simple slope for the relation between PF behavioral beliefs and attitude was not 
Figure 5.6. Simple slopes for the moderating e!ect of relative greater-good salience on the relation between 
personal-feedback behavioral beliefs and attitude toward participating in the SEQOME Project.
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significant for respondents who selected four GG outcomes and no PF outcomes, B = 
0.13, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [!0.00, 0.25], t(1559) = 1.92, p = .055.   
Hypothesized conditional indirect effects on intention.   According to 
H2RAM, the moderating effect of relative GG salience on the relationships between 
behavioral beliefs and intention to participate in the SEQOME Project were expected to 
be mediated through attitude.  To test these predictions, a pair of mediation analyses was 
performed.  In both of these, the outcome variable was intention to participate in the 
SEQOME Project and the proposed mediating variable was attitude toward doing so.  
The analyses focused on different initial causal variables.  The initial causal variables 
were the interaction terms of GG behavioral beliefs by relative GG salience (i.e., B1E1 " 
Relative GG Salience) and PF behavioral beliefs by relative GG salience (i.e., B2E2 " 
Relative GG Salience).  The generic statistical model used for these analyses is depicted 
in Figure 5.7.  
Attitude partially mediated the conditional relationship of GG behavioral beliefs 
by relative GG salience on intention.  The path coefficient for the indirect relationship of 
the B1E1 " Relative GG Salience term on intention through attitude was statistically 
significant, â3bˆ1 = 0.02, SE = 0.01, 95% CI [0.01, 0.03].  The direct effect of this 
interaction on intention remained statistically significant when controlling for attitude, 
perceived social pressure and perceived behavioral control, !'3 = 0.03, SE = 0.01, 95% CI 
[0.01, 0.06], t(1555) = 2.437, p = .015; however, it was substantially smaller than the 
total estimated direct effect when those variables were not included, !3 = 0.09, SE = 0.02, 
95% CI [0.05, 0.20], t(1559) = 4.16, p < .001.30  Nonetheless, partial mediation is still 
consistent with the predictions outlined in H2RAM. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
30 A portion of this conditional e!ect appears to have been mediated through the capacity dimension of perceived 
behavioral control.  The estimated indirect e!ect of this interaction term through capacity was statistically 
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Figure 5.8 illustrates the conditional indirect effect of GG behavioral beliefs on 
intention to participate in the SEQOME Project, as mediated through attitude at 
different levels of relative GG salience.  Referring to the path labels in Figure 5.7, I 
quantified this effect at different levels of relative GG salience, W, using an equation 
given by Hayes (2012c):  f(!W) = (a1 + a3W)b1.  The influence of GG behavioral beliefs on 
intention through attitude increased linearly as relative GG salience increased.  
Examination of the Johnson-Neyman significance region for this conditional indirect 
effect revealed GG behavioral beliefs did not significantly impact intention through 
attitude at values of relative GG salience lower than "3.22, !ˆ"3.22 = 0.04, SE = 0.02, 95% 
                                                                                                                                                                     
signi!cant, â3bˆ1 = 0.03, SE = 0.01, 95% CI [0.01, 0.05].  Comparable indirect e&ects through perceived social pressure, 
â3bˆ1 = 0.009, 95% CI [−0.001, 0.020], and the autonomy measure of perceived behavioral control, â3bˆ1 = −0.001, 95% 
CI [−0.000, 0.004], were not signi#cantly di$erent from zero.  It should be kept in mind that the regression models 
predicting capacity, and the other direct predictors of intention, do not include belief-based determinants of those 
constructs.  Thus, the association of attitudinal behavioral beliefs with capacity may have resulted from model 
misspeci!cation.  The evidence of mediation through capacity produced in this analysis may be spurious. 
 
 
Figure 5.7.  Statistical model for the conditional indirect e!ects of greater-good and personal-feedback behavioral 
beliefs on intention through attitude, as moderated by relative greater-good salience.  X1 = Greater-good behavioral 
beliefs; X2 = Personal-feedback behavioral beliefs; W = Relative greater-good salience; M1 = Attitude toward the 
SEQOME Project; Y = Intention to participate. Adapted from SPSS PROCESS documentation, by A. F. Hayes, 2012c, p. 24. 
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CI [0.00, 0.08].  In other words, GG behavioral beliefs did not significantly influence 
intentions to participate in the SEQOME Project through attitude among respondents 
who selected four PF outcomes but no GG outcomes in the dimensional-salience task 
(i.e., relative GG salience o??? 4).  This pattern echoes the results observed for the 
conditional direct effect of GG behavioral beliefs on attitude by relative GG salience, and 
further supports H2RAM.
Also consistent with H2RAM, the interaction of PF behavioral beliefs by relative 
GG salience (i.e., B2E2 ! Relative GG Salience) indirectly affected intention to participate 
in the SEQOME Project through attitude, â3bˆ1 ???0.010, SE = 0.004, 95% CI ??0.019, 
Figure 5.8. Bootstrap parameter estimates for the conditional indirect e!ect of greater-good behavioral beliefs on 
intention to participate in the SEQOME Project at di!erent levels of relative greater-good salience, as mediated 
through attitude. Values to the right of the vertical dotted line are within the Johnson-Neyman signi"cance region.
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!0.002], p = .021.31  Controlling for all other variables in the model, the average direct 
effect of this interaction on intention was not significant, !'3 = !0.02, SE = 0.01, t(1555) 
= !1.84, p  = .065.  Nor was there a significant direct effect of PF behavioral beliefs on 
intention, holding all else constant, !'1= 0.05, SE = 0.03, t(1555) = 1.59, p = .111.  
Combined, these results suggest that attitude fully mediated the effect of PF behavioral 
beliefs by relative GG salience on intention.32  
As illustrated in Figure 5.9, the conditional indirect effect of PF behavioral beliefs 
on intention, as mediated through attitude, decreased linearly as relative GG salience 
increased.  In other words, PF behavioral beliefs affected intentions to participate in the 
SEQOME Project more as PF outcomes became increasingly more salient than GG 
outcomes.  The boundary of the Johnson-Neyman significance region for this conditional 
indirect effect revealed that PF behavioral beliefs did not significantly impact intention 
to participate in the SEQOME Project at values of relative GG salience greater than 
+3.94, "ˆ3.94 = 0.03, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.02, 0.00].  That is, PF behavioral beliefs were 
not a significant determinant of intention for respondents who selected four GG 
outcomes but no PF outcomes in the dimensional-salience task (i.e., relative GG salience 
of +4),  
According to H2MPT, hypothesized moderating effects of Message Topic on the 
association between behavioral beliefs and attitude would indirectly impact intention.  
Because no significant conditional direct effects of the GG and PF behavioral beliefs on 
attitude by Message Topic were found, corresponding conditional indirect effects on  
                                                                                                                                                                      
31 An approximate p value was calculated by dividing the absolute value of the unstandardized path estimate by its 
standard error, −0.0097/0.0042.   The resulting z statistic was then converted to a p value.  
32 The estimated indirect e!ects of the B1E1 × Relative GG Salience interaction on intention through the perceived 
social pressure and the two dimensions of perceived behavioral control were not signi!cant.  The path estimate for 
the e!ect through perceived social pressure was â3bˆ1 = −0.00, SE = 0.01, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.01]. Through capacity, the 
estimated indirect e!ect was â3bˆ1 = −0.01, SE = 0.01, 95% CI [−0.03, 0.02]. Through autonomy, the indirect e$ect was 
â3bˆ1 = −0.00, SE = 0.0095% CI [−0.00 0.00]. 
intention through attitude were not possible.  Nonetheless, I conducted simple 
moderation analyses to explore whether there were conditional direct effects of GG and 
PF behavioral beliefs by Message Topic on intention that were not mediated through 
attitude.  
As was shown in Table 5.11, two interaction terms representing the conditional 
effects of GG and PF behavioral beliefs by Message Topic significantly improved the 
prediction of intention???R! = .003, ? F(1, 1559) = 3.91, p = .020.  This improvement in 
explained variance was derived exclusively from the interaction of the instrumentalist-
targeted message with PF behavioral beliefs (i.e., B2E2 ! instrumentalist-targeted), B =
??.11, SE = 0.04, 95% CI ??0.19??? 0.03], t(1555) ??? 2.80, p = .005.  Among respondents 
Figure 5.9.  Bootstrap parameter estimates for the conditional indirect e!ect of personal-feedback behavioral 
beliefs on intention to participate in the SEQOME Project at di!erent levels of relative greater-good salience, as 
mediated through attitude. Values to the left of the vertical dotted line are within the Johnson-Neyman 
signi"cance region.
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assigned to the instrumentalist-targeted message condition, PF behavioral beliefs were a 
slightly weaker determinant of intentions to participate in the SEQOME Project.  This 
effect was opposite of that predicted by H2MPT.  There is no evidence that a media 
priming effect increased the salience and influence of message-targeted beliefs on 
subsequent judgments about participating in the SEQOME Project. 
Hypothesis 3 :  Effects of message exposure on attitude and intention.   
Two competing hypotheses were posited regarding the effects of message exposure on 
attitude and intention.  Generally, belief salience was expected to moderate the effects of 
Message Topic on attitude and intention.    
Drawing on media priming theory, in H3MPT I predicted a main effect of Message 
Topic on attitude and intention to participate in the SEQOME Project.  This prediction 
was premised on the assumption that message exposure would impact intention 
indirectly through changes in behavioral beliefs and attitude.  Moreover, H3MPT relied on 
the further assumption that the relationship of behavioral beliefs with attitude would be 
moderated by Message Topic.  For example, exposure to a message addressing PF 
behavioral beliefs would strengthen the impact of PF behavioral beliefs on attitude.  
However, this underlying assumption was not met.  Message Topic did not moderate the 
association between behavioral beliefs and attitudes.  Nor did Message Topic moderate 
the association between behavioral beliefs and intentions.   
Instead, I focus here on testing the competing hypothesis expressed in H3RAM.  
With H3RAM, I predicted that the influence of the instrumentalist-targeted message on 
attitude and intention would be mediated by PF behavioral beliefs and moderated by 
Audience Segment.  Replacing the audience-segment construct with relative GG salience, 
the impact of the instrumentalist-targeted message on PF behavioral beliefs is expected 
to affect attitude and intention to a greater extent as relative GG salience decreases.  
! ! !
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Because relative GG salience is expected to moderate two causal pathways, the 
conceptual model underlying H3RAM is an instance of moderated mediation as defined by 
R. M. Baron & Kenny (1986; see also Preacher et al., 2007).   
A diagram of the statistical model used for this analysis is shown in Figure 5.10.  
The conditional indirect effect of the instrumentalist-targeted message on attitude was 
composed of two relationships: (a) the path from the instrumentalist-targeted message 
to PF behavioral beliefs, and (b) the path from PF behavioral beliefs to attitude.   Both of  
these paths were expected to be moderated by relative GG salience.  The statistical model 
predicting intention had the same basic structure, except that attitude, perceived social 
pressure and perceived behavioral control were included as control variables.  Referring 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10.  Statistical model for the conditional indirect e!ect of the instrumentalist-targeted message on 
attitude and intention through personal-feedback behavioral beliefs, as moderated by relative greater-good 
salience.  X = Instrumentalist-targeted message; W = Relative greater-good salience; M = Personal-feedback 
behavioral beliefs; YModel 1  = Attitude toward participating in the SEQOME Project; YModel 2 = Intention to participate in 
the SEQOME Project.  Adapted from SPSS Process documentation, by A. F. Hayes, 2012c, p. 74. 
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to the path labels given in Figure 5.10, these conditional indirect effects are quantified at 
different levels of relative GG salience, W, with the expression given by Muller, Judd, & 
Yzerbyt (2005): f(!W) = (a1 + a3W)(b1 + b2W).  
Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals and standard errors for hypothesized 
conditional indirect effects at different levels of relative GG salience were estimated 
using the PROCESS macro for SPSS with 1000 bootstrap replications.  Due to some 
limited flexibility in the PROCESS macro, the no-message control and altruist-targeted 
message conditions were combined into a single reference category for these analyses.33  
I compared coefficients from this model with corresponding estimates of a better-
specified model that included the second dummy variable and dual salience.  The 
differences between the two models were negligible. 
Conditional indirect effect of the instrumentalist-targeted message on 
attitude.   Figure 5.11 illustrates the conditional indirect effect of the instrumentalist-
targeted message on attitude toward participating in the SEQOME Project at different 
levels of relative GG salience.  Plotting the conditional indirect effect by relative GG 
salience reveals a clear curvilinear relationship, which was not explicitly predicted in the 
stated hypothesis (i.e., H3RAM). 
The Johnson-Neyman significance region for this conditional indirect effect had 
two boundaries within the observed range of relative GG salience.  The association 
between the instrumentalist-targeted message and attitude was not significantly 
different from zero for respondents with a speculative value of relative GG salience below  
                                                                                                                                                                      
33 One limitation of using the PROCESS macro to conduct this analysis was that only one initial variable could be 
entered at a time.  Thus, only one of the two dummy variables representing the three message topic conditions 
could be included.  Also, any additional variables de!ned as covariates in the model could only be selectively 
applied as predictors of the mediating or outcome variables as a block.  As a result, neither the dummy-coded 
variable representing the altruist-targeted message condition nor the dual-salience variable could be modeled as 
predictors of personal-feedback behavioral beliefs without also controlling for all other variables that were included 
as predictors of attitude. 
??.40??? ˆ ?.40 ???0.09, SE = 0.05, 95% CI ??0.?1, 0.00], p = .050.   Accordingly, the 
instrumentalist-targeted message had no discernable impact on attitude toward 
participating in the SEQOME Project among respondents who selected four PF outcomes 
and no GG outcomes during the dimensional-salience task,?? ˆ 4.00 ???0.04, SE = 0.08, 
95% CI ??0.?1, 0.10], p = .574.  Nor did the instrumentalist-targeted message influence 
attitude toward participation among respondents who selected four GG outcomes and no 
PF outcomes,?? ˆ +4.00 ???0.09, SE = 0.05, 95% CI ??0.19, 0.00], p = .061.
Compared to the no-message control and altruist-targeted message conditions, 
the instrumentalist-targeted message had the greatest impact on attitude for 
respondents with a relative GG salience value of +1.00,?? ˆ +1.00 ???0.1?, SE = 0.03, 95% CI 
Figure 5.11. Bootstrap parameter estimates for the conditional indirect e!ect of the instrumentalist-targeted 
message on attitude toward participating in the SEQOME Project at di!erent levels of relative greater-good salience, 
as mediated through personal-feedback behavioral beliefs.  Values falling between the vertical dotted lines are 
within the Johnson-Neyman signi"cance region.
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??0.17??? 0.08], p < .001.  Among respondents who nominated one additional GG 
outcome over the number of PF outcomes selected, the instrumentalist-targeted message 
led to a 1/10-unit decrease in attitude.  Because this curvilinear effect was not explicitly 
anticipated, H3RAM was not supported. The evidence does not support the overall 
prediction that the instrumentalist-targeted message will yield less favorable attitudes 
and weaker intentions as relative GG salience decreases.  
Conditional indirect e!ect of the instrumentalist -targeted message on 
intention. The conditional indirect effect of the instrumentalist-targeted message on 
intention to participate in the SEQOME Project at different levels of relative GG salience 
is presented in Figure 5.12.  As with the model predicting attitude, conditional indirect 
Figure 5.12. Bootstrap parameter estimates for the conditional indirect e!ect of the instrumentalist-targeted 
message on intention to participate in the SEQOME Project at di!erent levels of relative greater-good salience, as 
mediated through personal-feedback behavioral beliefs and attitude.  Values falling between the vertical dotted 
lines are within the Johnson-Neyman signi"cance region.
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effect of the instrumentalist-targeted on intention message by relative GG salience 
appeared to be curvilinear.  Once again, this curvilinear association was not explicitly 
predicted in H3RAM.   
The Johnson-Neyman significance region for the conditional indirect effect on 
intention was narrower than that of the model predicting attitude, but also had two 
boundaries within the observed range of relative GG salience.  The association between 
the instrumentalist-targeted message and intention was not significantly different from 
zero among respondents with relative GG salience below !2.67, "ˆ!2.67 = !0.03, SE = 
0.02, 95% CI [!0.09, 0.00], p = .050.  The conditional indirect effect on intention was 
also not significantly different from zero when relative GG salience exceeded +0.53, "ˆ0.53 
= !0.03, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [!0.06, 0.00], p = .050.  Among respondents who selected 
more GG outcomes than PF outcomes to any degree, the instrumentalist-targeted 
message did not have an observable impact on intention.  
The instrumentalist-targeted message had the greatest impact on intention for 
respondents with a relative GG salience value of !2, "ˆ!2.00 = !0.03, SE = 0.02, 95% CI 
[!0.07, !0.01], p = .046.  In other words, among respondents who nominated two more 
PF outcomes than GG outcomes, the instrumentalist-targeted message led to an 
estimated three-hundredths of a unit decrease in intention.  Thus, the instrumentalist-
targeted message significantly lowered intentions to participate in the SEQOME Project, 
but only when PF outcomes were moderately more salient than GG outcomes.  Due to 
the unanticipated curvilinearity of this conditional indirect effect, the findings with 
regard to intention do not support H3RAM.   
  
! ! !
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Research Questions  
 Lastly, I asked whether decisional conflict and attitudinal ambivalence would be 
influenced by Message Topic and/or relative GG salience.  To explore these questions, I 
conducted two multiple regression analyses (see Table 5.12).  In the first analysis, 
attitudinal ambivalence was the dependent variable.  The predictors were two dummy 
variables representing the instrumentalist- and altruist-targeted message topics, relative 
GG salience, dual salience, and two terms to test for a Message Topic ! Relative GG 
Salience interaction effect.34  The predictor variables and structure of the second analysis 
was identical, but decisional conflict was the dependent variable. 
 Relative GG salience was the only significant predictor of attitudinal 
ambivalence, accounting for a less than 2% its variance, "R! = .02, "F(1, 1562) = 27.22, 
p < .001.  As the relative GG salience increased attitudinal ambivalence decreased, # = 
$.12, p = .007.  
 In the model predicting decisional conflict, the Message Topic ! Relative GG 
Salience step was not significant, "R! = .00, "F(2, 1519) = 0.76, p = .466.  Controlling 
for all other variables, a main effect of Message Topic was observed, "R! = .01, "F(2, 
1519) = 8.08, p < .001. Compared to the no-message control, the instrumentalist- and 
altruist-targeted messages were each associated with small reductions in decisional 
conflict.  This effect was nominally more pronounced in the altruist-targeted condition, # 
= $.13, p < .001, than it was in the instrumentalist-targeted condition, # = $.09, p = 
.008; however, pairwise comparisons of the estimated marginal means for these two 
groups (30.07 and 32.66, respectively) revealed that this difference was not statistically 
significant, p = .135.  Thus, respondents provided with additional information about the
                                                                                                                                                                      
34 The model can also be thought of as an ANCOVA with a two-way interaction term speci!ed between the !xed 
e!ect (i.e., Message Topic) and one of the covariates (i.e., relative GG salience). 
! ! !
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Table 5.12 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Attitudinal Ambivalence and Decisional Con!ict by Message Topic, Relative 
Greater-Good salience, and Interaction Terms 
 Attitudinal ambivalence Decisional con!ict 
Predictor B SE β 95% CI B SE β 95% CI 
Constant 5.17*** 0.16  [4.86, 5.48] 38.51*** 1.08  [36.39, 40.64] 
Message topica         
 Instrumentalist-targeted −0.32 0.21 −.05 [−0.74, 0.10] −3.86** 1.44 −.09 [−6.69, −1.02] 
 Altruist-targeted −0.35 0.21 −.05 [0.07, 0.60] −5.75*** 1.46 −.13 [−8.62, −2.89] 
Relative GG salience −0.21** 0.08 −.12 [−0.36, −0.06] −2.08*** 0.54 −.17 [−3.13, −1.03] 
Dual salience −0.17 0.10 −.04 [−0.36, 0.03] −2.37*** 0.68 −.09 [−3.69, −1.05] 
Instrumentalist-targeted × Relative GG salience  −0.08 0.11 −.03 [−0.29, 0.14] 0.79 0.74 .04 [−0.65, 2.23] 
Altruist-targeted × Relative GG salience −0.03 0.11 −.01 [−0.24, 0.19] 0.00 0.75 .00 [−1.47, 1.47] 
         
Total R2 .02    .04    
Total F 5.49***    9.26***    
N  1,569    1,926    
Note.  N = 1,577.  CI = con!dence interval.  The analyses were conducted as hierarchical multiple regressions. Estimates from the !nal models are presented here. 
When relevant, change statistics of individual steps are reported in the text.  The decisional con!ict scale ranged from 0 to 100. Attitudinal ambivalence was 
measured on a 12-point scale, ranging from 0 to 11. 
 
†p < .06. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
a = Reference category is the no-message control group. 
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SEQOME Project—regardless of its specific content—experienced less decisional conflict.  
A main effect of relative GG salience on decisional conflict was also observed, !R! = .02, 
!F(1, 1519) = 32.54, p < .001.  All else being equal, decisional conflict decreased as 
relative GG salience increased, " = #.17, p < .001.  Overall, this model explained only 
about 4% of the variance in decisional conflict.  
Conclusion  
In Study 2, I examined the moderating effect of belief salience on causal 
pathways linking messages about participating in the SEQOME Project to beliefs, 
attitudes, and intentions to participate. Study 2 was designed to change beliefs about 
participating in a hypothetical whole genome sequencing research project (i.e., the 
SEQOME Project).  The targeted beliefs were chosen because they had been identified as 
being especially important to one of two different audience segments.  Each of these 
audience segments had been shown in Study 1 to have different motivations for 
participating in genetics research.  In this case, these motivations were manifest as 
beliefs about participating that were uniquely salient to one of the identified segments, 
but not the other.  According to the RAM, changes in the belief strength of these uniquely 
salient beliefs were expected to impact attitude and intention differently, depending on 
audience segment.  By extension, this proposition implies that matching message 
content to the salient beliefs underlying peoples’ decisions is a good strategy for fostering 
informed consent.  A caveat derived from MPT was also explored.  If messages generate 
temporary increases in belief salience, then matching content to audience segments 
would be less beneficial—at least in the short term.  No evidence was found to support 
predictions derived from MPT regarding the effects of message-exposure on belief 
salience.    
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Results from Study 2 provide a nuanced view of the conditional effects of belief 
salience.  For example, there was evidence that salience reduced the amount of belief 
change produced by a message; however, this was only found for the message targeting 
expectations about receiving personal feedback (i.e., the instrumentalist-targeted 
message).  On the other hand, belief salience increased the impact of GG and PF 
behavioral beliefs on attitudes and intentions to participate.  Taken together, the overall 
impact of the instrumentalist-targeted message on attitude and intention was greatest 
when GG and PF outcomes were both salient to some degree.  This finding is interesting 
from an informed-consent strategy perspective.  Salient beliefs were stronger 
determinants of attitudes and intentions to participate in the SEQOME Project than 
were nonsalient beliefs.  Because salient beliefs have a greater impact on participation 
decisions, salient beliefs represent material information that should be given disclosure 
priority (Fischhoff, 2011).  This is especially true when salient beliefs are factually 
incorrect.  For example, most of the respondents in Study 2 expected to receive some 
form of personal genetic-risk or health information by participating in the SEQOME 
Project.  This expectation was false, given that the SEQOME Project was defined as a 
study that would not return any research results.   Lowering expectations about receiving 
personal feedback would be an important goal of disclosure, especially among 
respondents for whom those expectations were salient.  At the same time, this study 
provided evidence that changing salient expectations or beliefs is more difficult than 
changing nonsalient beliefs.  Thus, at least sometimes, the beliefs that need to be 
changed the most are also the least amenable to change. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION  
In this dissertation, I examined public expectations about participating in 
research involving whole genome sequencing and broad sharing of personal genomic 
information.  I tested several hypotheses related to content matching and message 
customization in an effort to clarify how the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
participation decisions might be leveraged to better meet disclosure obligations.  
Drawing on the reasoned action model (RAM; see Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010), I argued that 
efforts to support informed consent require a descriptive understanding of the beliefs 
upon which people base their decisions.  The RAM postulates that most action is driven 
by a limited number of cognitive factors.  Ultimately, behaviors that are under volitional 
control are determined by salient beliefs—those outcomes that readily come to mind 
when a person thinks about performing the behavior.  From this it follows that effective 
informed consent procedures would prioritize information based on its correspondence 
to those salient beliefs.  In other words, once salient beliefs about participating in a 
research project have been identified, a major goal of a consent disclosure is to ensure 
that the expectations expressed in those beliefs are accurate or true.   
Moreover, I have suggested that identifying qualitative differences in the content 
of beliefs underlying people’s decisions to participate in genomic research could prove 
valuable for delivering customized disclosure materials.  In as much as the changeable, 
subjective factors influencing behavior differ from person to person, meeting the 
informational needs of a diverse population might require a targeted or tailored 
approach to informed consent.  With this in mind, I explored the feasibility of taking a 
bottom-up approach to define meaningful audience segments.  Using theory-based 
belief-elicitation procedures, the personally salient beliefs of a large sample of potential 
research participants were identified.  In Study 1, I employed a data-driven approach to 
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define audience segments that differed with respect to their underlying motivations for 
participating.  The input for this segmentation analysis drew on responses to an open-
ended belief elicitation procedure.  In Study 2, the open-ended procedure was replaced 
with a dimensional-salience task.  Respondents were presented with a list of commonly 
mentioned outcomes and asked to select those that were most important to their 
participation decisions.  
All respondents were also asked to complete a set of closed-ended belief strength 
and outcome evaluation items.  Many of these items directly referred to outcomes 
frequently mentioned in the open-ended elicitation or selected in the list-based task.  
The amount of differentiation and communality between the identified audience 
segments was assessed using qualitative and quantitative criteria.  Expanding on the 
expectancy-value principle,35 messages targeted to address the unique behavioral beliefs 
of distinct audience segments were expected to influence behavior more than messages 
aimed at the general population (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, 2010; 
Hobbis & Sutton, 2005).  The implications of media priming theory (MPT; e.g., Cappella 
et al., 2000) with respect to changes in belief salience resulting from message exposure 
and for defining an audience’s informational needs based on prior observation were also 
examined.   
In this final chapter, I review the major findings of this dissertation.  I also 
discuss the implications of these findings for theory and practice in the domains of 
human genomics and health communication.  The chapter concludes with a review of 
limitations and implications for future research and practice.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
35 Eagly & Chaiken (1993) describe the expectancy-value principle as the notion that message content or arguments 
must address the primary beliefs that serve as the basis of whichever variable the message is meant to in!uence.  
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Summary of Findings  
Study 1  
Study 1 drew on a content analysis of responses to an open-ended belief 
elicitation procedure.  A major advantage of the open-ended procedure is that it allowed 
respondents to spontaneously generate consequences they thought would result from 
participating in a genetic research study.  The use of a free association task supported the 
aim of eliciting outcomes that were truly top-of-mind to respondents, and thus likely to 
represent the primary beliefs that influence behavior.  Data derived from the elicitation 
was then used to divide a general-population sample into distinct audience segments.  
The aim of the segmentation was to classify respondents into groups, so as to maximize 
within group similarities regarding salient beliefs while also maximizing between group 
differences.  Cluster analysis revealed four groups of participants.  Two of these groups 
comprised approximately two-thirds of the overall sample, were roughly proportionate 
in size, and displayed qualitative differences in the perceived consequences of 
participating in a genetic research study that came readily to mind.  Because the 
qualitative differences between these two groups were demonstrable, they became the 
focus of subsequent analyses.   
The distinguishing characteristic of the first group (viz., altruists) was that its 
members listed outcomes related to helping others, contributing to science and to 
medicine with great frequency in the open-ended elicitation.  Additional concerns that 
were uniquely salient for this group based on qualitative criteria were that participating 
would be inconvenient and might cause physical pain (e.g., because a blood sample 
would be drawn).  People in the second group (viz., instrumentalists), on the other hand, 
were more likely to mention outcomes related to receiving information about their 
personal genetic risk, health status, and prevention or treatment of disease.  This group 
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was also unique with respect to the frequency that concerns about feeling worried and 
that participating might lead to the discovery of something that they would rather not 
know.  The groups also displayed some qualitative similarities.  Substantial numbers of 
respondents in both groups expressed concerns about privacy, that their genetic 
information or biological samples might be misused by researchers, and that 
participating would be time consuming.  All of the outcomes described here were 
classified as modally salient for one or both groups based on the decision rules defined 
by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980).  The emergence of groups with qualitative differences in 
the prominence of concerns about contributing to the greater good and receiving 
research results is consistent with findings of prior research that examined people’s 
motivations for participating in large-scale genome sequencing research (Facio et al., 
2011).   
To further verify that the altruist and instrumentalist segments had different 
underlying motivations to participate in a genetic research study, I tested whether the 
belief strength of outcomes that were uniquely salient to those groups were more 
strongly related to attitude and intention among its members.  Two Likert-type belief-
strength measures referred to the uniquely salient outcomes of the two segments.  All 
respondents were asked to rate how strongly they agreed or disagreed that participating 
in a genetics research study would help scientists develop treatments for disease.  This 
item matched one of the elicitation themes mentioned by a large number of people in the 
altruist segment but less so among the instrumentalists.  All respondents were also asked 
to rate how strongly they agreed that participating would give them access to their own 
genetic health risk information.  This item corresponded with a belief that was 
mentioned much more frequently by the instrumentalists than it was by the altruists.    
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According to the RAM, salient behavioral beliefs (i.e., belief strength ! outcome 
evaluation product terms) are expected to have a greater impact on attitude and, 
indirectly, intention than nonsalient beliefs.  Using audience segment as an operational 
proxy of salience, it was predicted that audience segment would moderate the 
association of behavioral beliefs with attitude and intentions.  Specifically, expectations 
about helping scientists develop treatments for disease were uniquely salient for 
altruists, and were more strongly associated with attitude and intention among altruists 
than among instrumentalists.  Likewise, beliefs that participating would provide 
personalized feedback about one’s genetic risk were more strongly associated with 
attitude and intention among instrumentalists.  The results of Study 1 were fully in line 
with the hypothesized conditional effect of belief salience on belief–attitude and belief–
intention relationships in the context of participating in large-cohort genetic research.  
Further, Study 1 established that audience segments defined using a data-driven 
clustering procedure drawing on open-ended belief elicitation results could serve as 
useful proxies of belief salience.  Ultimately, the results meet a descriptive precondition 
for matching message content to the informational needs of distinct audience segments.  
Study 2  
To further test how the impact of behavioral beliefs on attitude and intention is 
moderated by belief salience, an experimental approach was taken in Study 2.  Although 
correlational evidence supporting the hypothesis that salient beliefs are more strongly 
related to attitudes and intentions than nonsalient beliefs was found in Study 1, such 
analyses are incapable of distinguishing beliefs that contribute to the formation of 
attitudes and intention from those that are merely associated but not causally antecedent 
to them (see Fishbein, 1967; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988).  For this experiment, I 
developed two messages.  One was designed to address beliefs that were uniquely salient 
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for people in the altruist segment.  The other was designed to address beliefs that were 
uniquely salient for the instrumentalists.  Participating in a hypothetical, whole genome 
sequencing study called the SEQOME Project was the target behavior in Study 2.  A 
central aim of the analyses was to assess how exposure to the audience-segment targeted 
messages would affect changes in belief strength, attitude and intention.  Critically, the 
study was designed to assess whether respondents who received content more closely 
matched to their salient beliefs would be more affected by the messages. 
Hypothesis 1a and 1b derived from a single conceptual model for the effects of 
message exposure on belief strength (see Jaccard, 1981).  Belief salience was expected to 
moderate the impact of message appeals on changes in belief strength.  Message appeals 
targeting salient beliefs were predicted to result in less belief change than appeals 
targeting nonsalient beliefs.  Taken together, the tests of H1a and H1b lend only partial 
support for the conceptual model.  
No evidence was found for the specific interaction effect predicted in H1a.  
Salience of greater-good (GG) beliefs did not moderate the influence of the altruist-
targeted message on GG belief strength.  Nevertheless, there is reason to suspect that a 
ceiling effect may have been at play.  For example, the intercept of the model predicting 
GG belief strength was 5.91 on a scale ranging from 1 to 7.  In other words, the weighted 
average GG belief strength in the no-message control group was very close to the 
maximum value of that variable. This characteristic of the study sample left very little 
room for improvement.  The altruist-targeted message was designed to increase GG 
belief strength.  When the vast majority of people in a sample already strongly agree with 
a proposition, persuading them to agree even more strongly with it may not be possible.  
In effect, the opportunity to detect differences in GG belief strength was likely hindered.  
In this regard, the position taken by the message was constrained by the study context.  
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Investigators conducting human-subjects research are required to disclose the 
anticipated benefit of a study.  Typically, the benefits of a research study apply to society 
at large or the progression of knowledge.  In that sense, it would be unrealistic for a 
consent disclosure to explicitly disconfirm that a study will contribute to the greater 
good.  
The conceptual model underpinning Hypothesis 1b established that belief 
salience would moderate the association between the instrumentalist-targeted message 
and personal-feedback (PF) belief strength.  Whereas the altruist-targeted message was 
designed to affirm GG beliefs, the instrumentalist-targeted message explicitly denied 
that participating in the SEQOME Project would yield PF outcomes.  Based on a 
moderation analysis, the interaction effect predicted in H1b was supported.  The 
instrumentalist-targeted message reduced PF belief strength more as relative GG 
salience increased.  This interaction effect was observed regardless of whether the no-
message control or altruist-targeted message was used as the reference group.  However, 
by explaining about 1% additional variance in PF belief strength, one might reasonably 
question the practical significance of this tiny effect, at least in this context.  
Results from both studies supported the existence of a moderating influence of 
belief salience on the association of behavioral beliefs with attitudes and intentions to 
participate in genetic and genomic research.  In Study 1, for example, expectations that 
participating w0uld contribute to science were more strongly related to attitudes and 
intentions among respondents for whom that belief was salient versus nonsalient.  In 
Study 2, two versions of this hypothesis were tested.  The version based on an account of 
belief salience derived from the RAM suggested that behavioral beliefs (i.e., belief-
evaluation products) would have a stronger positive impact on attitude and intention 
when those beliefs are salient.  The competing version derived from MPT took into 
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consideration the possibility that message exposure could increase belief salience.  Thus, 
the positive impact of behavioral beliefs on attitude and intention was expected to be 
more pronounced following exposure to a message addressing those beliefs.   
The direct and indirect conditional effects predicted in the RAM-based version of 
Hypothesis 2 were supported while the competing predictions derived from the MPT 
account were not.  As originally proposed, the audience segment variable was meant to 
capture this notion of salience.  GG beliefs were supposed to be uniquely salient for 
altruists and PF beliefs were supposed to be uniquely salient for instrumentalists.  
However, because the audience segments identified in Study 1 did not generalize to the 
Study 2 sample, the relative GG salience operationalization was used instead.  This 
operational change and its contributing factors had two obvious implications for the 
statistical power to detect hypothesized interaction effects (see Aguinis & Gottfredson, 
2010; McClelland & Judd, 1993).  First, compared to the open-ended belief elicitation 
procedure, the dimensional-salience task used in Study 2 appears to have been a less 
reliable means of eliciting top-of-mind consequences of participating in genomic 
research.  Measurement error reduces statistical power to detect interaction effects.  
Second, relative GG salience was an interval-level variable with an approximately normal 
distribution.  Regression coefficient estimates of product terms derived from two 
interval-level variables tend to have larger standard errors than product terms derived 
from one or more dichotomous variables, all else being equal.  Inflated standard errors 
reduce the size of the t statistic, and thus also reduce power.   Despite these drawbacks, 
relative GG salience was still better aligned with the methodological assumptions of 
Study 2 than were any of the alternative segmentation strategies explored in Appendix C.   
In H2RAM, I predicted that the association of GG and PF behavioral beliefs with 
attitude and intention would be moderated by belief salience, as measured prior to 
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message exposure. Consistent with H2RAM, results from moderation analyses indicated 
that the positive association of PF behavioral beliefs with attitude and intention became 
stronger as relative GG salience decreased (i.e., PF beliefs were more salient).  Likewise, 
the association of GG behavioral beliefs with attitude and intention became stronger as 
relative GG salience increased.   
No evidence was obtained to support the predictions derived from media priming 
theory (i.e., H2MPT).  From the MPT perspective, message exposure was expected to 
influence belief salience, such that GG outcomes would become temporarily more salient 
following exposure to the altruist-targeted message and PF outcomes would be more 
salient in response to the instrumentalist-targeted message.  Were such message-based 
increases in salience to occur, it was expected that stronger associations between 
message-targeted behavioral beliefs with attitude and intention would have been 
observed.  In effect, GG behavioral beliefs would have a greater impact on attitude and 
intention for respondents assigned to the altruist-targeted message and PF behavioral 
beliefs would have a greater impact among respondents assigned to the instrumentalist-
targeted message condition.  For the most part, the interaction terms designed to test 
this hypothesis were not significant.  The one exception was a regression coefficient for a 
direct conditional effect of PF behavioral beliefs on intention by instrumentalist-message 
topic.  However, rather than strengthen the impact of PF beliefs on intention, the sign of 
this coefficient indicated that exposure to the instrumentalist-targeted message 
weakened this relationship.   
When interpreting these results, it should be kept in mind that priming effects 
are a function of both the recency and intensity of the prime (Roscos-Ewoldsen et al., 
2008; Kim, Mello, Lee, & Cappella, 2012).  Whereas recency refers to the brevity of the 
time lag between the prime stimulus and assessment of the target object, intensity refers 
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to the frequency and duration of the prime.  High-intensity, recent primes produce larger 
priming effects.  In this study, respondents were exposed only once to the altruist- or 
instrumentalist-targeted message (i.e., low frequency).  Thus, the intensity of these 
messages as prime stimuli may have been too low to produce discernible effects.   
In the two versions of Hypothesis 3, the impact of the instrumentalist-targeted 
message on attitude and intention through PF behavioral beliefs was examined.  An 
underlying assumption of both hypotheses was that the instrumentalist-targeted 
message would indirectly affect attitudes and intentions through changes in PF belief 
strength.  According to the RAM-based version, I predicted an Audience Segment by 
Message Topic interaction effect, such that instrumentalists receiving the 
instrumentalist-targeted message were expected to have the least favorable attitudes and 
weakest intentions.  From the MPT perspective, the weakest attitudes and intentions 
were expected among respondents who viewed the instrumentalist-targeted message 
regardless of audience segment.  Neither hypothesis, as stated, was supported; however, 
the results are more consistent with the RAM-based hypothesis than the MPT-based 
hypothesis.   
With increased salience of PF beliefs, PF behavioral beliefs were a stronger 
determinant of attitude and intention but were also more difficult to change.  As a 
result, the instrumentalist-targeted message had the greatest impact on the attitudes and 
intentions of people for whom GG and PF beliefs were both salient to some degree.  The 
failure of the data to support the stated hypothesis does not reflect an inconsistency with 
the underlying conceptual model, but rather a flaw in my logic deriving H3RAM from that 
model.  Specifically, I did not place proper weight on the moderating effect of belief 
salience with respect to the association between the instrumentalist-targeted message 
and PF belief strength.  Instead, I over-emphasized the weighted-average effect of that 
! ! !
! 153 
message.  On average, the instrumentalist-targeted message had a simple effect on PF 
belief strength, such that it significantly weakened PF beliefs.  However, the effect of the 
instrumentalist-targeted message on the PF belief strength was also moderated by belief 
salience.  Exposure to the instrumentalist-targeted message weakened PF beliefs to a 
greater extent as relative GG salience increased.  Belief salience also moderated the 
impact of PF behavioral beliefs on attitude and intention, but in the opposite direction.  
When expectations about receiving individual research results or treatment 
recommendations were more salient, those beliefs had a greater impact on attitude and, 
indirectly, intention.  Combined, the opposing moderating effects of PF belief salience on 
these two pathways clearly suggest that a curvilinear indirect effect of the 
instrumentalist-targeted message should have been expected.  
Lastly, the effects of receiving additional information and belief salience on 
attitudinal ambivalence and decisional conflict were explored.  Attitudinal ambivalence 
decreased slightly as relative GG salience increased.  Receiving additional information 
about the SEQOME Project in the form of the altruist- or instrumentalist-targeted 
messages did not affect attitudinal ambivalence.  A main effect of Message Topic on 
decisional conflict was observed, such that decisional conflict was reduced following 
exposure to the altruist- and instrumentalist-targeted messages.  The match between 
message content and the audience’s salient beliefs did not have an appreciable influence 
on decisional conflict beyond the main effect of receiving additional information about 
the project.  
Theoretical and Practical Implications  
The findings reported in this dissertation affirm a major theoretical proposition 
of the RAM that has received limited support in past research.   Conceptually, salient 
behavioral beliefs are expected to be more strongly related to attitude and intention than 
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nonsalient behavioral beliefs (Hackman & Anderson, 1968; Kaplan & Fishbein, 1969; see 
also Towriss, 1984 as cited in Rutter & Bunce, 1989).  A number of past studies have 
tested some variation of this hypothesis (Agnew, 1998; Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; 
Hackman & Anderson, 1968; Kaplan & Fishbein, 1969; O’Sullivan, McGee, & Keegan, 
2008; Rutter & Bunce, 1989; Steadman, Rutter, & Field, 2002; Thomas & Tuck, 1975; 
van der Pligt et al., 2000).  A common element of these studies is that they compared 
correlations between direct measures of attitude and two or more composite belief 
indices made up of beliefs representing specific levels of belief salience (e.g., personally 
salient indices, modally salient indices, or nonsalient indices). With the exception of 
Agnew (1998), no significant differences in the strength of these associations were 
observed.  Overall, indirect measures of RAM constructs (e.g., attitudes, norms, 
perceived behavioral control) based on personally derived beliefs have criterion-oriented 
validity that is, at best, as good as that achieved by modal indices.  Rather than examine 
the conditional effects of belief salience on the correlation between a belief composite 
and attitude, this dissertation found evidence that salience moderates the association of 
specific belief items with attitude and intention.  
From a practical perspective, this moderating effect of belief salience may open 
up additional approaches for selecting message content.  Reliable data respecting the 
beliefs that are salient for particular audience segments or specific individuals could be 
used to determine which beliefs are likely to have the greatest impact on their decisions 
and behavior (see Jaccard, 2012).  This would be a departure from most typical 
applications of the RAM, which assume the causal weights of belief-based and other 
model predictors are homogenous for the target audience.  In order to achieve this, it will 
be necessary to translate the belief elicitation procedure—which is typically treated as a 
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qualitative (and frequently overlooked) step of formative research leading to message 
development—into a critical and automated component of interventions. 
The results of Study 2 also have implications for theories of belief change.  The 
motivation behind testing for conditional effects of belief salience on yielding to message 
claims was based on a conceptual account of belief change that emphasizes the role of 
discrepancy and confidence in prior judgments as important causal variables (Jaccard, 
1981).  Empirical evidence from prior research demonstrating that belief salience was 
related to discrepancy and confidence served as the logical bridge connecting salience to 
belief change.  Although the findings were partially in line with the hypotheses, the 
proposed causal pathway was not directly tested.  Because confidence was not directly 
measured, the observed conditional effect of belief salience may not have had anything to 
do with confidence.  Evoking a previously observed correlation between belief salience 
and confidence does not establish how or whether those constructs are actually related.   
Although the size of the conditional effect of belief salience on the association 
between the instrumentalist-targeted message and PF belief strength was very small if 
judged by the conventional thresholds established by Jacob Cohen (1988), disregarding 
the effect on that basis alone would be a mistake.  First, when considered in the context 
of moderator effects in the social sciences, the observed effect warrants further 
consideration.  Moderator effects observed in social science studies typically account for 
less than 1% of the variance in the dependent variable (Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, & Pierce, 
2005; Aiken & West, 1991; Champoux & Peters, 1987; Chaplin, 1991; M. G. Evans, 1985; 
McClelland & Judd, 1993).  In light of this, Kenny (2011) has suggested that when testing 
for moderation effects, a more realistic standard for interpreting effect size estimates 
(viz. f2) would be small = 0.005, medium = 0.010, and large = 0.025.  Given those 
thresholds, the observed moderator effects in both studies may be considered medium-
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sized—despite being very small in general terms.  Given the difficulty of detecting 
moderator effects, M. G. Evans (1985) argued that an interaction explaining as little as 
1% of the total variance should still be considered important, especially when its 
theoretical implications are understood.   More importantly, the interaction of belief 
salience with the instrumentalist-targeted message contributed to an interesting 
moderated mediation effect on attitude and intention.   
If considered in terms of content matching as a communication strategy, this 
moderated mediation effect presents an interesting conundrum.  According to the 
expectancy-value principle, the salient beliefs underlying a behavior or decision are 
reasonable targets for communication interventions.  If the communicator succeeds in 
changing those beliefs, then the message is more likely to influence action.  However, the 
findings from Study 2 suggest that, at least under some circumstances, beliefs that are 
more salient may also be more difficult to change.  For example, the instrumentalist-
targeted message reduced PF belief strength to a lesser extent at lower levels of relative 
GG salience (i.e., a greater number of PF outcomes were nominated as salient than GG 
outcomes).  The combined effect of these conditional effects of belief salience conflict 
with one another; it is more difficult to dispel misconceptions that actually drive 
behavior than it is to dispel misconceptions that are unrelated to it.   
That said, I do not want to overstate the practical implications of the observed 
interaction effects of belief salience as they relate to developing audience-targeted 
informed consent procedures for large-scale genomic research.  Although two discernible 
audience segments were identified in Study 1, the extent to which they differed from one 
another appears to have been somewhat overestimated.  Based on the qualitative 
analysis of frequently mentioned belief elicitation themes in the altruist and 
instrumentalist segments, each group appeared to hold six uniquely salient beliefs while 
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only three beliefs were salient to both groups.  The analysis of belief strength ratings of 
those outcomes in Study 2 revealed that many of the uniquely salient beliefs were 
redundant.  For example, beliefs about contributing to science shared a great deal of 
variance with beliefs about advancing medicine, contributing to knowledge, and helping 
others.  Likewise, beliefs about receiving information about personal genetic risk 
covaried to a considerable degree with beliefs about learning about current health, 
treatment and prevention.  Although all of these outcomes were assigned separate 
themes in the content analysis, these qualitative distinctions did not carry over into the 
correlational analyses.  In that sense, each segment differed on fewer behaviorally-
relevant beliefs than initially supposed.  Because attitudes and intentions are driven by 
the entire constellation of salient beliefs about participating, these differences may not 
be great enough to warrant adopting an audience-targeted consent disclosure strategy.   
On the other hand, variation in the specific consequences comprising the GG and 
PF themes might instead suggest that still greater individualization in this domain is 
justified.  The open-ended belief elicitation procedure appears to have been particularly 
useful for determining which beliefs were most important to the participation decisions 
of individual respondents.  Acknowledging subtle differences in thematically-similar 
elicited consequences may be important for addressing prospective genomic research 
participants’ specific needs and concerns about participating.   
For example, people’s expectations about being provided with personal genetic 
risk information tended to covary strongly with their beliefs about receiving information 
that would help them make medical treatment decisions.  The correlation between these 
two belief-strength measures could indicate how people view genomic information.  
Personal genetic risk information might have been perceived as a kind of information 
that is useful for making medical treatment decisions.  If that were the case, a plausible 
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explanation for the shared variance between these two measures might be that 
participants understood them to be slightly different ways of saying that genomic 
research participation will provide medically useful information.  Alternatively, the 
correlation could mean that people have proportionate expectations about receiving 
personal genetic risk information as well as additional information that is useful for 
making treatment decisions.  In that case, treating the two beliefs as though they were 
interchangeable would be unjustified. A closer analysis of belief elicitation responses 
(esp. those using the traditional, open-ended method) might provide insight on this 
issue.  If respondents tend to report one or the other thematically similar outcome but 
not both, it is less likely that those outcomes are perceived to be distinct (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010).   
Regardless, the results have important implications for prioritizing the content of 
information featured in informed consent procedures.  Instead of identifying distinct 
audience segments with different informational needs with respect to participating, the 
basic procedure that I’ve been discussing could still be useful for matching message 
content to the modally salient beliefs of the general population.  The analyses in Study 1 
and 2 that focus on the relationships of behavioral beliefs with attitude and intention 
revealed seven perceived consequences of participating in genetic and genomic research 
that have the greatest influence on participation decisions, generally: (i) Beliefs about 
contributing to the greater-good, (ii) expectations related to receiving individual research 
results or other feedback, (iii) concerns about privacy, (iv) uncertainty that researchers 
will use DNA samples in ways that are consistent with the subject’s personal values, (v) 
concerns that participating will cause worry, (vi) beliefs related to feeling physical pain 
(e.g., from having blood drawn), and (vii) beliefs that research participation will be time 
consuming.  The regulatory guidelines for informed consent already dictate that 
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researchers are required to address all of these beliefs in one form or another.  As was 
explained in Chapter 2, the guidelines also require that several other categories of 
information be disclosed.   Because information related to the seven consequences listed 
here are more likely to reflect the informational needs of potential research participants, 
strategies to prioritize facts related to those consequences should be explored.  I want to 
emphasize that prioritizing does not imply excluding other forms of information.  
Rather, the goal is to improve the accessibility and comprehensibility of information that 
is most likely to be material to people’s decisions (see Fischhoff, 2011). 
For instance, on average, respondents to both of the surveys conducted for this 
dissertation expected to receive personal feedback related to their genetic health risk as 
part of participating in hypothetical genetic and genomic research studies.  In Study 2, I 
also assessed expectations about receiving individual research results pertaining to 
current health, treatment and disease prevention.  As with expectations about receiving 
genetic risk information, respondents also assumed that these kinds of information 
would be returned.  This is consistent with a common finding reported in the literature.  
Many potential participants of genetic and genomic research studies expect to receive 
individual research results as a condition of enrollment (Kaufman et al., 2008; 
Meulenkamp et al., 2010; Murphy Bollinger, Scott, Dvoskin, & Kaufman, 2012; Murphy, 
Scott, Kaufman, Geller, LeRoy, & Hudson, 2008; Nobile et al., 2013; O’Daniel & Haga, 
2011).  For example, Kaufman et al. (2008) conducted a population-based survey of US 
adults to assess public support for a large cohort study proposed in 2004 by NHGRI.  
The study would aim to recruit a nationally representative sample of at least 500,000 
people who would agree to provide DNA samples and extensive information about their 
health and environment over many years.  Overall, the percentage of respondents who 
said they definitely or probably would participate increased from 55% to 65% when told 
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that individual results would be returned.  This result corroborated self-reported 
importance of individual research results on participation decisions; 75% of respondents 
said they would be less likely to participate if individual research results were not made 
available to them. 
In the background information of studies conducted for this dissertation, no 
indication that results would be returned was given.  When considered in relation to the 
pervasiveness of these expectations in other samples and settings, it appears that many 
people presume that individual research results will be returned in exchange for 
participation in genetic and genomic research.  Moreover, in this dissertation, 
expectations about receiving individual research results were associated with attitudes 
toward participating and intentions to participate.  Again, this finding is consistent with 
those of Kaufman et al. (2008).  Traditionally, individual research results from genetic 
and genomic research studies have not been returned to participants.  In fact, it remains 
a subject of ongoing debate whether, how and to what extent individual research results 
should be returned to participants (A. L. McGuire & Lupski, 2010; Wolf, 2012).  Because 
these beliefs are material to a large number of potential research participants, in as much 
as expectations about receiving individual research results are inaccurate, it is important 
that the informed consent process dispel those misconceptions.   
Effectively doing so may require a more detailed account of what potential and 
actual research participants expect to receive.  In this dissertation, salient consequences 
directly related to return of results were combined into fairly broad themes (i.e., genetic 
risk information, treatment-related information, etc.).  Naturally, individual respondents 
may have had still more specific kinds of results in mind, falling into those general 
categories (e.g., genetic information about my risk for Alzheimer’s disease but not for 
diabetes).  They might also have implicit expectations about how that risk information 
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would be delivered to them, or about how much control they would have to seek out 
specific results while ignoring others.  If those expectations can reasonably be met 
without impeding scientific progress, it may be worthwhile for genomics researcher to 
offer some form of feedback.  However, as J. P. Evans and Rothschild (2012) point out, 
just because a majority of potential research subjects expect to receive a given benefit in 
exchange for their participation does not obligate researchers or the scientific enterprise 
to meet those expectations.   
Limitations  and Conclusion  
As with any research, this study also had several limitations.  First, the target 
behavior examined in Study 1 was not identical to the focal behavior in Study 2.   
Although this is a clear violation of the principle of correspondence (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2010), the general public does not appear at this time to draw category distinctions 
between various forms of targeted genetic research studies, large-cohort biobanks, and 
whole-genome sequencing research.  To bolster this assumption, the relevance of the 
advantages and disadvantages elicited in the gPOD study were corroborated by research 
that examined the motivations behind participating in ClinSeq™, a whole-genome 
clinical sequencing study being conducted at the NIH (Biesecker et al., 2009).  In 
particular, Facio et al. (2011) asked a subsample (N = 322) of the ClinSeq™ cohort to 
report their “reasons for wanting to participate in [ClinSeq™]?”  Responses to this 
question were then submitted to a content analysis to identify common themes in much 
the same way that Fishbein & Ajzen (2010) recommend analyzing belief elicitation 
responses.  Similarity in the themes generated in response to the gPOD elicitation items 
and those observed by Facio et al. (2011) were interpreted as evidence that the modally 
salient behavioral outcomes of “volunteering to take a genetic test as part of a research 
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study sometime in the next 12 months” would be largely the same as those related to 
participating in a whole-genome sequencing study. 
A second limitation was the questionable validity of the dimensional salience task 
as a method of identifying personally salient beliefs in Study 2.  The decision to use the 
dimensional salience task was based primarily on the assumption that it would be less 
demanding for respondents, and would thus lead to reductions in non-response bias.  
Another important consideration was that the dimensional salience task would remove 
the need to conduct a content analysis of a large number of open-ended elicitation 
responses.  This second consideration also made the dimensional salience task more 
appealing from an applied perspective in that it could easily be integrated as part of an 
automated message tailoring system.   
However, large discrepancies between the major themes elicited in Study 1 
compared to the frequencies of outcomes nominated in Study 2 suggest that the 
dimensional salience task introduced response bias.   Generally, the proportion of 
respondents who selected items related to greater-good themes and personal-feedback 
themes was generally much greater in Study 2 than it was in Study 1.  These 
discrepancies may in part reflect differences in the populations from which the samples 
were drawn (e.g., which were primarily differentiated by time and specific behavioral 
context).  The most likely explanation, though, rests with differences between the 
elicitation and dimensional salience tasks.  Notably, the latter required that all 
respondents nominate exactly 5 items from a list of 20 options, while the former allowed 
between 1 and 4 responses drawn from the respondent’s imagination.  Rather than 
choose items because they were truly top-of-mind, respondents may have selected items 
from the dimensional salience task for other reasons (e.g., social desirability, the 
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perception that the outcome represented a good reason for participating, or order on the 
list). 
 A third limitation concerned the restricted variation among respondents with 
respect to the perceived consequences of participating in the hypothetical genomic 
research studies that readily came to mind.  Although there were sufficient thematic 
differences within the Study 1 sample to identify distinct subgroups, these groups did not 
generalize to Study 2.  Moreover, it appears that some of the qualitative differences 
identified in the content analysis did not reflect actual differences in perceived outcomes 
from the subjects’ point-of-view.  For example, receiving genetic risk information 
appears to have been a specific case of a broader category of outcomes, which also 
included receiving treatment advice and learning about current health.  This dissertation 
is interested in content matching as a strategy for prioritizing information disclosed to 
foster informed decisions about participating in large-scale genomic research.  Thus, 
striking a balance between the internal and external validity of the methods used was 
necessary.  The theoretical framework guiding this research established that salient 
behavioral beliefs have a conceptually important status with respect to attitudes, 
intentions and behavior.  My approach was to identify the knowledge-based salient 
beliefs that would likely influence decisions to participate, and then attempt to define 
subgroups of the population based on differences in those beliefs.  Both studies drew on 
demographically representative population-based samples of U.S. adults.  Nonetheless, 
the amount of observed variance in the population regarding salient beliefs, and the 
content of those beliefs, was not subject to my control.   
 Despite limited differences in belief salience, evidence to support many of the 
hypothesized conditional relationships was found.  As has already been discussed, these 
effects tended to be quite small.  Conceivably, had there been greater differences in 
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salience over a greater number of perceived consequences of participating in the 
hypothetical research projects, these effects might have been larger.  In other words, 
restricted variance might have weakened the effects in this context.  Descriptively, that 
does little to alter the practical implications of the findings as they relate to informed 
consent procedures in the domain of large-scale genomic research.  Theoretically, 
though, it leaves open the possibility that in other behavioral contexts and populations 
where there is a great deal of variation in the salient beliefs that people hold, content 
matching and audience segmentation strategies like that explored here may prove more 
effective.   
To yield medically useful information, data from personal genome profiles need 
to be coupled with clinical information about disease, and compared to genomic 
sequence data from many other people.  Continued advancement of genomic medicine 
and related fields will depend on large numbers of willing research participants.  In 
addition to agreeing to have their DNA sequenced and personal genome profiles 
generated, participants will also need to be willing to share detailed medical, socio-
psychological and behavioral data (President’s Commission, 2012).  To help ensure that 
the benefits of genomic science are equitably distributed throughout society, it is 
important that the pool of willing participants is diverse and does not systematically 
exclude anyone; however, there is also an ethical responsibility to ensure that those who 
participate do so for reasons that are consistent with their own values and preferences.  
Efforts to select and prioritize the content of consent materials in order to facilitate 
decisions about participating in genomic research would benefit from a descriptive 
understanding of the cognitive bases of those decisions.  Recognizing that different 
people may have different reasons for wanting to participate in large-scale genomic 
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research, this research was able to shed some light on the existence, nature, and impact 
of these differences.
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APPENDIX A:  
QUESTIONNAIRE AND PROGRAMMING NOTES  
[PROGRAMMING NOTE: Include a ‘CASEID’ variable in the database that records a unique 
identification number for each subject, maybe ID# from SSI] 
 
[INSERT A NO BACK PROMPT FOR EVERY SCREEN THROUGHOUT THE SURVEY] 
[DISPLAY] 
 
You have been invited to participate in a research study.  
 
The purpose of this research study is to examine public opinions on issues related to 
genetics research. You will be asked to read some information about a genomic 
research project and complete a survey online (approximately 25 minutes). This 
research is not designed to bene!t you personally. Your participation is voluntary 
which means you can choose whether or not to participate. You may end your 
participation in the study at any time.  
 
In some research studies, the investigators cannot tell you exactly what the study is 
about before you participate in the study. We will describe the tasks in the study in a 
general way, but we can’t explain the real purpose of the study until after you 
complete these tasks. When you are done, we will explain why we are doing this study, 
what we are looking at, and any other information you should know about this study. 
You will also be able to ask any questions you might have about the study’s purpose 
and the tasks you did. Though we may not be able to explain the real purpose of the 
study until after you complete the tasks, there are no additional risks to those that 
have been described in this consent form. 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, concerns or 
complaints pertaining to your participation in this study, you may contact the O!ce of 
Regulatory A!airs at the University of Pennsylvania by calling (215) 898-2614. 
 
This research has been reviewed according to the IRB procedures of the University of 
Pennsylvania for research involving human subjects. 
 
By clicking the “accept” button below you are certifying that you freely and voluntarily 
choose to participate in this research study. 
 
[RADIO BUTTON, CAN SELECT ONLY ONE] 
 
[PROMPT IF SKIPPED: “This question requires an answer.  Please make a selection before 
continuing.”] 
 
 
SQ_1. I have read the consent form and agree to participate in this research project. 
 
Accept  <1> ! 
Decline <2> ! 
! ! !
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[DISPLAY IF SQ_1=2 OR REFUSED] 
 
We accept your refusal to participate in this project.  Thank you. 
 
[TERMINATE IF SQ_1=2 OR REFUSED] 
[CONTINUE IF SQ_1=1] 
 
[RANDOMLY ASSIGN SUBJECTS INTO THREE GROUPS. RECORD ASSIGNMENT INTO 
VARIABLE ‘XMEDTOP’, WHERE 
1=Altruist-targeted Message Topic 
2=Instrumentalist-targeted Message Topic 
3=No-Message Control] 
 
[DISPLAY] 
 
General instructions 
 
Many questions in this survey make use of rating scales with seven places. Please read 
each statement carefully, and then select the point on the scale that best describes 
your opinion. Be sure to read each scale closely. It may seem that some questions 
have been repeated. Even so, please respond to every question.  
 
This survey will take approximately 25 minutes to complete. Your responses to these 
questions will be kept con!dential. 
 
[DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS] 
 
Background 
 
In this study, we focus on participation in a research study that involves whole-
genome sequencing. Whole-genome sequencing is a technology that allows us to 
analyze (or sequence) almost all of the genome from a single person. The human 
genome is the material in our cells that includes thousands of genes. Genes carry the 
instructions that your body needs to develop and function. Genome sequencing 
allows us to !nd gene alterations, which are also known as “gene variants.” These 
gene variants may be important to your health or the health of your relatives.  
 
One project, called the SEQOME Project, plans to collect DNA samples from several 
thousand adults living in the United States. The purpose is to improve the 
prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness, and the promotion of health 
throughout society.  
 
When answering the following questions, imagine that you have been asked to take 
part in the SEQOME Project, a whole-genome sequencing study. There are no right or 
wrong answers. We are interested in your personal opinions. 
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[DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS] 
 
[PROGRAMMING NOTE: FORMAT ITEMS IN BOX AS SCROLLABLE LIST ON SINGLE 
SCREEN. MULTIPLE SELECTIONS (EXACTLY 5) CAN BE MADE. RANDOMIZE ORDER OF 
LIST ITEMS AND RECORD ORDER. RECORD NUMERICAL VALUE OF ITEMS SELECTED IN 
ORDER THAT THEY APPEAR IN LIST INTO FOLLOWING VARIABLES: 
A_1_1 
A_1_2 
A_1_3 
A_1_4 
A_1_5] 
 
[PROMPT IF GREATER THAN 5 ITEMS SELECTED: “You may only select 5 items from the 
list. If you would like to change a selection you have already made, please deselect an item 
before making a new selection.”] 
 
[PROMPT IF LESS THAN 5 ITEMS: “You have selected less than 5 items. Please select exactly 
5 items from the list before continuing.”] 
 
<Section A. Dimensional Salience Task> 
 
 In the space below, there is a menu of advantages and disadvantages that many 
people think are relevant to participating in whole-genome sequencing studies, like 
the SEQOME Project. Please scroll through the list and select the 5 items that are most 
important to you for deciding whether to participate in the SEQOME Project. We 
would like you to select exactly 5 items from the list.  
 
! <1> Contributing to knowledge. 
! <2> Contributing to medical research. 
! <3> Helping advance science. 
! <4> Helping others in the future. 
! <5> Receiving information about my current health. 
! <6> Receiving information about my personal genetic risk for disease. 
! <7> Receiving information about my personal genetic code. 
! <8> Learning information to help me prevent disease. 
! <9> Learning information to help me make treatment decisions. 
! <10> Learning more about my family history of disease. 
! <11> Receiving information that may be helpful to my relatives. 
! <12> Receiving compensation other than money. 
! ! !
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! <13> Doing something that is inconvenient. 
! <14> Having to make time in my busy schedule. 
! <15> Feeling physical pain. 
! <16> Feeling worried. 
! <17> Putting my privacy at risk. 
! <18> Learning something that I cannot do anything about. 
! <19> Learning something that I do not want to know. 
! <20> Losing control over how my DNA samples are used. 
 
 
 
<Message Topic Manipulation> 
 
[DISPLAY IF XMEDTOP =1:  
“ALTRUIST-TARGETED MESSAGE, 
THEN CONTINUE TO SECTION X ON CLICK] 
 
[DISPLAY IF XMEDTOP =2:  
“INSTRUMENTALIST-TARGETED MESSAGE, 
THEN CONTINUE TO SECTION X ON CLICK] 
 
[IF XMEDTOP =3, CONTINUE DIRECTLY TO SECTION X] 
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!
170 
< Section X. Information Quality> 
 
[DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS;  
IMMEDIATELY BEFORE ‘SECTION B’] 
[Italicize ‘SEQOME Project’] 
 
The next few questions will ask you to rate the quality of the background information 
about the SEQOME Project that was presented to you. 
 
[RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QUESTIONS X_1_1 THROUGH X_1_3] 
[RADIO BUTTONS, CAN SELECT ONLY ONE OPTION PER QUESTION] 
[SET ITEM STEM IN BOLD, ‘SEQOME Project’ IN BOLD-ITALICS] 
[PROMPT IF ANY X_1 ITEMS ARE SKIPPED: “Please respond to every question before 
continuing.”] 
 
[X_1_1] I learned enough about the SEQOME Project from the information that was 
presented. 
 strongly  
disagree 
<1> 
mainly  
disagree 
<2> 
somewhat 
disagree 
<3> 
neither agree  
nor disagree 
<4> 
somewhat  
agree 
<5> 
mainly 
agree 
<6> 
strongly  
agree 
<7> 
 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 
 
[X_1_2] How satis!ed would you say you were with the background information about 
the SEQOME Project? 
 not at all 
satis!ed 
<1> 
hardly 
satis!ed 
<2> 
a little 
satis!ed 
<3> 
moderately 
satis!ed 
<4> 
mainly 
satis!ed 
<5> 
considerably 
satis!ed 
<6> 
completely 
satis!ed 
<7> 
 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 
 
[X_1_3] How well do you feel you understood the background information about the 
SEQOME Project that was presented? 
 not at all 
understood  
<1> 
hardly 
understood 
<2> 
a little 
understood  
<3> 
moderately 
understood 
<4> 
mainly 
understood  
<5> 
considerably 
understood  
<6> 
completely 
understood  
<7> 
 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
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< Section B. Reasoned Action Model> 
 [DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS] 
 
For each of the following questions, please read each statement carefully, and then 
select the point on the scale that best matches your opinion. Be sure to read each 
scale closely and please respond to every question.  
 
[GRID: RADIO BUTTONS, CAN SELECT ONLY ONE ] 
[RANDOMIZE AND RECORD ORDER] 
[PROMPT IF ANY B_1 ITEMS ARE SKIPPED: “Please respond to every question before 
continuing.”] 
 
< Section B.1. Attitude> 
 
For me to participate in the SEQOME Project  would be: 
  
extremely 
<1> 
very 
 <2> 
somewhat
<3> 
in-between 
<4> 
 
somewhat
<5> 
very 
 <6> 
extremely 
<7> 
 
[B_1_1] Bad ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Good 
[B_1_2] Exciting ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Boring 
[B_1_3] Disturbing ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Reassuring 
[B_1_4] Harmful ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Beneficial 
[B_1_5] Valuable  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Worthless 
 
[RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QUESTIONS B_2_1 THROUGH B_3_3 AND RECORD ORDER] 
[RADIO BUTTONS, CAN SELECT ONLY ONE OPTION PER QUESTION] 
[PROMPT IF ANY B_2 OR B_3 ITEMS ARE SKIPPED: “Please respond to every question 
before continuing.”] 
 
< Section B.2. Behavioral Intention> 
 
[B_2_1] How likely is it that you would volunteer to participate in the SEQOME Project if 
you were asked to take part in it? 
 extremely 
unlikely 
<1> 
very  
unlikely 
<2> 
somewhat 
unlikely 
<3> 
neither likely  
nor unlikely 
<4> 
somewhat 
likely 
<5> 
very  
likely 
<6> 
extremely 
likely 
<7> 
 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 
[B_2_2] I intend to participate in the SEQOME Project if I am asked to take part in it. 
 strongly  
disagree 
<1> 
mainly  
disagree 
<2> 
somewhat 
disagree 
<3> 
neither agree  
nor disagree 
<4> 
somewhat  
agree 
<5> 
mainly 
agree 
<6> 
strongly  
agree 
<7> 
 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
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[B_2_3] If I am asked to take part, I plan to participate in the SEQOME Project. 
 strongly  
disagree 
<1> 
mainly  
disagree 
<2> 
somewhat 
disagree 
<3> 
neither agree  
nor disagree 
<4> 
somewhat  
agree 
<5> 
mainly 
agree 
<6> 
strongly  
agree 
<7> 
 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 
< Section B.3. Perceived Behavioral Control> 
 
 
[B_3_1] If I am asked to take part, I am con!dent that I am able to participate in the 
SEQOME Project. 
 completely 
 false 
<1> 
mainly 
false 
<2> 
partly 
false 
<3> 
neither true  
nor false 
<4> 
partly  
true 
<5> 
mainly  
true 
<6> 
completely 
true 
<7> 
 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 
[B_3_2] If I am asked to take part, participating in the SEQOME Project is completely up to me. 
 strongly  
disagree 
<1> 
mainly  
disagree 
<2> 
somewhat 
disagree 
<3> 
neither agree  
nor disagree 
<4> 
somewhat  
agree 
<5> 
mainly 
agree 
<6> 
strongly  
agree 
<7> 
 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 
[B_3_3] If I am asked to take part, participating in the SEQOME Project is under my control: 
 not at all 
under my 
control 
<1> 
hardly  
under my 
control 
<2> 
a little  
under my 
control 
<3> 
moderately  
under my 
control 
<4> 
mainly  
under my 
control 
<5> 
considerably  
under my 
control 
<6> 
completely 
under my 
control 
<7> 
 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
  
  
! ! !
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< Section B.4. Perceived Social Pressure> 
 
[DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS] 
 
Other people in your life whose opinions you value may have opinions about whether 
or not you should participate in the SEQOME Project. For each of the following 
questions, please select the point on the scale that best describes your point of view.  
 
[RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QUESTIONS B_4_1 THROUGH B_4_3 AND RECORD ORDER] 
[RADIO BUTTONS, CAN SELECT ONLY ONE OPTION PER QUESTION] 
[PROMPT IF ANY B_4 ITEMS ARE SKIPPED: “Please respond to every question before 
continuing.”] 
 
[B_4_1] Most people who are important to me would think that I should participate in the SEQOME 
Project if I am asked to take part in it. 
 completely 
 false 
<1> 
mainly 
false 
<2> 
partly 
false 
<3> 
neither true  
nor false 
<4> 
partly  
true 
<5> 
mainly  
true 
<6> 
completely 
true 
<7> 
 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 
[B_4_2] Most people whose opinions I value would approve of me participating in the 
SEQOME Project if I am asked to take part in it. 
 extremely 
unlikely 
<1> 
very  
unlikely 
<2> 
somewhat 
unlikely 
<3> 
neither likely  
nor unlikely 
<4> 
somewhat 
likely 
<5> 
very  
likely 
<6> 
extremely 
likely 
<7> 
 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 
[B_4_3] Most people I respect and admire think I should participate in the SEQOME Project 
if I am asked to take part in it. 
 strongly  
disagree 
<1> 
mainly  
disagree 
<2> 
somewhat 
disagree 
<3> 
neither agree  
nor disagree 
<4> 
somewhat  
agree 
<5> 
mainly 
agree 
<6> 
strongly  
agree 
<7> 
 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
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< Section C. Behavioral Beliefs> 
 
< Section C.1. Outcome Evaluations> 
 
[DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS] 
 
Below we have listed some outcomes that experts and people like you consider 
important when they think about participating in a whole-genome sequencing study, 
like the SEQOME Project. 
 
For each item, please select the point on the scale that best describes your opinion. 
Once again, there are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your personal 
point of view.  
 
[RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QUESTIONS C_1_1 THROUGH C_1_15 AND RECORD ORDER] 
[GRID: RADIO BUTTONS, CAN SELECT ONLY ONE OPTION PER QUESTION] 
[PROMPT IF ANY C_1 ITEMS ARE SKIPPED: “Please respond to every question before 
continuing.”] 
[PROGRAMMING NOTE: May want to break-up grids with many questions throughout survey 
so that there are 5-6 questions per screen? Or at least so that the response scale (i.e., 
extremely bad – extremely good, etc.) is repeated every 5-6 questions] 
 
 extremely  
bad 
<1> 
very  
bad 
<2> 
somewhat  
bad 
<3> 
neither good 
nor bad 
<4> 
somewhat  
good 
<5> 
very  
good 
<6> 
extremely 
good 
<7> 
[C_1_1] Helping others in the future 
is: 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_1_2] Helping advance science is: ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_1_3] Contributing to medical 
research is: 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_1_4] Feeling physical pain is: ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_1_5] For something to be an 
inconvenience to me is: 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_1_6] Contributing to knowledge 
is: 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_1_7] Receiving information about 
my personal genetic health 
risk is: 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_1_8] Learning something new 
about my current health is:  
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_1_9] To be told something about 
my genes that I do not 
want to know is:  
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_1_10] Feeling worried about my 
health is: 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 
        
! ! !
!
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extremely  
bad 
<1> 
very  
bad 
<2> 
somewhat  
bad 
<3> 
neither good 
nor bad 
<4> 
somewhat  
good 
<5> 
very  
good 
<6> 
extremely 
good 
<7> 
[C_1_11] Receiving information to 
help me make medical 
treatment decisions is: 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_1_12] Being given information to 
help me prevent disease is: 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_1_13] For something to take up a 
lot of my time is:  
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_1_14] Putting the privacy of my 
genetic information at risk 
is:  
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_1_15] Being a part of research that 
goes against my personal 
values is: 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 
< Section C.2. Belief Strength> 
 
[DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS] 
 
 We would also like to know how strongly you believe each of the following outcomes 
will happen if you participate in the SEQOME Project. For each item, please select the 
point on the scale that best describes your opinion. 
 
[RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QUESTIONS C_2_1 THROUGH C_2_15 AND RECORD ORDER] 
[GRID: RADIO BUTTONS, CAN SELECT ONLY ONE OPTION PER QUESTION] 
[PROMPT IF ANY C_2 ITEMS ARE SKIPPED: “Please respond to every question before 
continuing.”] 
 
My participation in the SEQOME Project will… 
 
strongly  
disagree 
<1> 
mainly  
disagree 
<2> 
somewhat 
disagree 
<3> 
neither agree  
nor disagree 
<4> 
somewhat  
agree 
<5> 
mainly 
agree 
<6> 
strongly  
agree 
<7> 
[C_2_1] Help others in the future.  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_2_2] Help advance science.  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_2_3] Contribute to medical research.  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_2_4] Cause me to feel physical pain. ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_2_5] Be an inconvenience to me. ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_2_6] Contribute to knowledge. ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_2_7] Give me information about my 
personal genetic health risk. 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
         
! ! !
!
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  strongly  
disagree 
<1> 
mainly  
disagree 
<2> 
somewhat 
disagree 
<3> 
neither agree  
nor disagree 
<4> 
somewhat  
agree 
<5> 
mainly 
agree 
<6> 
strongly  
agree 
<7> 
[C_2_8] Teach me something new 
about my current health. 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_2_9] Tell me something about my 
genes that I do not want to 
know. 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_2_10] Make me feel worried about 
my health. 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_2_11] Give me information to help 
me make medical treatment 
decisions. 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_2_12] Provide me with information to 
help me prevent disease. 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_2_13] Take up a lot of my time. ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_2_14] Put the privacy of my genetic 
information at risk. 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
[C_2_15] Make me a part of research 
that goes against my personal 
values. 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 
! ! !
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< Section C.3. Attitudinal Ambivalence> 
 
[DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS] 
 
[RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QUESTIONS C_3_1 & C_3_2 AND RECORD ORDER] 
[RADIO BUTTONS, CAN SELECT ONLY ONE OPTION PER QUESTION] 
[PROMPT IF ANY B_3 ITEMS ARE SKIPPED: “Please respond to every question before 
continuing.”] 
 
[C_3_1] Considering only the positive qualities of participating in the SEQOME Project and ignoring 
its negative ones, please evaluate your participation on the following scale. For me to 
participate in the SEQOME Project is… 
  not at all 
 positive 
<1> 
a little  
positive 
<2> 
moderately 
positive 
<3> 
mainly  
positive 
<4> 
completely 
positive 
<5> 
 
  ! ! ! ! !  
 
[C_3_2] Considering only the negative qualities of participating in the SEQOME Project and 
ignoring its positive ones, please evaluate your participation on the following scale. 
For me to participate in the SEQOME Project is… 
  not at all 
 negative 
<1> 
a little  
negative 
<2> 
moderately 
negative 
<3> 
mainly  
negative 
<4> 
completely 
negative 
<5> 
 
  ! ! ! ! !  
 
< Section D. Decisional Conflict Scale> 
 
[DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS] 
[RADIO BUTTONS, CAN SELECT ONLY ONE OPTION PER QUESTION] 
[PROMPT IF SKIPPED: “This question requires an answer. Please make a selection before 
continuing.”] 
 
[D_1_1] If you were asked to take part in the SEQOME Project and you had to make a 
decision today, would you choose to participate?  
  ! <1> Yes.      
  ! <2> No.     
  ! <3> Don’t know.     
 
  
! ! !
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[DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS] 
 
Now, thinking about the choice you just made, please look at the following comments some 
people make when deciding to participate in a whole-genome sequencing study, like the SEQOME 
Project. Please show how strongly you agree or disagree with these comments by !lling the circle 
that best shows how you feel about the decision you just made. 
 
[RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QUESTIONS D_2_1 THROUGH D_2_16 AND RECORD ORDER] 
[GRID: RADIO BUTTONS, CAN SELECT ONLY ONE OPTION PER QUESTION] 
[PROMPT IF ANY D_2 ITEMS ARE SKIPPED: “Please respond to every question before 
continuing.”] 
 
 
 
strongly 
disagree 
<1> 
somewhat  
disagree 
<2> 
neither agree 
nor disagree 
<3> 
somewhat  
agree 
<4> 
strongly  
agree 
<5> 
[D_2_1] When it comes to choosing to participate in the 
SEQOME Project, I know which options are 
available to me. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_2] I know the benefits of participating in the 
SEQOME Project. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_3] I know the risks of participating in the SEQOME 
Project. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_4] I am clear about which benefits of participating in 
the SEQOME Project matter most to me. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_5] I am clear about which risks of participating in 
the SEQOME Project matter most to me. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_6] I am clear about which is more important to me, 
the benefits or the risks of participating in the 
SEQOME Project. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_7] I am clear about the best choice for me. ! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_8] I feel unsure about what to choose.  ! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_9] This decision is hard for me to make.  ! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_10] I have enough support from others to make a 
choice. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_11] I feel pressure from others in making this 
decision.  
! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_12] I have enough advice to make a choice. ! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_13] I feel I have made an informed choice. ! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_14] My decision shows what is most important to me. ! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_15] I expect to stick with my decision. ! ! ! ! ! 
[D_2_16] I am satisfied with my decision. ! ! ! ! ! 
! ! !
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< Section Y. Genome Sequencing Knowledge > 
[DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN;  
IMMEDIATELY AFTER D_2 ITEMS] 
 
The following questions ask about your current understanding of genetics. 
 
[RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QUESTIONS Y_1_1 THROUGH Y_1_6 AND RECORD ORDER] 
[GRID: RADIO BUTTONS, CAN SELECT ONLY ONE OPTION PER QUESTION] 
 [PROMPT IF ANY Y_1 ITEMS ARE SKIPPED: “Please respond to every question before 
continuing.”] 
 
 
 
strongly 
disagree 
<1> 
somewhat 
disagree 
<2> 
neither agree 
nor disagree 
<3> 
somewhat  
agree 
<4> 
strongly  
agree 
<5> 
[Y_1_1] I am con!dent in my ability to understand 
information about genetics. 
 
! ! ! ! ! 
[Y_1_2] It would be easy for me to get information about 
genetics if I wanted to. 
 
! ! ! ! ! 
[Y_1_3] I would be able to understand information about 
how genes can a!ect my health. 
 
! ! ! ! ! 
[Y_1_4] I have a good idea about how genetics may 
in!uence risk for disease generally. 
 
! ! ! ! ! 
[Y_1_5] I have a good idea about how my own genetic 
make-up might a!ect my risk for disease. 
 
! ! ! ! ! 
[Y_1_6] I would be able to explain to others how genes 
a!ect health. 
 
! ! ! ! ! 
 
! ! !
!
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< Section E. Message Quality> 
< Section E.1. Personal Relevance> 
< Section E.2. Message Strength> 
 
[IF XMEDTOP =3, SKIP SECTION E AND GO DIRECTLY TO SECTION F] 
[DISPLAY IF XMEDTOP =1 OR XMEDTOP =2] 
 
Earlier in this questionnaire, we showed you a fact sheet about participating in a 
whole-genome sequencing study titled, “Top 5 things you should know about 
participating in the SEQOME Project.” We would like to know what you think about that 
fact sheet.  
 
For each of the following items, please select the point on the scale that best describes 
your opinion. Once again, there are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in 
your personal point of view. 
 
[RANDOMIZE ORDER OF QUESTIONS E_1_1 THROUGH E_2_9 AND RECORD ORDER] 
[GRID: RADIO BUTTONS, CAN SELECT ONLY ONE OPTION PER QUESTION] 
[PROMPT IF ANY E_1 OR E_2 ITEMS ARE SKIPPED: “Please respond to every question 
before continuing.”] 
 
 
 
strongly 
disagree 
<1> 
somewhat 
disagree 
<2> 
neither agree 
nor disagree 
<3> 
somewhat  
agree 
<4> 
strongly  
agree 
<5> 
[E_1_1] The fact sheet speaks directly to my opinions 
about participating in the SEQOME Project. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[E_1_2] The fact sheet was directed to me personally. ! ! ! ! ! 
[E_1_3] The fact sheet took who I am into account. ! ! ! ! ! 
[E_2_1] The fact sheet provided an argument about 
participating in the SEQOME Project that is 
believable. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[E_2_2] The fact sheet provided an argument about 
participating in the SEQOME Project that is 
convincing. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[E_2_3] The fact sheet provided an argument about 
participating in the SEQOME Project that is 
important to me. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[E_2_4] The fact sheet helped me feel con!dent about 
deciding whether or not to participate in the 
SEQOME Project. 
! ! ! ! ! 
! ! !
!
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 strongly 
disagree 
<1> 
somewhat 
disagree 
<2> 
neither agree 
nor disagree 
<3> 
somewhat  
agree 
<4> 
strongly  
agree 
<5> 
[E_2_5] The fact sheet would help my friends decide 
whether or not to participate in the SEQOME 
Project. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[E_2_6] The fact sheet put thoughts in my mind about 
wanting to participate in the SEQOME Project. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[E_2_7] The fact sheet put thoughts in my mind about 
not wanting to participate in the SEQOME 
Project. 
! ! ! ! ! 
[E_2_8] Overall, how much do you agree or disagree with 
the argument provided in the fact sheet? 
! ! ! ! ! 
[E_2_9] The reasons the fact sheet gave for participating 
in the SEQOME Project are weak. 
! ! ! ! ! 
! ! !
!
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< Section F. Demographics> 
 
[DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS] 
 
Now we would like to ask some general questions about you. 
 
[PROMPT IF ANY F_1 ITEMS ARE SKIPPED: “Please respond to every question before 
continuing.”] 
 
[TEXT BOX: ALLOW NUMERICAL INPUT ONLY. RECORD VALUE ENTERED] 
 
[F_1_1] What is your age in years?  
  <Enter Number>  
 
[RADIO BUTTONS, CAN SELECT ONLY ONE OPTION PER QUESTION] 
 
[F_1_2] Are you Male or Female?  
  ! <1> Male. 
  ! <2> Female. 
 
 
[F_1_3] What is the highest level of education that you have completed?  
  ! <1> Less than high school. 
  ! <2> High school graduate or GED. 
  ! <3> Some college, but did not finish. 
  ! <4> Two-year college degree / A.A. or A.S.  
  ! <5> Four-year college degree / B.A. or B.S. 
  ! <6> Masters, doctorate or professional degree. 
 
 
[F_1_4] Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?  
  ! <1> Yes. 
  ! <2> No. 
  ! <3> Don’t know. 
 
 
[F_1_5] Which of the following would you say is your race? Please select the one option 
that best describes you. 
  ! <1> White. 
  ! <2> Black or African American. 
  ! <3> American Indian or Alaska Native. 
  ! <4> Asian or Paci!c Islander. 
  ! <5> Other. 
! ! !
!
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[F_1_6] Which of the following is the best estimate of your total household income from 
all sources, before taxes, in 2011?  
  ! <1> Less than $25,000. 
  ! <2> $25,000 - $49,999. 
  ! <3> $50,000 - $74,999. 
  ! <4> $75,000 - $99,999. 
  ! <5> $100,000 or more. 
! ! !
!
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<Debriefing>  
 
[IF XMEDTOP =1: DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS] 
 
This concludes our study. Thank you for participating!  
 
We’d like to explain our purpose in conducting this study.  We are interested in 
understanding how attitudes and behavior are a!ected by being exposed to new 
information about a topic.  
 
You were assigned to one of several conditions. Some participants received 
information about the SEQOME Project that was di!erent from the information you 
received. In particular, you viewed a fact sheet that was customized to better re!ect 
aspects of participating in the SEQOME Project that relate to possible bene!ts to 
society. Other participants received a fact sheet that was designed to better address 
beliefs related to personal bene!ts of participating. Yet another group of participants 
were not given a fact sheet at all.  
 
Please note that the SEQOME Project is not a real research project. Similarly, all 
information you viewed today was created solely for use in this study.  This was done 
to help achieve the aims of the study. We would like to emphasize that our 
descriptions of the SEQOME Project may not represent genomic research in general.  
 
This research is being conducted by Ryan S. Paquin, M.A. and Joseph N. Cappella, 
Ph.D. at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania.  If you 
have any questions about the research study itself, please contact Mr. Paquin at 
rpaquin@asc.upenn.edu.  
 
If you would like to learn more about genetics and genomic research, the National 
Human Genome Research Institute has many public resources available through its 
website: http://www.genome.gov/Education/FactSheets/ 
 
[END OF SURVEY IF XMEDTOP = 1] 
! ! !
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[IF XMEDTOP =2: DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS] 
 
This concludes our study. Thank you for participating!  
 
We’d like to explain our purpose in conducting this study.  We are interested in 
understanding how attitudes and behavior are a!ected by being exposed to new 
information about a topic.  
 
You were assigned to one of several conditions. Some participants received 
information about the SEQOME Project that was di!erent from the information you 
received. In particular, some participants viewed a fact sheet that was customized to 
better re!ect aspects of participating in the SEQOME Project that relate to possible 
bene!ts to society. You received a fact sheet that was designed to better address 
beliefs related to personal bene!ts of participating. Yet another group of participants 
were not given a fact sheet at all.  
 
Please note that the SEQOME Project is not a real research project. Similarly, all 
information you viewed today was created solely for use in this study.  This was done 
to help achieve the aims of the study. We would like to emphasize that our 
descriptions of the SEQOME Project may not represent genomic research in general.  
 
This research is being conducted by Ryan S. Paquin, M.A. and Joseph N. Cappella, 
Ph.D. at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania.  If you 
have any questions about the research study itself, please contact Mr. Paquin at 
rpaquin@asc.upenn.edu. 
 
If you would like to learn more about genetics and genomic research, the National 
Human Genome Research Institute has many public resources available through its 
website: http://www.genome.gov/Education/FactSheets/ 
 
[END OF SURVEY IF XMEDTOP = 2]
! ! !
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[IF XMEDTOP =3: DISPLAY ON SEPARATE SCREEN FROM PREVIOUS] 
 
This concludes our study. Thank you for participating!  
 
We’d like to explain our purpose in conducting this study.  We are interested in 
understanding how attitudes and behavior are a!ected by being exposed to new 
information about a topic.  
 
You were assigned to one of several conditions. Some participants received 
information about the SEQOME Project that was di!erent from the information you 
received. In particular, some participants viewed a fact sheet that was customized to 
better re!ect aspects of participating in the SEQOME Project that relate to possible 
bene!ts to society. Other participants received a fact sheet that was designed to 
better address beliefs related to personal bene!ts of participating. You were part of 
yet another group of participants that was not given a fact sheet at all.  
 
Please note that the SEQOME Project is not a real research project. Similarly, all 
information you viewed today was created solely for use in this study.  This was done 
to help achieve the aims of the study. We would like to emphasize that our 
descriptions of the SEQOME Project may not represent genomic research in general.  
 
This research is being conducted by Ryan S. Paquin, M.A. and Joseph N. Cappella, 
Ph.D. at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania.  If you 
have any questions about the research study itself, please contact Mr. Paquin at 
rpaquin@asc.upenn.edu. 
 
If you would like to learn more about genetics and genomic research, the National 
Human Genome Research Institute has many public resources available through its 
website: http://www.genome.gov/Education/FactSheets/ 
 
[END OF SURVEY IF XMEDTOP = 3] 
  
! ! !
!
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APPENDIX B:  
MESSAGE TOPIC MANIPULATION  
 
<Altruist-targeted Message> 
 
We would like you to be aware of the following information concerning the SEQOME Project. 
Please read the following fact sheet carefully. 
 
Top 5 Things You Should Know about Participating in the 
SEQOME Project 
 
• Some parts of participating in the SEQOME Project will be 
inconvenient.   In order to participate, you will need to come in for an 
initial visit at a regional assessment center.  During this visit, you will be 
asked to answer questions about your health and have some routine 
clinical tests done.  You may also be re-contacted over the course of many 
years to provide additional information.  
• Everyone who agrees to participate in the SEQOME Project must have 
a sample of blood drawn for long term storage and analysis.  People 
usually feel minor discomfort, pain and bruising where the needle enters 
for blood drawing.  
• Your participation in the SEQOME Project will contribute to medical 
research. By analyzing survey answers and DNA samples collected from 
participants, researchers may be able to work out why some people 
develop particular diseases while others do not. This should help us !nd 
new ways to prevent early death and disability from many di!erent 
diseases.  
• The information and samples you provide by participating will be 
used in many future studies to help advance science.  Also, by 
participating you will help contribute to knowledge.  The genetic 
material and data we collect from participants of the SEQOME Project will 
be put in scienti!c databases that are available to researchers around the 
world.  
• Your participation should help future generations by giving them a 
much better chance of living their lives free of diseases that disable 
and kill.  Even though, like donating blood, the SEQOME Project is not 
intended to directly help those who take part.  
 
! ! !
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<Instrumentalist-targeted Message> 
 
We would like you to be aware of the following information concerning the SEQOME Project. 
Please read the following fact sheet carefully. 
 
Top 5 Things You Should Know about Participating in the 
SEQOME Project 
 
• You should not expect to receive any information about your current 
health status as part of your participation in the SEQOME Project.  The 
SEQOME Project is a research study, not medical care.  We only intend to 
share information if it has urgent importance to your health.  However, 
you should know that this type of result will be found very rarely, and 
most people in this study will not have a result like this.  
• You will not be given any feedback concerning your personal genetic 
health risk as part of your participation in the SEQOME Project.  It will 
take a long time for the data from this project to be used to produce 
health-related information that we will know how to interpret accurately.  
The results of your genome sequencing will not be given to you or your 
doctors.  
• By taking part in the SEQOME Project, you will not be provided with 
information to help you make medical treatment decisions.  Also, you 
will not be given information to help you prevent disease as part of 
your participation in this project.  The genetic tests that will be done for 
this study are not a part of routine health care.   
• Taking part in the SEQOME Project is not expected to cause you to feel 
worried about your health.  Part of the decision not to return genetic 
sequencing results to participants of the SEQOME Project is to help 
minimize the risk of emotional and psychological harm.  
• It is very unlikely that you will learn something about your genes that 
you do not want to know as a result of taking part in the SEQOME 
Project.  This is because your sequencing results will not be returned to 
you.  
 
! ! !
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APPENDIX C:  
EVALUATION OF THE AUDIENCE-SEGMENTATION STRATEGY  
As proposed, the experiment was designed as a 3 (Message Topic: 
instrumentalist-targeted message, altruist-targeted message, and no-message control) ! 
2 (Audience Segment: altruists vs. instrumentalists) between-subjects factorial design.  
Audience Segment was to be an observed variable operationalized using the classification 
scheme defined in Study 1.  Seven items from the dimensional-salience list were 
especially important components of this rule.  The first three correspond to greater-good 
(GG) elicitation themes used as clustering variables in Study 1: (a) “Helping others in the 
future,” (b) “Contributing to medical research,” and (c) “Helping advance science.”  The 
other four are examples of personal-feedback (PF) elicitation themes: (a) “Receiving 
information about my current health,” (b) “Receiving information about my personal 
genetic risk for disease,” (c) “Learning information to help me prevent disease,” and (d) 
“Learning information to help me make treatment decisions.”  The proposed 
segmentation strategy was as follows: 
(i) If a respondent selects at least one GG theme and no PF themes, 
classify him as a member of the altruist audience segment. 
(ii) If a respondent selects at least one PF theme and no GG theme, 
classify her as a member of the instrumentalist audience segment. 
(iii) Respondents who do not select any GG or PF themes are to be 
classified as members of the neither segment.  
! ! !
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(iv) Classify respondents who select at least one item corresponding to 
a GG theme and at least one that corresponds to a PF theme as 
members of the mixed segment.36 
The proposed double-factorial design assumed that the rule for classifying 
respondents into audience segments established in Study 1 would generalize to Study 2.  
Audience Segment was meant to be a categorical proxy of belief salience.   Sorting 
observations into discrete and theoretically meaningful categories would increase the 
likelihood of detecting hypothesized interaction effects (McClelland & Judd, 1993).  
Moreover, it was important to maximize the number of respondents classified as 
altruists and instrumentalists.  Also important was achieving a balanced ratio of subjects 
in these two groups.  In applications of the generalized linear model (GLM)—including 
moderated multiple regression—statistical power to detect interaction effects with 
categorical moderating variables deteriorates as (a) total sample size decreases, and (b) 
the number of subjects in each subgroup of the moderator becomes more dissimilar 
(Aguinis & Gottfredson, 2010; Keppel & Wickens, 2004).  Thus, statistical power is 
partially dependent upon segment size and proportionality.  
Based on an a priori power analysis, it was estimated that a combined total of 
880 altruists and instrumentalists would be required to detect the small-to-medium 
effects (e.g., f2 = .014) expected in this study without exceeding a Type II error-rate of .20 
(i.e., power = .80).  Unfortunately, this basic condition was not met.  Generalizing from 
the results of Study 1, it was expected that approximately two-thirds of the respondents 
would be classified as members of either the altruist or instrumentalist audience 
segment.  Applying the proposed segmentation strategy to the Study 2 sample, only 530 
respondents (34%) were classified into these two segments.  Moreover, in Study 2, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
36 The last two segments were not examined in any depth in this dissertation.  
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altruists outnumbered instrumentalists by a ratio somewhat greater than 3:2.  In Study 1, 
the ratio of altruists to instrumentalists was very close to 1:1.  Following the proposed 
segmentation scheme, 21% (n = 332) were classified as altruists, 13% (n = 198) as 
instrumentalists, 4% (n = 70) were sorted into the neither segment, and 62% (n = 977) 
were in the mixed segment.  These segments were expected to comprise 36%, 33%, 20% 
and 11% of the full sample, respectively.  The proposed segmentation strategy produced 
groups that were too few in number and dissimilar in size to achieve sufficient power to 
test my hypotheses.  
In light of these results, I explored several alternative segmentation strategies.  In 
addition to partitioning the full sample into adequately apportioned groups, a good 
strategy would yield audience segments with two additional characteristics: (c) maximize 
the number of modally salient beliefs in each segment that match beliefs addressed in 
the corresponding message-topic condition (i.e., altruists : altruist-targeted :: 
instrumentalists : instrumentalist-targeted), and (d) maximize differences among the 
modally salient beliefs of altruists versus instrumentalists.  I explored several alternative 
strategies aimed at defining larger segments that would meet these criteria.  Table C.1 
summarizes the classification rules I explored and provides an overview of how well each 
strategy met the given aims.  Taking into consideration all four criteria for judging 
segmentation effectiveness, Strategy 9 appeared to be the best alternative.  However, 
with only 613 respondents classified as altruists and instrumentalists, this strategy still 
fell short of the target sample size. 
To assess differences among salient beliefs of audience segments identified using 
Strategy 9, I examined three characteristics.37  First, there should be differences between 
segments in which outcomes are classified as modally salient, using the rules established 
                                                                                                                                                                      
37 The same characteristics were used in Study 1 to validate the original clustering solution. 
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Table C.1 
 
Summary of Classi!cation Rules Used in an Exploratory Audience Segmentation Analysis 
 
   Criteria 
Strategy Segments Rule a b c d 
1a Altruists GGA  ! 1 & PFA = 0  – / – / 
 Instrumentalists GGA = 0 & PFA ! 1      
 Neither GGA = 0 & PFA = 0     
 Mixed GGA ! 1 & PFA ! 1     
       
2 Altruists (GGA ! 1 & PFA = 0) or (GGA > 1 & PFA = 1) + / – – 
 Instrumentalists (GGA = 0 & PFA ! 1) or (GGA = 1 & PFA > 1)     
 Neither GGA = 0 & PFA = 0     
 Mixed GGA > 1 & PFA > 1     
 One each GGA = 1 & PFA = 1     
       
3 Altruists (GGA ! 1 & PFA = 0)  / + – / 
 Instrumentalists (GGA = 0 & PFA ! 1) or (GGA = 1 & PFA > 1)     
 Neither GGA = 0 & PFA = 0     
 Mixed GGA > 1 & PFA ! 1     
 One each GGA = 1 & PFA = 1     
       
4 Altruists GGB ! 1 & PFB = 0 – – + + 
 Instrumentalists GGB = 0 & PFB ! 1     
 Neither GGB = 0 & PFB = 0     
 Mixed GGB > 0 & PFB > 0     
       
5 Altruists (GGB ! 1 & PFB = 0) or (GGB > 1 & PFB = 1) + – + – 
 Instrumentalists (GGB = 0 & PFB ! 1) or (GGB = 1 & PFB > 1)     
 Neither GGB = 0 & PFB = 0     
 Mixed GGB > 1 & PFB > 1     
 One each GGB = 1 & PFB = 1     
       
6 Altruists GGB ! 1 & PFB = 0 – + + / 
 Instrumentalists (GGB = 0 & PFB ! 1) or (GGB = 1 & PFB > 1)     
 Neither GGB = 0 & PFB = 0     
 Mixed GGB > 1 & PFB ! 1     
 One each GGB = 1 & PFB = 1     
(table continues on next page) 
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Table C.1 (continued) 
 
   Criteria 
Strategy Segments Rule a b c d 
7 Altruists GGC ! 1 & PFA = 0 – – / + 
 Instrumentalists GGC = 0 & PFA ! 1     
 Neither GGC = 0 & PFA = 0     
 Mixed GGC > 0 & PFA > 0     
       
8 Altruists (GGC ! 1 & PFA = 0) or (GGC > 1 & PFA = 1) + – / - 
 Instrumentalists (GGC = 0 & PFA ! 1) or (GGC = 1 & PFA > 1)     
 Neither GGC = 0 & PFA = 0     
 Mixed GGC > 1 & PFA > 1     
 One each GGC = 1 & PFA = 1     
       
9 Altruists GGC ! 1 & PFA = 0 / + / / 
 Instrumentalists (GGC = 0 & PFA ! 1) or (GGC = 1 & PFA > 1)     
 Neither GGC = 0 & PFA = 0     
 Mixed GGC > 1 & PFA ! 1     
 One each GGC = 1 & PFA = 1     
       
Note. a = Maximize the number of respondents classi!ed as altruists or instrumentalists; b= Achieve a more 
balanced ratio of altruists to instrumentalists; c = Maximize number of modally salient beliefs in each segment that 
match those addressed in the corresponding message-topic condition; d = Maximize the di!erentiation between 
the modally salient beliefs of respondents classi!ed as altruists compared to instrumentalists; + = Strategy does 
well on the criterion; / = Strategy is acceptable on the criteria; – = Strategy does poorly on the criterion; GGA = 
Number of selections from the dimensional-salience task corresponding to three items in the greater-good 
metatheme as de!ned in Study 1: “Helping others in the future,” “Contributing to medical research,” or “Helping 
advance science;” PFA = Number of selections from the dimensional-salience task related to four items in the 
personal-feedback metatheme as de!ned in Study 1: “Receiving information about my current health,” “Receiving 
information about my personal genetic risk for disease,” “Learning information to help me prevent disease,” or 
“Learning information to help me make treatment decisions;” GGB = Number of selections matching six beliefs 
addressed in the altruist-targeted message from Study 2 (i.e., All three items from the set GGA, plus “Contribute to 
knowledge,” “Feeling physical pain,” and “Doing something that is inconvenient;” PFB = Selections matching the six 
beliefs in the instrumentalist-targeted message (i.e.,  The four items from the PFA set, plus “Learning something that 
I do not want to know,” or “Feeling worried.” GGC = Selections that match the four most salient items from set GGB 
(i.e., “Helping others in the future,” “Contributing to medical research,” “Helping advance science, or “Contribute to 
knowledge.”) 
 
a Originally proposed strategy. 
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by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980).  Specifically, at least some of the beliefs addressed in the 
altruist-targeted message should be uniquely salient for respondents classified as 
altruists, and beliefs addressed by theinstrumentalist-targeted message should be 
uniquely salient for instrumentalists.  Second, there should be differences in how 
strongly these beliefs are held by members of the respective segments (Cronen & 
Conville, 1975; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  The belief strength of outcomes that are 
uniquely salient to altruists should be greater among altruists than instrumentalists, and 
vice versa.  Third, and most important, the magnitude of associations between uniquely 
salient behavioral beliefs and intention should differ by audience segment.  Correlation 
coefficients relating the altruist segment’s uniquely salient behavioral beliefs to intention 
should be greater among altruists; correlations between instrumentalist salient beliefs 
and intention should be greater among instrumentalists.  Failure to fulfill these 
characteristics calls into question the usefulness of the observed audience segments as 
proxies for belief salience.   
Strategy 9 aimed to increase differentiation between eight items that were 
addressed by either the altruist- or instrumentalist-targeted messages.  Descriptive 
comparisons of belief items nominated as salient by the altruist and instrumentalist 
segments are presented in Table C.2.  As planned, members of the altruist segment did 
not select any items corresponding to expectations to receive information (i) “about 
personal genetic risk for disease,” (ii) “about current health,” (iii) “to help prevent 
disease,” or (iv) “to help make treatment decisions.”  This occurred by definition, as a 
direct result of the classification rule used to define the altruist segment.  These same 
four beliefs were the most frequently selected items among instrumentalists, indicating 
qualitative differentiation.  The four most frequently selected items among altruists 
corresponded with expectations about (i) “helping others in the future,” (ii) “contributing  
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Table C.2 
 
Frequency of Behavioral Outcomes Selected by participants from the Dimensional-Salience Task by 
Strategy 9 Audience Segment 
 
Altruists  
(n = 345) 
Instrumentalists  
(n = 268)  
Belief item f % f % χ2 
Altruist-targeted message beliefs      
 Help others in the future. 258 74.8ab 34 11.6 255.64*** 
 Contribute to medical research. 227 65.8ab 55 18.7ab 142.76*** 
 Help advance science. 229 66.4ab 33 11.2 199.60*** 
 Contribute to knowledge. 227 65.8ab 26 8.8 215.28*** 
 Feel physical pain. 52 15.1 44 15.0 0.00 
 Do something that is inconvenient. 31 9.0 27 9.2 0.01 
Instrumentalist-targeted message beliefs      
 Receive information about my personal genetic risk for disease. 0 — 154 52.4
ab 238.10*** 
 Receive information about my current health. 0 — 117 58.2ab 273.98*** 
 Learn information to help me prevent disease. 0 — 161 54.8ab 252.56*** 
 Learn information to help me make treatment decisions. 0 — 142 48.3
ab 214.24*** 
 Feel worried. 46 13.3 45 15.3 0.51 
 Learn something that I do not want to know. 42 12.2 39 13.3 0.17 
Nonmessage beliefs      
 Receive information about my personal genetic code. 98 28.4
ab 114 38.8ab 7.70 
 Receive information that may be helpful to my relatives. 139 40.3
ab 102 34.7ab 2.12 
 Learn more about my family history of disease. 82 23.8ab 92 31.3ab 4.54 
 Put my privacy at risk.  68 19.7b 60 20.4ab 0.05 
 Receive compensation other than money. 65 18.8b 46 15.6a 1.13 
 Lose control over how my DNA samples are used. 72 20.9ab 56 19.0ab 0.33 
 Learn something that I cannot do anything about. 41 11.9 39 13.3 0.28 
 Have to make time in my busy schedule. 48 13.9 30 10.2 2.04 
Note. N = 639. f = Frequency count of the number of times each belief item was selected. % = Percentage of 
respondents who selected the item.  Each participant was required to select !ve items from a list of twenty.   
*** p < .001 (Bonferroni-adjusted). 
 
a Modal salient belief for audience segment based on “75% of selected items” decision rule. 
b Modal salient belief for audience segment based on “Top 10 valid elicitation responses” decision rule. 
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to medical research,” (iii) “advancing science,” and (iv) “contributing to knowledge.”  
With the exception of “contribute to medical research,” these items were not selected 
frequently enough by instrumentalists to meet the “75%” and “top 10” decision rules 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).  Qualitatively, three of the beliefs addressed in the altruist-
targeted message were differentially salient for the altruist segment, and four of the 
beliefs addressed in the instrumentalist-targeted message were differentially salient for 
the instrumentalists.  
Chi-square tests of independence were also used to determine whether different 
proportions of altruists and instrumentalists nominated each belief as salient.  To protect 
against inflated experiment-wise Type I error, a more conservative Bonferroni-adjusted 
critical value for detecting significant differences was used.  By this criterion, all eight 
beliefs were differentially salient for altruists and instrumentalists.  All other outcomes 
were nominated with statistically equivalent frequency by altruists and instrumentalists. 
 Table C.3 shows between-segment means and standard deviations of belief 
strength items related to outcomes listed in the dimensional-salience task.  Also 
presented are zero-order correlations of these behavioral beliefs (i.e., belief-evaluation 
products) with intention to participate in the SEQOME Project.  Because the altruist-
targeted and instrumentalist-targeted messages were expected to influence these 
statistics, the analysis was restricted to the no-message control group.  There were 
between-segment differences in belief strength for the four outcomes nominated most 
frequently by altruists.  Altruists believed significantly more strongly than 
instrumentalists that participating would contribute to science, medical research, 
knowledge, and help others.   Instrumentalists had nominally stronger beliefs about 
receiving genetic risk information and information about current health, though these 
differences were not significant. Beliefs about receiving information to help with medical  
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Table C.3 
Mean Belief Strength and Correlation with Intention of Belief Items by Strategy 9 Audience Segment  
 
 
Altruists 
(n = 113) 
Instrumentalists 
(n = 93) 
Belief item M (SD) r M (SD) r 
 
My participation in the SEQOME Project will…     
Alturist-targeted message beliefs     
…Help others in the future 6.02 (1.10) a .50 5.43 (1.36) .34 
…Help advance science. 6.12 (1.03) a .53 5.39 (1.41) .47 
…Contribute to medical research. 6.18 (1.07) a .62c 5.42 (1.42) .43 
…Contribute to knowledge. 6.03 (1.15) a .57c 5.48 (1.33) .37 
…Cause me to feel physical pain. 3.27 (1.66) .34 3.60 (1.56) .20b 
…Be an inconvenience to me. 3.31 (1.59) .36c 3.70 (1.44) .11b 
Instrumentalist-targeted message beliefs      
…Give me information about my personal genetic health risk. 5.43 (1.39) .36 5.67 (1.16) .36 
…Teach me something new about my current health.  5.57 (1.34) .45 5.65 (1.24) .39 
…give me information to help me make medical treatment decisions.  5.47 (1.30) .53 5.48 (1.40) .37 
…Provide me with information to help me prevent disease.  5.45 (1.30) .56c 5.46 (1.35) .28 
…Tell me something about my genes that I do not want to know. 4.12 (1.61) .29 4.33 (1.59) .24 
…Make me feel worried about my health.  3.70 (1.65) .16b 3.92 (1.72) .13b 
Other beliefs     
…Take up a lot of my time. 3.70 (1.59) .40 3.91 (1.38) .22 
…Put the privacy of my genetic information at risk 
 
3.81 (1.67) .14b 4.18 (1.58) .25 
…Make me a part of research that goes against my personal values.  3.05 (1.88) .28 3.78a (1.59) .19b 
 
Note. Means and standard deviations relate to the belief strength items corresponding to each outcome.  
Correlation coe!cients reported are measures of the association between each behavioral belief (i.e., belief-
evaluation products) with intention to participate in the SEQOME Project.   
 
a    Based on an independent samples t-test, the mean belief strength of this item for this audience segment is 
signi!cantly greater than in the other segment, p < .05. 
b    Correlation coe!cient within this audience segment is not signi!cantly di"erent from zero at p < .05.  
c    Correlation coe!cient is signi"cantly greater in this audience segment than the other, p < .05; based on a one-
tailed test of the di!erence between two correlation coe"cients in two independent samples, using Fisher’s r to z 
transformation. 
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treatment decisions and disease prevention were almost identical in both audience 
segments. 
 Significant differences between correlation coefficients found in the altruist and 
instrumentalist segments were found, based on one-tailed tests using Fisher’s r to z 
transformation.  Beliefs about contributing to medical research and knowledge were 
more strongly associated with intentions to participate among altruists than among 
instrumentalists.  The correlation coefficient for the belief that participating would be 
inconvenient was also greater in the altruist segment.  The correlation coefficients for the 
other beliefs addressed in the altruist-targeted message are also nominally greater in the 
altruist segment, but not significantly so.  In all, beliefs that were expected to be more 
salient to the altruists appear to have been so.  However, correlation coefficients for most 
of the beliefs that were supposed to be more salient to the instrumentalists were 
nominally smaller in the instrumentalist segment.  In fact, the correlation coefficient for 
the belief about learning information to prevent disease was significantly smaller among 
instrumentalists.   In other words, the qualitative evidence that instrumentalist-targeted 
beliefs were more salient to instrumentalists was not corroborated by tests for 
differences in mean belief strength and belief–intention correlations.  When considered 
in combination with the low number of respondents classified as altruists and 
instrumentalists, even the best-case audience segmentation strategy (i.e., Strategy 9) was 
inadequate for the purposes of Study 2.
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